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PREFACE 
It gives us great pleasure to present, on behalf of the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the 
UNIDROIT Legislative Guide on Intermediated Securities, which the 
UNIDROIT Governing Council adopted at its 96th session (Rome, 10-
12 May 2017). 
The Guide is the third instrument resulting from UNIDROIT’s work 
in the area of capital markets law, which has sought to promote 
legal certainty and sustainable growth in this very significant area 
of economic activity. The Guide is intended to complement and 
promote the first instrument – the UNIDROIT Convention on 
Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, which was adopted 
at the final session of the diplomatic Conference to adopt a 
Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated 
Securities (Geneva, 5-9 October 2009) – by summarising the 
Convention’s key principles and rules and by offering guidance on 
choices to be made and matters to be addressed or clarified in 
establishing an intermediated securities holding system or 
evaluating an existing one. The Guide also complements and 
promotes the second instrument – the UNIDROIT Principles on the 
Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions, which were adopted by 
the UNIDROIT Governing Council at its 92nd session (Rome, 8-10 
May 2013) – by offering guidance consistent with those Principles 
and incorporating references to them. 
The Guide is the result of extensive research, deliberations and 
teamwork. In addition to adopting the Geneva Securities 
Convention, the diplomatic Conference established a Committee on 
Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-Up and Implementation to assist 
with the Convention’s promotion and implementation. That 
Committee – made up of governmental experts and representatives, 
observers and interested stakeholders – provided guidance on the 
development of the Guide at its first three meetings (Rome, 6-8 
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September 2010; Rio de Janeiro, 27-28 March 2012; and Istanbul, 
11-13 November 2013). Using the Committee’s guidance, an 
informal group of renowned experts prepared and reviewed, with 
the assistance of the UNIDROIT Secretariat, a draft of the Guide over 
the course of three meetings at UNIDROIT’s seat in Rome (23-24 
October 2015; 16-17 May 2016; and 12-13 December 2016), as 
well as via videoconferences. The draft Guide was twice circulated 
broadly for review and comments by States, international 
organisations and stakeholders: first, in advance of the informal 
experts group’s third meeting for consideration at that meeting; 
and second, in advance of the Committee’s fourth meeting. At the 
latter meeting (Beijing, 29-30 March 2017), the Committee 
considered in detail the draft Guide and the comments received, 
agreeing upon certain amendments and additions and ultimately 
recommending that the Guide, as revised, be submitted to the 
UNIDROIT Governing Council for review and adoption at its 96th 
session (Rome, 10-12 May 2017). 
UNIDROIT would like to express its deepest gratitude to the members 
of the informal experts group and to the members, observers and 
representatives of the Committee, without whom the successful 
preparation of the Guide would not have been possible. Particular 
mention is deserved by Mr Hideki Kanda (Member, UNIDROIT 
Governing Council), who provided tremendous leadership and 
expertise in chairing the informal experts group, and by Ms Niu 
Wenjie (People’s Republic of China) and Mr Alexandre Pinheiro 
dos Santos (Brazil), who kindly served as co-chairs of the 
Committee and very ably led the Committee’s work. 
Special thanks go to the translation team at the China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Corporation Ltd., including Ms Niu, Mr 
Zhang Yunhui, Ms Jiang Lan, Ms Wu Jing, Ms Wei Qing, Ms Li 
Weiye and Ms Li Nan, for preparing the Chinese version of the 
Guide; Mr Jesús García Aparicio (Cuatrecasas, Madrid) for 
preparing the forthcoming Spanish version of the Guide in co-
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operation with Mr Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez (Faculty of 
Law, Universidad Autónoma of Madrid); and Mr Solomon Ngoladi 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, Nigeria) and Mr Matteo 
Solinas (Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington) for 
their contributions to the Guide during their fellowship and 
consultancy with UNIDROIT respectively. 
Special thanks also go to the members of the Secretariat, in 
particular Mr Neale Bergman for providing outstanding assistance 
by ensuring consistency in style, offering crucial input on substance 
to the informal experts group and writing some portions of the 
Guide; Ms Frédérique Mestre for her thorough and extensive work 
in preparing the French version of the Guide in co-operation with 
Mr Luc Thévenoz (Faculty of Law, University of Geneva); and Ms 
Isabelle Dubois for her excellent secretarial support. 
Last but by no means least, UNIDROIT would like to express its 
sincere appreciation to the generous hosts of the Committee’s 
meetings, in particular the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Capital Markets Board of Turkey, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Corporation Ltd. 
 
José Angelo Estrella Faria Alberto Mazzoni 
Secretary-General President 
UNIDROIT UNIDROIT 
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GLOSSARY 
The Glossary contains brief definitions or descriptions for key 
terms in the Guide. It includes the definitions or descriptions 
provided by the Geneva Securities Convention and the Official 
Commentary and, for other terms, relies to the extent possible on 
the definitions provided by CPMI’s glossary of terms used in 
payments and settlements systems.  
Account agreement  
The agreement between the account holder and the relevant 
intermediary governing the securities account. See paragraph 108.  
Account holder  
A person in whose name an intermediary maintains a securities 
account, whether that person is acting for its own account or for 
others (including in the capacity of intermediary). See 
paragraph  70.  
Applicable law  
The law that is applicable by virtue of the private international law 
rules of the forum. The applicable law may, or may not, be the law 
of a Contracting State to the Geneva Securities Convention (i.e. the 
non-Convention law). See paragraph 75. 
Book entry 
An electronic recording of securities or other financial assets. The 
transfer of book-entry securities and other financial assets does not 
involve the physical movement of paper documents or certificates. 
See paragraph 16. 
Book-entry system 
A mechanism that enables market participants to transfer assets (for 
example, securities) without the physical movement of paper 
documents or certificates. See paragraph 16. 
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Central counterparty (CCP) 
An entity which operates as the buyer for every seller and as the 
seller for every buyer so that the parties only bear the credit risk of 
the CCP. See paragraph 20.   
Central securities depository (CSD) 
An entity that provides the initial recording of securities in a book-
entry system or that provides and maintains the securities accounts 
at the top tier of the intermediated holding chain. The entity may 
provide additional services such as clearing, settlement and 
processing corporate actions. It plays an important role in helping 
to ensure the integrity of securities issues. See paragraph 16.  
Claw back  
A statutory provision entitling an insolvency administrator to 
recover benefits, funds or other assets which have been unduly 
transferred to third parties before filing for insolvency. Claw back 
can also refer to a contractual provision regarding the benefits, 
funds or other assets which have been given out but need to be 
returned due to certain special circumstances which were 
predefined in the contract. See paragraph 274.  
Clearing  
The process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, 
confirming transactions prior to settlement, potentially including 
the netting of transactions and the establishment of final positions 
for settlement. Sometimes this term is also used (imprecisely) to 
cover settlement. See paragraph 21. 
Close-out netting provision 
A provision of a collateral agreement, or of a set of connected 
agreements of which a collateral agreement forms part, under 
which, on the occurrence of an enforcement event, either or both of 
the following shall occur, or may at the election of the collateral 
taker occur, whether through the operation of netting or set-off or 
otherwise: (a) the respective obligations of the parties are 
accelerated so as to be immediately due and expressed as an 
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obligation to pay an amount representing their estimated current 
value or are terminated and replaced by an obligation to pay such 
an amount; (b) an account is taken of what is due from each party 
to the other in relation to such obligations, and a net sum equal to 
the balance of the account is payable by the party from whom the 
larger amount is due to the other party. See paragraphs 272 and 289. 
Control agreement  
An agreement in relation to intermediated securities between an 
account holder, the relevant intermediary and another person or, if 
so provided by the non-Convention law, between an account holder 
and the relevant intermediary or between an account holder and 
another person of which the relevant intermediary receives notice, 
which includes either or both of the following provisions: (a) that 
the relevant intermediary is not permitted to comply with any 
instructions given by the account holder in relation to the 
intermediated securities to which the agreement relates without the 
consent of that other person; or (b) that the relevant intermediary is 
obliged to comply with any instructions given by that other person 
in relation to the intermediated securities to which the agreement 
relates in such circumstances and as to such matters as may be 
provided by the agreement, without any further consent of the 
account holder. See paragraph 141.   
Corporate actions  
Events called or initiated by an issuer of securities concerning the 
securities and the holders of the securities. See rights attached to 
the securities and paragraph 110. 
Corporate law 
The area of law dealing with the formation and operation of a 
company, which in particular includes the rights of shareholders. 
See paragraph  72.  
Dematerialisation 
The issuance (or re-issuance) of securities which are not 
represented by a physical certificate. The issue is usually 
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documented by a record maintained by the issuer or a CSD or some 
other intermediary. The securities issued are credited to securities 
accounts and held and transferred by way of book entries in 
securities accounts. See paragraph 17. 
Designating entry  
An entry in a securities account made in favour of a person 
(including the relevant intermediary) other than the account holder 
in relation to intermediated securities, which, under the account 
agreement, a control agreement, the uniform rules of a SSS or the 
non-Convention law, has either or both of the following effects: (a) 
that the relevant intermediary is not permitted to comply with any 
instructions given by the account holder in relation to the 
intermediated securities as to which the entry is made without the 
consent of that person; or (b) that the relevant intermediary is 
obliged to comply with any instructions given by that person in 
relation to the intermediated securities as to which the entry is made 
in such circumstances and as to such matters as may be provided 
by the account agreement, a control agreement or the uniform rules 
of a SSS, without any further consent of the account holder. See 
paragraph 141.  
Functional approach  
An approach using language that is as neutral as possible and which 
formulates rules by reference to their results. For example, because 
confusion can easily arise from the varying traditions and 
conceptual frameworks of different systems of law, under the 
functional approach adopted by the drafters of the Geneva 
Securities Convention, terms such as “property” and “proprietary 
interests” were avoided, and instead more generic language such as 
“effects against third parties” was used. See paragraph 67.  
Global or jumbo certificate  
In the context of the immobilisation of securities, a certificate held 
in a book-entry system that represents all or part of the securities of 
a particular issue. See paragraph 16. 
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Immobilisation 
The act of durably concentrating the holding of securities 
certificates with a depository to allow the crediting of an equal 
amount of securities to securities accounts and the transferability of 
such securities by way of book entry. See paragraph 16. 
Intermediary  
A person (including a CSD) who in the course of a business or other 
regular activity maintains securities accounts for others or both for 
others and for its own account and is acting in that capacity. See 
paragraph 70.  
Intermediated holding chain  
A term used to describe the relationship and interaction among the 
(possibly many) tiers of participants in an intermediated securities 
holding system. See paragraph 15.  
Intermediated securities  
Securities credited to a securities account or rights or interests in 
securities resulting from the credit of securities to a securities 
account. See paragraph 15.  
Investor  
A person or entity, such as individuals, companies, pension funds 
and collective investment funds, who acquire securities to make a 
profit or gain an advantage. See paragraph 22.  
Issuer  
A government or entity such as a company which issues securities. 
See paragraph 22.  
Law outside the Convention 
Law which may include non-Convention law, applicable law, 
insolvency rules or uniform rules of the SCSs and SSSs. See 
paragraph 75 and Annexes 1-4.  
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Negative control  
A type of control in which the relevant intermediary is not 
permitted to comply with any instructions given by the account 
holder in relation to intermediated securities for which a 
designating entry or control agreement has been made without the 
consent of the person in whose favour such entry or agreement was 
made. See paragraph 146.  
Netting arrangements 
An arrangement by which debits and credits in respect of securities 
of the same description may be effected on a net basis. See 
paragraph 136.  
“No credit without debit” rule 
A rule whereby any credit to a securities account must have a 
corresponding debit to another securities account. See paragraph 
130 et seq.  
Non-Convention law 
The law in force in the Contracting State referred to in Article 2 of 
the Geneva Securities Convention other than the provisions of that 
Convention. See paragraph 75 and Annex 1.  
Omnibus account  
An account of a relevant intermediary with its own (next-tier) 
intermediary in which securities held for more than one customer 
of the relevant intermediary are commingled. See paragraphs 51 
and 213. This term may also refer to such an account in which 
securities held for customers of the relevant intermediary are 
commingled with securities the relevant intermediary holds for its 
own account. 
Positive control  
A type of control in which the relevant intermediary is obliged to 
comply with any instructions given by the person in whose favour 
a designating entry or control agreement had been made in relation 
to intermediated securities in such circumstances and for such 
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matters as may be provided by the account agreement, a control 
agreement or the uniform rules of a SSS, without any further 
consent of the account holder. See paragraph 146.  
Priority  
Ranking among competing interests with respect to the same 
intermediated securities. See paragraph 182.  
Private law  
The area of law which regulates the relationships between 
individuals and private entities (e.g. contract law, tort law, etc.). See 
paragraph 75. 
Relevant intermediary  
The intermediary that, in relation to a securities account, maintains 
that securities account for the account holder. See paragraph 43.  
Rights attached to the securities  
Rights which accrue to a holder of securities by virtue of holding 
the securities, such as dividends, other distributions, and voting 
rights, as well as the right to receive information necessary for 
account holders to exercise those other rights. See paragraph 24. 
Securities account  
An account maintained by an intermediary to which securities may 
be credited or debited. See paragraphs 15 and 70.  
Securities clearing system (SCS) 
A system that clears, but does not settle, securities transactions 
through a CCP or otherwise and is operated by a central bank or 
central banks or is subject to regulation, supervision or oversight by 
a governmental or public authority in relation to its rules. To qualify 
as a SCS under the Geneva Securities Convention, it must also be 
identified as such in a declaration made by the Contracting State 
the law of which governs the system on the ground of the reduction 
of risk to the stability of the financial system. See paragraph 70.  
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Securities settlement system (SSS) 
A system that settles, or clears and settles, securities transactions 
and is operated by a central bank or central banks or is subject to 
regulation, supervision or oversight by a governmental or public 
authority in relation to its rules. To qualify as a SSS under the 
Geneva Securities Convention, it must also be identified as such in 
a declaration made by the Contracting State the law of which 
governs the system on the ground of the reduction of risk to the 
stability of the financial system. See paragraph 70.  
Security interest 
A limited interest in assets (such as a lien, pledge, charge, or title 
transfer) which secures an obligation. See paragraph 19.  
Segregated account 
An account structure in which a specific intermediary holds the 
securities belonging to one or more account holders in an account 
with its own (relevant) intermediary that is distinct (segregated) 
from the securities its holds for itself or for other account holders. 
See paragraph 213. 
Settlement  
A process which discharges the obligations arising out of the 
agreement of the parties to transfer securities. Securities settlement 
may represent the conclusion and fulfilment of a stock exchange 
transaction between two or more parties (i.e. a trading object is 
exchanged for a cash counter value). Resulting obligations can be 
redeemed either in central bank or book money. Settlement is 
normally preceded by clearing. See paragraph 21. 
Transfer 
The acquisition and disposition of intermediated securities and any 
limited interests (e.g. security interests) therein. See paragraph 123 
et seq. 
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Transparent systems  
Systems in which an investor’s particular holdings are identified 
by, or known to, the CSD primarily because the role of maintaining 
a securities account is shared between the CSD (which is the 
relevant intermediary for the purpose of the Geneva Securities 
Convention and the Guide) and other persons often called account 
operators, such as investment firms, securities dealers, etc. See 
paragraph 51.  
Upper-tier attachment  
An attachment of intermediated securities at any level in the chain 
above its debtor’s immediate intermediary, which is generally 
prohibited in the Geneva Securities Convention. See paragraph 199.  
Usufruct  
A limited and temporary proprietary interest in intermediated 
securities which the owner of those securities confers on a person 
and which entitles that person to derive income or benefit from that 
property. See paragraph 94. 
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LIST OF LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES 
Legislative    Principle 1 (Rights    of    account    holders):    The 
Convention provides any account holder with a core set of rights 
resulting from the credit of securities to a securities account. The 
law should establish additional rights consistent with how it 
characterises the legal position of account holders. It may 
distinguish between the rights enjoyed by an investor (including an 
intermediary acting for its own account) and those accruing to an 
intermediary acting in its capacity of intermediary. 
Legislative Principle 2 (Measures to enable the exercise of rights 
of account holders): The Convention provides one general and four 
specific obligations of intermediaries to their account holders. The 
law should establish specific contents for these duties and, if 
necessary, expand them in a manner consistent with its own 
characterisation of an account holder’s legal position. The law 
should also specify the manner in which an intermediary may 
comply with its obligations and determine the conditions under 
which an intermediary becomes liable. In transparent systems, 
where intermediary functions are shared between the CSD and 
account operators, the law should clearly allocate the respective 
responsibilities, and the Contracting State must make a declaration 
in this respect. 
Legislative   Principle 3   (Liability   of   intermediaries): The 
Convention does not specify the liability of intermediaries. The law 
should clearly establish the conditions and the extent of such 
liability, and whether it may be exempted by way of contractual 
provisions. 
Legislative Principle 4 (Acquisition and disposition of 
intermediated securities): The Convention provides that 
intermediated securities or any limited interests therein may be 
transferred by debits and credits. The law also may adopt any one 
or more of the other methods specified by the Convention. 
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Legislative Principle 5 (Unauthorised dispositions and invalidity, 
reversal and conditions): The Convention provides that an 
intermediary may only dispose of intermediated securities with the 
authorisation of the person(s) affected by the disposition. The law 
may provide for other cases of authorised dispositions, and it should 
establish the consequences of unauthorised dispositions. The law 
should also determine whether and in what circumstances a book 
entry is invalid, reversible, or conditional, and the consequences 
thereof. 
Legislative Principle 6 (Protection of an innocent acquirer): The 
Convention provides that an innocent acquirer who acquires for 
value is protected against adverse claims. This protection covers 
instances in which (a) another person has an interest in 
intermediated securities which is violated by the acquisition, and 
(b) the acquisition could be affected by an earlier defective entry. 
The law may extend the scope of this protection. 
Legislative Principle 7 (Priorities): The Convention provides clear 
priority rules that apply among competing claimants to the same 
intermediated securities. The law may supplement and adjust these 
priority rules. The law should address priority contests that are not 
resolved by the Convention. 
Legislative Principle 8 (Prohibition of upper-tier attachment): The 
Convention, with limited exceptions, prohibits any attachment of 
intermediated securities of an account holder against, or so as to 
affect (a) a securities account of any person other than that account 
holder, (b) the issuer of any securities credited to a securities account 
of that account holder, or (c) a person other than the account holder 
and the relevant intermediary. 
Legislative Principle 9 (Prevention of shortfalls and allocation of 
securities): The Convention requires intermediaries to prevent 
shortfalls, notably by holding or having available sufficient 
securities  to  cover  credits  to  securities  accounts  that  these  
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intermediaries maintain. The law should regulate the method, 
manner, and time frame for compliance. 
The Convention also requires intermediaries to allocate securities 
to account holders’ rights. The law may establish a specific form of 
segregation as a method of allocation. 
Legislative Principle 10 (Securities clearing and settlement 
systems): The Convention recognises the systemic importance of 
securities clearing or settlement systems, and in some instances 
allows derogations to the rules of the Convention to the extent 
permitted by the law applicable to the system. The law should only 
allow for derogations to the Convention rules where such 
derogations are necessary to ensure the integrity of the local 
securities clearing or settlement systems. 
The law should clearly determine when an instruction or a 
transaction within a securities clearing or settlement system 
becomes irrevocable and final, notwithstanding the insolvency of 
the operator of the system or one of its participants. 
Legislative Principle 11 (Issuers): The Convention generally does 
not deal with the relationships between account holders and issuers. 
The law should clearly define the persons entitled to exercise the 
rights attached to the securities vis-à-vis the issuer and the 
conditions for such exercise. The law should facilitate the exercise 
of those rights by the ultimate account holder, in particular, by 
allowing intermediaries who act on behalf of account holders to 
exercise voting rights or other rights in different ways, and should 
recognise holding through representatives other than intermediaries 
(i.e. nominees). 
In the insolvency proceeding of an issuer, the Convention provides 
that an account holder is not precluded from exercising a right of 
set-off merely because it holds securities through intermediaries. 
Legislative Principle 12 (Insolvency protection): The Convention 
establishes important insolvency proceeding-related rules on the 
interests made effective against third-parties and provides loss- 
sharing rules in case of a shortfall of account holder securities. 
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However, the law should address many other important and 
relevant features of insolvency and regulatory law that the 
Convention leaves to it. 
Legislative Principle 13 (Special provisions in relation to 
collateral transactions): The law should establish clear and sound 
rules in relation to collateral transactions involving intermediated 
securities. The Convention provides optional rules in relation to 
such transactions, whether by way of security collateral agreement 
or title transfer collateral agreement. Other international 
instruments and documents, reflecting lessons of the financial 
crisis, provide further guidance on regulatory, private and 
insolvency law issues involved. 
Legislative Principle 14 (Conflict of laws aspects): As the 
Convention does not contain conflict of laws rules, the law should 
establish clear and sound conflict of laws rules in relation to 
intermediated securities. 
Legislative Principle 15 (Other instruments and regulations and 
implementation): Lawmakers should consider the various 
instruments and guidance that is available in order to develop and 
implement an intermediated securities holding system which is 
tailored to their legal and economic context and consistent with the 
principles and rules contained in the Guide. 
1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 The UNIDROIT Legislative Guide on Intermediated 
Securities (the Guide) addresses important matters to be considered 
in the creation of an intermediated securities holding system or the 
evaluation of an existing system. The Guide summarises the key 
principles and rules from the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive 
Rules for Intermediated Securities (the Geneva Securities 
Convention or the Convention) and offers recommendations and 
guidance on those principles and rules as well as related matters not 
addressed in the Convention.  
 As the Convention’s drafters adopted a core and functional 
harmonisation approach, the Convention provides harmonised 
rules regarding certain intermediated securities issues, but also 
leaves various issues to be defined and determined by other rules 
of law in force in a Contracting State. The Guide complements the 
Convention by addressing these issues and, like the Convention, 
seeks to improve the legal framework for holding and transfer of 
intermediated securities, in order to enhance the internal soundness 
of domestic financial markets and their cross-border compatibility 
and, as such, to promote sustainable capital formation. In particular, 
the Guide explains what is and what is not covered by the 
Convention and provides guidance for States to consider in creating 
an intermediated securities holding system or evaluating an existing 
one. The Guide thus makes clear that the Convention is capable of 
accommodating different domestic holding systems and rendering 
their interactions significantly less risky and more predictable.  
 The Guide further seeks to promote the creation of 
comprehensive and coherent sets of legal rules for intermediated 
securities in two ways. First, in complementing the Convention, it 
is hoped that the Guide will promote its adoption and 
implementation. Second, in summarising the Convention’s key 
principles and rules, it is hoped that, even where the Convention is 
 
2 GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES 
 
not adopted, such principles and rules could be chosen and 
implemented in those systems. Either way, the end result would be 
enhanced legal certainty and economic efficiency with respect to 
the holding and transfer of intermediated securities, in both 
domestic and cross-border situations.  
 The Guide is structured in nine Parts. Part I provides an 
overview on securities, describing their origins and development 
and identifying five general models of intermediated securities 
holding systems. Part II describes in brief the Geneva Securities 
Convention, including its purpose to reduce legal uncertainty and 
risk, its core and functional harmonisation approach, and the 
important role of law outside the Convention. Parts III-VII identify 
legislative principles, summarise key principles and rules regarding 
holding and transfer of intermediated securities, and explain their 
interaction with law outside the Convention. These Parts include 
coverage of the rights of account holders and the duties and 
liabilities of intermediaries (Part III), the transfer of intermediated 
securities (Part IV), the integrity of the intermediated holding 
system (Part V), insolvency protection (Part VI), and special 
provisions in relation to collateral transactions (Part VII). Lastly, 
Parts VIII-IX also identify legislative principles and provide 
overviews on conflict of laws aspects (Part VIII) and on other 
instruments and regulations and the implementation of the 
Convention or its principles and rules in a domestic legal 
framework (Part IX). In addition, model examples of legislative or 
regulatory texts or related descriptions, as well as bibliographic 
references, are included on UNIDROIT’s webpage for the Guide, 
which is available at: http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-
markets/legislative-guide. 
 Lastly, it must be noted at the outset that the Guide is not 
intended to assist judges, arbitrators or practitioners in interpreting 
the Convention’s principles and rules or understanding its 
implications. The Official Commentary on the UNIDROIT 
Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (the 
“Official Commentary”) provides such comprehensive guidance 
and the Guide, accordingly, draws from it extensively. 
3 
PART I - OVERVIEW ON SECURITIES 
 This Part provides an overview on securities. First, Part I.A 
describes the basics of securities and securities holding. Second, 
Part I.B identifies and briefly discusses five general models of 
intermediated securities holding systems.  
A. Basics of securities and securities holding 
 Governments and companies need money to finance their 
activities, and they often raise money from the public. For that 
purpose, they may issue bonds, which are bought and sold by 
investors in capital markets. The investors commit to lend money, 
known as the principal, to the issuers and, in exchange, the issuers 
commit to pay interest and repay the principal amount of the bond 
when it matures.  
 Companies, in addition, may issue shares, which are also 
bought and sold by investors in capital markets. Investors who 
purchase and hold shares commit to provide the money to the 
issuers and, in exchange, the issuers commit to pay the investors 
dividends (e.g. a portion of a company’s profit) and to grant them 
particular participatory rights in the company, such as voting rights 
in shareholder meetings.   
 Bonds and shares, as well as other financial instruments or 
assets, are generally known as securities, although the definition 
varies from system to system. There are thus many different types 
of securities, including bonds and other debt instruments traded in 
the capital markets; shares and other equity instruments, whether or 
not they are traded on an exchange; and transferable units – other 
than shares – in collective investment schemes.  
 Securities holding, which may be non-intermediated or 
intermediated, is both a mainstay of the international financial 
system and a major component of the world’s economy. For 
instance, BIS estimated in December 2016 that the total outstanding 
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amount of global debt securities was USD 102.3 trillion, of which 
USD 80.6 trillion was from domestic debt securities and USD 21.7 
trillion was from international debt securities. See BIS Quarterly 
Review (December 2016), Graph C.1 and related statistics. 
1. Non-intermediated securities 
 Securities were traditionally issued in the form of physical 
certificates or by recordation in the issuer’s register, or both. Non-
intermediated securities generally can be unregistered or registered 
and be certificated or uncertificated.  
 Unregistered non-intermediated securities are those where 
the holder of the securities, usually referred to as the bearer, is not 
known to the issuer, but holds physical certificates. In this kind of 
holding, ownership of the securities generally vests in the holder, 
who may sell them by delivery of the physical certificates to a buyer 
in exchange for the payment of an agreed price and, where 
necessary, an agreement to transfer ownership to the buyer.  
 Registered non-intermediated securities are those where the 
holder of the securities is known to the issuer, which records 
ownership of the securities in the name of the holder in its register. 
The issuer’s recordation of securities ownership enables it to send, 
for example, dividend payments or voting information directly to 
the holder of the securities.  
 Registered non-intermediated securities can be either 
certificated or uncertificated. If certificated, the issuer, in addition 
to recordation of the holder’s ownership of the securities in its 
register, issues a securities certificate to evidence such ownership. 
Delivery of the securities certificate to a buyer with a contractual 
agreement to transfer generally transfers ownership to the buyer. 
Usually the securities would be endorsed to the buyer, with the 
issuer to record such transfer from the seller to the buyer in its 
register, or the securities may be endorsed in blank. If 
uncertificated, no securities certificates are issued and the holder of  
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such securities can sell them by contractual agreement with a buyer, 
in which case the issuer would record that transfer from the seller 
to the buyer in its register. 
2. Intermediated securities 
 Due to technological advances, it is no longer necessary to 
hold securities in physical paper form or to register ownership or 
transfers directly in an issuer’s paper register. Holding and transfer 
of securities are now generally registered as electronic book-entries 
in securities accounts maintained by intermediaries, such as banks 
and other financial institutions, and they are referred to as 
intermediated securities. The intermediaries are an important link 
between the issuer and the investor in what are referred to as 
intermediated holding chains. 
 The emergence of the book-entry system, based on 
electronic book entries in securities accounts, is also connected 
with the immobilisation and dematerialisation of securities. 
Immobilisation involves durably concentrating the holding of 
securities in a central securities depository (CSD) – which is an 
intermediary that provides the initial recording of securities in a 
book-entry system or that provides and maintains the securities 
accounts at the top tier of the intermediated holding chain – to allow 
the crediting of an equal amount of securities to securities accounts 
and the transferability of such securities by way of book entries in 
securities accounts. The deposit of securities at the CSD may be 
done in the form of individual certificates, a combined certificate, 
known as a global or jumbo certificate which represents all or part 
of the securities of a particular issue, or a letter by the issuer 
evidencing entrustment with the CSD of a certain quantity of 
securities of a specific type. Transfers of immobilised securities 
thus can take place by electronic book-entries by intermediaries and 
do not require actual movement of certificates.  
 Dematerialisation goes further than immobilisation and 
eliminates certificates altogether. The securities are represented by 
book-entries alone throughout the intermediated holding chain. 
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 Intermediation, immobilisation and dematerialisation have 
reduced significantly and, in some systems, even eliminated the 
paperwork traditionally necessary for securities transfers. These 
developments have accordingly allowed for greater numbers of 
holdings and transfers and increased the size of capital markets.  
3. Common securities transactions 
 Securities are bought and sold on capital markets, and there 
are many types of securities transactions. Some common 
transactions are so-called “plain” sales of securities, creation of a 
security interest, repurchase transactions, and securities lending 
transactions: 
(a)  A “plain” sale of securities against payment.  
(b)  A transaction that involves a security interest in 
securities. For example, if Company A loans cash to 
Company B for the purchase of securities, a security interest 
may be created in those securities in favour of Company A, 
in order to ensure that A can recover the value of the loan. In 
the event that Company B defaults in repaying the loan, 
Company A could obtain the securities and sell them to 
recover what Company B owes. 
(c)  In a repurchase (or “repo”) transaction, a seller seeking 
cash transfers securities to a buyer outright in exchange for 
cash at the purchase date, while the seller returns the cash 
together with an interest component at the repurchase date in 
exchange for equivalent securities. See, e.g., diagram 279-1 
below. 
(d)  A securities lending transaction is similar to a repo, 
except that the borrower seeks transfer of ownership of 
specific securities with a promise to return equivalent 
securities, which may be collateralised with cash or 
securities. For example, a lender transfers securities (e.g. 100 
shares of Company A) to a borrower who transfers securities 
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(e.g. 100 shares of Company B) to the lender and, at a later 
date, both parties transfer equivalent securities and the 
borrower pays a fee. 
 Market participants may enter into multiple transactions 
every day. Such transactions occur on various exchanges or trading 
platforms, or on the so-called “over-the-counter” market. Many 
transactions are cleared, settled, or both cleared and settled through 
a central counterparty (CCP), an entity which operates as the buyer 
for every seller and as the seller for every buyer so that the parties 
only bear the credit risk of the CCP. Where multiple transactions 
are made each day, it makes sense not to transfer gross quantities 
per transaction but, where possible, to net transfer obligations at 
predetermined times and to transfer only the resulting net amount. 
 The transaction process involves what is known as clearing 
and settlement. First, clearing refers to the process of transmitting, 
reconciling and, in some cases, confirming transactions prior to 
settlement, potentially including the netting of transactions and the 
establishment of final positions. Sometimes this term is also used 
imprecisely to cover settlement.  Second, settlement implies the 
process which discharges the obligations arising out of the 
agreement of the parties to transfer securities (e.g. the exchange of 
cash counter value for the traded securities and the credit of 
securities to the account of the buyer). 
4. Securities holding chains 
 In the context of securities holding, as mentioned above, 
there are various key participants, which occupy different places in 
securities holding chains.  These participants include: 
(a)  Issuers – at the origin of the chain – such as a 
government issuing bonds or a company issuing bonds or 
shares;  
(b)  Intermediaries – in the middle of the chain – such as a 
CSD, which is responsible for keeping paper securities, if 
8 GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES 
 
any, maintaining electronic records, and administering them, 
and banks or other financial institutions which maintain 
accounts on behalf of investors or on their own behalf; and  
(c)  Investors – at the end of the chain – such as individuals, 
companies, pension funds and collective investment funds 
who acquire securities. 
 The following is an overview, together with basic securities 
holding diagrams, of (a) non-intermediated holding and (b) 
intermediated holding. 
a. Non-intermediated holding 
 In traditional non-intermediated securities holding, there are 
no intermediaries between the issuer and the investor. Such holding 
may encompass, for example, certificated securities held physically 
by the investor (diagram 24-1), securities directly registered in the 
issuer’s register in the investor’s name (diagram 24-2) or both 
(diagram 24-3). The advantage of such a direct connection between 
the issuer and the investor is that the issuer is able to identify the 
investor (except for unregistered (bearer) securities) and the 
investor is able to exercise the rights attached to the securities (e.g. 
rights which accrue to a holder of securities by virtue of holding the 
securities, such as dividends, other distributions, and voting rights, 
as well as the right to receive information necessary for account 
holders to exercise those other rights) directly with the issuer. The 
investor also does not bear the risks attendant to the insolvency of 
an intermediary as there is no intermediary. 
Diagram 24-1: Non-intermediated securities holding – physical 
certificates 
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Diagram 24-2: Non-intermediated securities holding – entries in 
the issuer’s register 
 
Diagram 24-3: Non-intermediated securities holding – physical 
certificates and entries in the issuer’s register 
b. Intermediated holding 
 In an intermediated holding chain, there is at least one 
intermediary – and possibly more – between the issuer and the 
investor. Such chains may involve, for example, immobilised 
securities certificates held by the CSD (diagram 25-1) or 
dematerialised securities represented solely by electronic book-
entries recorded by the CSD (diagram 25-2). In addition, an issuer’s 
register may be run by a CSD or an agent, whether the chain 
involves immobilised securities certificates or dematerialised 
securities.  
Diagram 25-1: Intermediated securities holding chain – 
immobilised securities certificates 
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Diagram 25-2: Intermediated securities holding chain – 
dematerialised securities 
 The following provides examples of domestic and 
international intermediated holding chains. Because of the possible 
variations, the diagrams are simplified to show basic, static links in 
holding chains between issuers, intermediaries, and investors.  
(i) Domestic examples 
 Domestic intermediated holding chains can be simple. As 
shown in diagram 25-1 and 25-2 above, the CSD, for example, may 
be the only intermediary between the issuer and the investor. In 
some systems, there are no intermediaries involved other than the 
CSD, and the investors hold their securities directly with the CSD. 
Apart from safekeeping of securities, in some systems, the CSD 
may act merely as a conduit for communications between the issuer 
and the investor. In others, the CSD may have more responsibilities 
and play a greater role in a particular securities clearing or 
settlement system for the efficient transfer of securities, depending 
on how such responsibilities are divided among CSDs, stock 
exchanges, central banks, and other market participants. 
 Domestic intermediated holding chains, however, can also 
be rather long, with several links of intermediaries between the 
issuer and the investor. In such chains, investors are at the end of 
the chains, with their securities accounts maintained by their 
intermediaries. For instance, an investor may enter into an 
agreement with an intermediary to manage the relationship with the 
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CSD (e.g. serve as the technical interface between the investor and 
the CSD). Diagram 28-1 shows an example where a top-tier 
intermediary (CSD) holds the securities in an account on behalf of 
another Intermediary (2), and the latter holds them on behalf of the 
investor.  
 
Diagram 28-1: Domestic intermediated securities holding chain 
with two intermediaries 
 Naturally, holding chains may become even more complex 
as the number of intermediaries increases, as diagram 29-1 shows. 
The CSD keeps the securities and maintains an account for 
Intermediary 2, which in turn maintains an account for 
Intermediary 3, which in turn maintains an account for the investor. 
Such chains are actually quite common in the book-entry system. 
Regulation of intermediaries, as a result, becomes very important 
and, in some systems, intermediaries are extensively regulated. In 
markets, intermediaries can be broker-dealers, banks or investment 
entities and can also be referred to as “custodians,” “sub-
custodians,” or by other terms. The Guide, however, generally 
refers to them as intermediaries. See paragraph 70.  
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Diagram 29-1: Domestic intermediated securities holding chain 
with three intermediaries 
 Even in these domestic examples, the presence of 
intermediaries between the issuers and investors means that the 
issuers and investors may not have a direct relationship. Absent 
proper laws and regulations within a domestic system, it may be 
difficult to determine who is entitled to exercise the rights attached 
to the securities. It depends, for example, on whether that system 
enables an investor at one end of the chain to exercise its rights 
directly with the issuer, or whether those rights are passed along 
and exercised via the chain of intermediaries. 
(ii) International examples  
 In today’s capital markets, investors in securities are no 
longer confined within domestic boundaries. On the contrary, 
investors often buy securities from issuers based in other 
jurisdictions. Cross-border holding chains often involve several 
intermediaries, and the following examples are included in this 
regard.  
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 In some international holding chains, the CSD is located in 
a different State than the issuer. For example, as shown in diagram 
32-1 below, a company in State A opts to register its securities with 
a CSD in State B for various reasons. In such a case, that company 
registers and deposits the securities with State B’s CSD, which is 
the first intermediary in the holding chain. Intermediary 2 has an 
account with the CSD, to which the securities are credited. 
Intermediary 2 credits those securities to the account that it 
maintains on behalf of Intermediary 3, and Intermediary 3 credits 
those securities to the account it maintains on behalf of the investor.  
 
Diagram 32-1: Cross-border intermediated securities holding 
chain spanning two States in which the issuer opted to use a foreign 
CSD 
 In most international holding chains, however, the CSD is 
located in the same State as the issuer. As shown in diagram 33-1 
below, the securities are issued by a company in State A and 
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deposited with the CSD (Intermediary 1). There is another 
intermediary in State A, a local investment firm (Intermediary 2), 
which has an account with the CSD, to which the securities are 
credited. The investment firm allocates those securities overseas to 
an international bank based in State B (Intermediary 3), which 
credits them to the securities account of an investor in that State. 
 
Diagram 33-1: Cross-border intermediated securities holding 
chain spanning two States 
 International holding chains, as shown in diagram 34-1 
below, can reach across more than one border. In this example, the 
securities are issued by a company in State A. Under State A’s law, 
all securities issued by companies in that State must be kept and 
registered at State A’s CSD. This CSD is the first intermediary and 
monopolises the market for registering securities in State A. There 
is another intermediary in State A, a local investment firm 
(Intermediary 2), which has an account with the CSD, to which the 
securities are credited. The investment firm allocates those 
securities overseas, to an international bank based in State B 
(Intermediary 3). A local bank in State C (Intermediary 4) acquires 
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those securities on behalf of an investor from State C. As soon as 
the intermediary in State B allocates those securities to the local 
bank’s securities account, the local bank in turn credits them to the 
investor’s securities account.  
 
Diagram 34-1: Cross-border intermediated securities holding 
chain spanning three States 
 In these international examples, the investor’s exercise of 
the rights attached to the securities may prove to be difficult. A 
particular domestic law, for example, may not recognise the rights 
or interests of investors located in another jurisdiction, may prevent 
intermediaries from acting on behalf of those investors, or may not 
facilitate sufficiently the exercise of the investors’ rights via the 
holding chain. In addition, the relationship between intermediaries 
across borders is governed by contractual arrangements. Subject to 
laws and regulations in a particular system, it is the contract itself 
which defines the rights and obligations between the intermediaries 
involved. If the contract does not contemplate the obligation to pass 
the rights attached to the securities via those intermediaries, the 
exercise of such rights by the investor at the end of the chain may 
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be disrupted. These examples, moreover, generally involve 
simplified, static holdings and not transfers. In reality, securities 
holding chains can fluctuate on a daily basis and involve many 
intermediaries and account holders, and different laws may be 
applicable to particular links in the chain. See generally Part VIII 
below. 
5. Risks associated with intermediated securities 
 There are risks associated with the holding and transfer of 
intermediated securities, ranging from unauthorised disposition to 
the insolvency of intermediaries. Especially in the cross-border 
context, the most central risk to the holding of intermediated 
securities arises from legal uncertainty surrounding how different 
jurisdictions treat the rights of account holders in relation to their 
intermediated securities.  
 Investors want to be certain about the legal regime which 
will determine their rights in intermediated securities, for example, 
in the event of disputes or the insolvency of an intermediary. If an 
intermediary is financially distressed and becomes insolvent, there 
may be a shortfall in securities, whereby the intermediary does not 
have enough securities on hand to satisfy those credited to its 
account holders’ securities accounts. In this way, an intermediary’s 
insolvency, depending for instance on the size of the shortfall, can 
both put the holdings of investors at the end of the chain at risk and 
pull other intermediaries into insolvency as well, thereby 
threatening systemic effects. Such effects may be compounded 
where there are multiple intermediaries located in different 
jurisdictions with different applicable insolvency laws. 
 Harmonisation efforts like the Geneva Securities 
Convention and the Guide aim to reduce legal uncertainty and thus 
the risks associated with intermediated securities. It must be noted, 
however, that such efforts are not a panacea for all risks associated 
with intermediated securities.  
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B. Intermediated securities holding models 
 At present, there is no international uniform legal approach 
for intermediated securities holding systems. In some instances, 
reference is made to two very broad categories of holding systems 
– “direct” holding models, in which intermediaries only serve as 
bookkeepers for investors and have no interest in investors’ 
securities, and “indirect” holding models, in which intermediaries 
have an interest in investors’ securities. The Guide, however, 
identifies and makes reference to, albeit still at a broad level, five 
general models of holding systems (i.e. individual ownership, co-
ownership, trust, security entitlement, and contractual), which are 
discussed briefly below. Diagrams are provided for each of them, 
though they are not necessarily representative of every system 
under a particular model and show only the static holding of 
intermediated securities and not the flow of rights, such as voting 
rights and distributions, via the holding chain. The models, 
moreover, are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, as some 
systems might be mixed systems because, for instance, different 
models may be used for particular types of securities. Indeed, 
systems evolve over time, and there is accordingly a need for 
flexibility in the legal approaches governing them. Following 
discussion of the five general models, an important distinction 
regarding identification of the investor in the holding chain is 
discussed in greater detail and a more complicated cross-border 
example is provided. 
1. Individual ownership model 
 Under the individual ownership model, neither the CSD nor 
any of the other intermediaries have any interest in the securities as 
the investor has full, individual ownership over the securities, 
which are deemed to be located directly in the investor’s securities 
account. In the French system, for example, in which all domestic 
securities issued are dematerialised, securities are recorded by way 
of book-entries at the CSD, which acts simply as a register for the 
issuer and other participants acting on behalf of the issuer. Neither 
the CSD nor any of the other intermediaries have any interest in the 
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securities as the investor has full, individual ownership over the 
securities, which are deemed to be located directly in the investor’s 
securities account. The investor accesses its securities through its 
own account with its intermediary and not through any other 
intermediary.  
 In the event the CSD or any other intermediary becomes 
insolvent, the investor, as the owner of the securities, has the right 
to require a new recording of those securities in the investor’s 
name. Intermediaries, including the CSD, do not have any right 
over such an investor’s securities, except in specific situations 
where a security interest is provided to an intermediary. 
 
Diagram 41-1: Individual ownership model  
 Some systems following this model are so-called 
transparent systems, which are described in paragraph 51 below. 
2. Co-ownership model 
 Under the co-ownership model (e.g. Austria, Germany and 
several other civil law jurisdictions), securities are typically 
deposited by the issuer with the CSD in the form of a global 
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certificate. The CSD, in turn, credits the securities accounts of its 
participants, typically banks acting as intermediaries for other 
intermediaries and investors. In this model, an investor has a shared 
interest. The investor has fractional ownership or, in other words 
co-ownership, corresponding to its holdings of a pool of securities 
held by the CSD. The investor accesses its securities through its 
intermediary and, as a result of the pooling of securities, the CSD 
and any other intermediaries above the investor’s intermediary (i.e. 
relevant intermediary) would be unable to identify a particular 
investor’s specific holdings.  
 In the event the CSD or another intermediary becomes 
insolvent, an investor’s securities do not become part of the 
insolvency estate, as neither the CSD nor the other intermediaries 
own the securities. The investor is entitled to exercise and, if 
necessary, enforce the rights attached to the securities. 
 
Diagram 44-1: Co-ownership model 
3. Trust model 
 In the trust model (e.g. Australia, England and Wales, and 
Ireland), issuers’ securities are provided to the CSD for 
safekeeping, and the CSD acts as the issuers’ register and has no 
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legal interest in the securities. The CSD’s participants, typically 
intermediaries such as banks and other financial institutions, are 
considered to be the legal owners of the securities, whether for 
themselves or on behalf of their clients. Once those intermediaries 
credit those securities to their account holders’ securities accounts, 
they act as trustees for the account holders, who become 
beneficiaries and receive an equitable interest in the securities. 
Investors access their securities through their relevant 
intermediaries and not through those further up the holding chains. 
 In the event an intermediary becomes insolvent, the investor 
as a beneficiary has a proprietary interest over the securities, which 
cannot be claimed by the creditors of the intermediary. 
 
Diagram 46-1: Trust model  
4. Security entitlement model 
 Under this model (e.g. Canada and the United States of 
America), every securities account holder receives a security 
entitlement (i.e. a sui generis bundle of rights against the 
intermediary and over the assets held by the intermediary) against 
its relevant intermediary. In other words, there are security 
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entitlement holders at each level of the holding chain below the 
CSD. The entitlement holder has no ability to exercise economic or 
other rights to the financial asset directly against the issuer. The 
intermediary, however, has an obligation to obtain and pass on the 
rights attached to the securities to the entitlement holder and to 
exercise such rights on the entitlement holder’s behalf. Investors at 
the end of the holding chain, which hold a security entitlement 
against their relevant intermediary, access the securities through 
that intermediary and not through other intermediaries in the chain. 
 In the event an intermediary becomes insolvent, the account 
holder is protected as security entitlements are separated from the 
intermediary’s estate. 
 
Diagram 48-1: Security entitlement model 
5. Contractual model 
 Under the contractual model, investors do not acquire a 
bundle of proprietary interests to the securities, but instead acquire 
contractual rights vis-à-vis the relevant intermediary. The entire 
holding system consists of a network of bilateral contracts among 
22 GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES 
 
different market participants, from the CSD to the investor. The 
CSD or other intermediaries appear in the issuer’s book as the 
registered holders and, thereafter, the rights and benefits are to flow 
through the holding chain from one intermediary to another, 
eventually being available to the investors.  
 The terms and conditions of the relevant contracts between 
participants generally set out the legal framework on various issues, 
including the exercise of the investor’s rights or the consequences 
arising out of the insolvency of an intermediary. Domestic 
insolvency laws, however, usually determine the investor’s rights 
and claims against the intermediary’s estates with respect to 
securities to a considerable extent. In some systems, moreover, 
intermediaries may be structured so as to be insolvency-remote (i.e. 
by engaging only in custody and not in any other activity). For 
systems following this model, insolvency laws protecting investors 
or insolvent-remote intermediaries are essential because an 
investor’s contractual rights alone may not offer sufficient 
protection, for example, in the event of an intermediary’s 
insolvency.  
 
Diagram 50-1: Contractual model  
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6. Identification of the investor: transparent and non-
transparent systems 
 As noted above with respect to the individual ownership 
model, some systems are known as transparent systems. In such 
systems, an investor’s particular holdings are identified by, or 
known to, the CSD primarily because the role of maintaining a 
securities account is shared between the CSD (which is the relevant 
intermediary for the purpose of the Convention and the Guide) and 
other persons often called account operators, who are securities 
firms maintaining commercial relationships with investors. There 
are three general categories of transparent systems, and diagrams 
are provided for each: 
(a)  When the investor’s holdings are held in an account 
with the CSD: In such a system, there are separate accounts 
maintained at the CSD for each investor and the 
intermediaries merely operate these accounts. Any 
intermediaries thus serve the role of technical interface 
between the investor and the CSD. 
 
Diagram 51-1: Transparent system in which the investor’s holdings 
are held in an account with the CSD 
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(b)  When the investor’s holdings are identified in an 
intermediary’s account with the CSD: In such a system, the 
CSD maintains accounts in the name of intermediaries, and 
these accounts are divided into sub-accounts for each client 
of the intermediary and reflect each client’s holdings. 
 
Diagram 51-2: Transparent system in which the investor’s holdings 
are identified in an intermediary’s account with the CSD 
(c)  When the investor’s holdings are held by an 
intermediary in an omnibus account at the CSD and account 
information is registered on a regular basis: In such a system, 
there is an omnibus account at the CSD in the name of 
intermediaries, which maintain separate accounts in their 
register for their clients. Information regarding those separate 
accounts is permanently or regularly consolidated between 
the intermediaries and the CSD, thereby enabling the CSD to 
determine what exactly the clients hold.  
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Diagram 51-3: Transparent system in which the investor’s holdings 
are held by an intermediary in an omnibus account at the CSD and 
account information is registered on a regular basis 
The common feature of these three categories is that investors and 
their individual holdings are identified at the CSD level.  
 Non-transparent holding systems, on the other hand, refer to 
those in which the investor’s interest in securities is not identified 
at the level of the CSD, but only at the level of the relevant 
intermediary. 
 In some cases, as mentioned above, systems may be 
considered as “mixed” because one part of a holding chain in that 
system is transparent while the other part is non-transparent. In 
addition, most cross-border holding chains originating in a 
transparent system are mixed, in that a chain generally ceases to be 
transparent once it reaches across a border and becomes an 
international one. 
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7. Cross-border holdings involving multiple systems 
 Even between two internally sound and reliable domestic 
systems, holding securities through a chain of intermediaries across 
borders may give rise to various problems. First, the legal 
frameworks in which each market participant (issuers, 
intermediaries or investors) operates are different and they may not 
be calibrated to work together, thereby jeopardising the exercise of 
investors’ rights. Second, some jurisdictions have in place legal 
frameworks based on traditional models of capital markets and 
concepts of property law. Traditional models, even if perfectly 
developed from a legal point of view, may not match the standards 
required by increasingly modern, interconnected, and even 
paperless capital markets. Third, in most cases, a conflict of laws 
issue may arise when trying to determine the applicable law with 
respect to particular participants and aspects of the holding chain.  
 For example, as shown in diagram 55-1 below, 
Intermediary  2 holds securities in State A, which has a transparent 
individual ownership system. Such securities holding functions 
well under the domestic legal framework because that system is 
internally sound. Once some of those securities are transferred and 
held via Intermediaries 3 (in State B, which follows the trust model) 
and 4 (in State C, which follows the co-ownership model), 
however, the exercise of certain rights attached to the securities 
may become difficult. 
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Diagram 55-1: Varying ownership rights and interests in a cross-
border intermediated securities holding chain spanning three 
States 
 In particular, each of the account holders in diagram 55-1 – 
which includes Intermediaries 2, 3, and 4 and the investor as they 
each have accounts with the respective intermediary above them in 
the holding chain – receives the legal position attributed to it under 
the relevant domestic legal analysis. Accordingly, various laws 
(e.g. property, commercial, insolvency) of different jurisdictions 
might apply to various parts of the same holding chain, creating 
uncertainty and possible incompatibilities. 
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PART II - THE GENEVA SECURITIES 
CONVENTION 
 This Part describes in brief the Geneva Securities 
Convention, including its (a) purpose; (b) approach; (c) 
terminology; (d) scope; and (e) references to law outside of the 
Convention. 
A. Purpose 
 Intermediation in securities holding and the simultaneous 
developments of immobilisation and dematerialisation have 
enabled the rapid expansion of capital markets by reducing 
paperwork, allowing for an enormous volume of transactions every 
day, and promoting economic growth. Specific risks related to the 
physical existence of certificated securities have been largely 
eliminated with the introduction of book-entry systems, as such 
securities are no longer physically moved. Intermediated securities 
holding and transfer, however, are not without risks, as there may 
be significant legal uncertainty and even systemic risk, especially 
when such holding and transfer occurs cross-border. This section 
first describes these risks and then how the Geneva Securities 
Convention addresses them. 
1. Legal and systemic risk 
 Intermediated securities holding and transfer are not free 
from risk. There may be legal risk in the application of existing law, 
especially when that law is based on traditional legal concepts not 
tailored to modern securities holding and transfer. This risk may be 
compounded when securities are held and transferred across 
borders because the various domestic systems may not necessarily 
be compatible with one another, and different substantive rules may 
apply to the various participants in a holding chain. Upon the 
insolvency of an intermediary, moreover, there could be significant 
risk regarding a potential shortfall in securities and whether the 
investor’s interests in those securities are protected from the claims 
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of the intermediary’s general creditors as these issues may be 
handled differently in various systems. Such risk, in some 
situations, may dissuade investors from acquiring particular 
securities. In many situations, such risk increases transaction costs 
and hampers economic growth.  
 These risks may even become systemic. In times of 
financial stress, the insolvency of one intermediary could lead to 
the insolvency of other intermediaries, thereby triggering systemic 
effects.  
2. Harmonisation to reduce risk and promote 
sustainable economic growth 
 The Geneva Securities Convention, adopted in October 
2009 and tailored to the modern book-entry system, was carefully 
developed to address and minimise these risks. The Convention 
provides the core legal framework for a modern intermediated 
securities holding system, which is both internally sound and 
compatible with other systems.  
 Regarding internal soundness, the Convention’s drafters 
identified key features of intermediated holding systems which 
must be present in order for a particular system to be considered as 
sound, taking into account the objectives of investor protection and 
efficiency. Holders of intermediated securities should, for example, 
be confident that their interests are protected and subject to simple 
and clear rules and procedures regarding holding, transfer, and 
realisation. It was deemed essential, moreover, that the investor’s 
interest not be exposed to risks such as the insolvency of any 
intermediary in the holding chain or interference by unrelated third 
parties.  
 Regarding compatibility, the drafters recognised that 
different legal systems should be able to interconnect successfully 
where intermediated securities are held and transferred across 
borders. In a cross-border context, as differing rules and approaches 
may apply in respect of property law issues, supervision, corporate 
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law, etc., it was recognised that harmonisation of core issues was 
of the utmost importance.  
 A sound and compatible legal framework governing 
intermediated securities is essential for market stability and 
investor protection. Indeed, the Convention’s clear and transparent 
rules as to the effectiveness of an interest represented by a book-
entry credit, or about the effectiveness and finality of a transfer 
made through book-entry debits and credits, are essential to reduce 
uncertainty and systemic risk. The legal framework is all the more 
important in light of the extremely high value of securities held in 
intermediated systems and the enormous volume of intermediated 
securities transactions carried out on a daily basis. As that value and 
volume continues to increase, a proper legal framework could 
enhance the flow of capital and access to capital markets, thereby 
promoting sustainable economic development.    
B. Approach 
 In recognising the diversity of legal concepts underlying 
securities holding around the world, the Convention embraces a 
core and functional harmonisation approach in order to 
accommodate different legal systems and traditions within a unitary 
framework. Only elements essential to the establishment of internal 
soundness and cross-border compatibility are addressed.  
 The Convention’s approach is a core one in that it 
harmonises certain key matters related, for example, to the rights of 
account holders, securities transfers, and aspects of the integrity of 
the intermediated holding system. Other law is thus relied upon to 
cover matters not harmonised by the Convention. 
 The Convention’s approach is functional in that it uses 
language that is as neutral as possible to formulate rules by 
reference to their results. Under a functional approach, harmonising 
rules are formulated by reference to facts rather than particular legal 
terms or principles to allow operative results to be reached without 
overriding the underlying domestic legal traditions and doctrine. 
With the functional approach, for example, the Convention is 
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compatible with various characterisations of securities rights and 
interests and possesses the necessary flexibility to accommodate 
new technological advances and evolutions in intermediated 
securities holding systems. See paragraph 76 below.  
 The Convention’s drafters also worked to ensure 
compatibility with other relevant instruments, including recent 
domestic reform legislation, EU directives, and international 
instruments, in particular the Hague Securities Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions. Whereas 
the Hague Securities Convention provides conflict of laws rules for 
intermediated securities as addressed in paragraphs 303 and 307 et 
seq. below, the Geneva Securities Convention provides substantive 
rules for such securities, and the two Conventions complement one 
another. The Geneva Securities Convention also complements the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, which are to 
assist States in developing modern secured transactions laws and 
are addressed in paragraph 290 below, because the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide does not cover securities at all and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law contains rules for non-intermediated 
securities only.  
 In addition, new technologies have been developed that may 
be applied to securities holding. In particular, the so-called 
distributed ledger technology is seen as being of particular interest 
in the securities industry as a new approach for recording assets on 
a non-centralised basis (i.e. in a distributed and opened manner). 
See, for example, Discussion Paper, The Distributed Ledger 
Technology Applied to Securities Markets (ESMA/2016/773, 2 
June 2016). However, this new technological setting, which has its 
own challenges (such as integrity or safety of information 
technology systems), should in any case comply for the most part 
with the basic principles and rules that are provided for in the 
Convention. 
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C. Terminology 
 The Convention’s core and functional harmonisation 
approach is readily apparent when examining the terminology 
adopted by the Convention’s drafters. Article 1 of the Convention 
sets forth definitions for terms used in the Convention and 
comprehensive explanation of those terms is provided in the 
Official Commentary. The Guide adopts that terminology as well 
and, for ease of reference, the following key terms are briefly 
described below and together with other important terms in the 
Glossary: 
• Securities: This term is defined in Article 1(a) of the 
Convention as “any shares, bonds or other financial 
instruments or financial assets (other than cash) which are 
capable of being credited to a securities account and of being 
acquired and disposed of in accordance with the provisions 
of th[e] Convention.” That broad definition covers any 
financial assets which meet the two functional criteria of 
being able to be held in the intermediated holding system and 
to be governed by the Convention. But it does not cover cash 
(e.g. money deposited with a bank) or certain types of 
financial assets, including some categories of derivatives, as 
they do not meet those requisite criteria.  
• Securities account: This term is defined in Article 1(c) 
as “an account maintained by an intermediary to which 
securities may be credited or debited”. That definition 
applies, for example, to accounts maintained by an 
intermediary in the name of a natural or legal person who is 
not an intermediary; by an intermediary in the name of 
another intermediary; by a CSD in the name of an 
intermediary; or in a transparent system, by a CSD in the 
name of a natural or legal person (which may be an 
intermediary that in another capacity holds intermediated 
securities for its own account). It does not apply, however, to 
accounts maintained directly by issuers in the name of their 
shareholders or bondholders, or to issuer accounts (or 
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registers) maintained by CSDs or other persons such as 
transfer agents on behalf of issuers. 
• Account holder: This term is defined in Article 1(e) of 
the Convention as “a person in whose name an intermediary 
maintains a securities account, whether that person is acting 
for its own account or for others (including in the capacity of 
intermediary)”. That definition covers both investors and 
intermediaries, as intermediaries may be account holders who 
hold securities with a higher-tier intermediary in its own 
account or on behalf of their account holders. In defining the 
term “account holder” in this way, it was unnecessary to 
include a definition of the term “investor” and, from this point 
forward, the Guide generally uses the term “account holder”. 
Even the ultimate account holder at the end of the chain, 
moreover, may not be an investor. See paragraph 84 below. 
Even though the term is in the singular, it does not purport to 
prohibit a securities account from being maintained for 
several persons acting jointly.  
• Intermediary: This term is defined in Article 1(d) of the 
Convention as “a person (including a [CSD]) who in the 
course of a business or other regular activity maintains 
securities accounts for others or both for others and for its 
own account and is acting in that capacity”. Intermediaries 
are usually entities such as banks, brokers, central banks and 
similar persons that maintain securities accounts for their 
account holders. In some systems, for example, an 
intermediary may be referred to as an account operator or 
account provider. Because of the functional definition, 
virtually any natural or legal person is covered provided that 
it maintains securities accounts for others in the course of its 
business. CSDs, which are specifically mentioned but not 
defined, are intermediaries only in relation to their 
participants (i.e. their account holders) but not in relation to 
the issuer. 
• Securities clearing system (SCS): This term, which is 
defined in Article 1(o) of the Convention, refers to market 
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infrastructures facilitating and enhancing the efficient 
settlement of securities transactions among intermediaries. 
See paragraph 21 above and the Glossary. They are, in 
particular, market infrastructures, such as CCPs or clearing 
houses, that perform clearing functions (and possibly other 
functions not covered by the Convention), but not settlement. 
• Securities settlement system (SSS): This term, which is 
defined in Article 1(n) of the Convention, refers to market 
infrastructures permitting the efficient transfer of securities 
and funds among intermediaries, in particular by settling 
them or by clearing and settling them. See paragraph 21 
above and the Glossary. 
• Issuer: This term is not defined in the Convention, as it 
is understood to refer to a government or company which 
issues securities. See paragraph 22 above.  
D. Scope 
 Further to the harmonisation approach adopted by the 
Convention’s drafters, the Convention’s scope of application is 
limited to only core aspects of intermediated securities holding and 
transfer. In this regard, the Convention’s definitions play a key role 
in establishing the Convention’s scope. As noted in paragraph 70 
above, the Convention applies to “securities” which are capable of 
being credited to a “securities account” and of being acquired and 
disposed of in accordance with the Convention’s provisions. As the 
Convention does not specify a list of securities falling within its 
scope, it therefore allows for the evolution of market practice and 
the creation of new types of securities capable of being held in the 
intermediated holding system. For further discussion of what types 
of securities fall within the Convention’s scope, see Official 
Commentary, paragraph 1-10 et seq. 
 The Convention, however, generally excludes the area of 
law usually (but not necessarily) called corporate law (see Article 
8), in particular the relationship between issuers and account 
holders. While the Convention generally does not cover this area of 
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law, there are a few exceptions, specifically minimal provisions 
necessary to ensure integrity and achieve compatibility of 
intermediated securities holding systems around the world.  
 Like so-called corporate law, other legal and regulatory 
aspects fall outside the scope of the Convention. In other words, 
such aspects are to be addressed by each Contracting State’s legal 
and regulatory system. The only constraint is that such aspects must 
be addressed in ways which do not contravene the Convention’s 
provisions.   
E. Law outside of the Convention 
 As the Geneva Securities Convention addresses the core 
issues necessary for achieving internal soundness and compatibility 
in a functional way, there are various matters that are to be 
addressed by law outside the Convention. In implementing the 
Convention, States thus retain significant legal and regulatory 
space, and there are important policy decisions to be made. There 
are three particular aspects to the way in which the Convention 
deals with law outside the Convention. 
 First, the Convention contains express references to law 
outside the Convention. Such references include the following:  
• Non-Convention law: This term, which is defined in 
Article 1(m), refers to substantive law in relation to 
intermediated securities (other than the Convention) of the 
Contracting State. In many instances, the non-Convention 
law is to work as a complement to a Convention rule. A list 
of references to non-Convention law is included in Annex 1. 
• Applicable law: This term refers to the law applicable 
by virtue of the private international law rules of the forum. 
The applicable law may, or may not, be the law of a 
Contracting State to the Convention (i.e. the non-Convention 
law). A list of references to applicable law is included in 
Annex 2. 
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• Insolvency rules: Insolvency law would be part of the 
non-Convention law or the applicable law, but insolvency is 
dealt with as a separate category because the commencement 
of an insolvency proceeding may trigger the mandatory 
application of special rules of law of the jurisdiction in which 
those proceedings are conducted that displace, or deviate 
from, the rules that would otherwise be applicable. A list of 
references to insolvency rules is included in Annex 3.  
• Uniform rules of securities clearing systems (SCSs) and 
securities settlement systems (SSSs): The term “uniform 
rules” is defined in Article 1(p) as rules of an SCS or SSS 
which are common to the participants or to a class of 
participants and are publicly accessible. Such rules may 
derogate from or supplement the Convention’s rules. While 
Contracting States may only have limited or indirect 
influence over the rules of SCSs and SSSs, as they are 
typically private entities, Contracting States generally 
regulate such entities. Through such regulation, for which the 
Convention provides no rules, Contracting States could 
influence the content of these rules. A list of references to 
uniform rules of SCSs and SSSs is contained in Annex 4. 
 Second, there are references for which Contracting States, 
in properly implementing the Convention, have to make a 
declaration. The system of declarations provided for under the 
Convention gives Contracting States the possibility of making 
choices regarding these matters so as to achieve the policy 
objectives that they see fit in respect of intermediated securities and 
facilitate the coordination between the Convention’s provisions and 
their legal systems, which may follow one or more of the general 
models discussed in Part I.B. The system of declarations also 
provides the necessary flexibility to accommodate technological 
developments and evolutions in those models and legal systems. 
Model declaration forms are included with the Explanatory 
Memorandum for the Assistance of States and Regional Economic 
Integration Organisations on the System of Declarations under the 
Geneva Securities Convention, known as the Declarations 
Memorandum, which was issued by UNIDROIT in its capacity as 
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Depository for the Convention and is available on UNIDROIT’s 
website (UNIDROIT 2012 – DC11/DEP/Doc. 1 rev.). 
 For example, the Convention applies, in principle, to any 
securities account maintained by an intermediary. Article 5 of the 
Convention, however, permits a Contracting State to limit by 
declaration the Convention’s scope of application to the securities 
accounts maintained by “regulated” intermediaries or those 
maintained by a central bank. The purpose of this rule is to offer 
States the possibility of excluding application of the Convention to 
securities accounts maintained by “unregulated” intermediaries, if 
and to the extent Contracting States would deem such exclusion 
appropriate. For more information on the optional declaration under 
Article 5, including a model declaration form, see the Declarations 
Memorandum, Section 4.B and accompanying Form No. 2. 
 Third, there are other particular matters, including in the 
field of corporate and regulatory law, which could have been 
addressed in the Convention, but were not due to the core and 
functional harmonisation approach adopted. Such matters are also 
to be taken into account, to the extent necessary, by law outside the 
Convention. 
 Law outside the Convention, in particular these three 
aspects, is addressed in the following Parts of the Guide, which 
inter alia offer guidance on the important policy choices to be made 
in creating an intermediated securities holding system or evaluating 
an existing one. 
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PART III - RIGHTS OF ACCOUNT 
HOLDERS AND DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 
OF INTERMEDIARIES 
 This Part and those that follow identify principles and rules 
capable of enhancing holding and transfer of intermediated 
securities and explain their interaction with law outside the 
Convention. To do so, each of these Parts identifies legislative 
principles which generally summarise, as applicable, what is 
covered by the Convention and what is to be addressed or clarified 
in creating or evaluating an intermediated securities holding 
system. The legislative principles, in addition to appearing in boxes 
throughout the remainder of the Guide, are also set forth together 
at pages xxxi-xxxiv above. 
 Following the legislative principles, each of these Parts then 
reviews the core Convention principles and rules and, as necessary, 
discusses the choices to be made by declaration and the matters to 
be addressed or clarified. This Part, in particular, addresses (a) the 
rights of account holders, (b) measures to enable the exercise of 
rights of account holders, and (c) liability of intermediaries. 
A. Rights of account holders 
Legislative Principle 1:  The Convention provides any account 
holder with a core set of rights resulting from the credit of 
securities to a securities account. The law should establish 
additional rights consistent with how it characterises the legal 
position of account holders. It may distinguish between the rights 
enjoyed by an investor (including an intermediary acting for its 
own account) and those accruing to an intermediary acting in its 
capacity of intermediary.  
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
 RIGHTS OF ACCOUNT HOLDERS AND DUTIES 39 
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• All account holders have the right to dispose of the 
securities credited to their securities account and, to the extent 
it is permissible and feasible, the right to hold the securities 
otherwise than through a credit to their securities account. 
Article 9(1)(b)–(c).  
• In addition to these rights, the ultimate account holder 
must receive and be able to exercise all the rights attached to 
the securities. Article 9(1)(a)(i).  
• The non-Convention law may provide additional rights 
to all account holders, or to some of them. Article 9(1)(a)(ii) 
and 9(1)(d). 
• The non-Convention law determines the limits to the 
rights above when the credit in a securities account provides 
the account holder with a security interest or another limited 
interest. Article 9(3).  
 In the intermediated securities holding system, securities are 
represented by credits made in the securities accounts maintained 
by the intermediaries at each level of the holding chain. A credit 
may also represent a security interest or another limited interest. 
 At the bottom of the holding chain is an account holder, who 
is not acting as an intermediary and is referred to as the ultimate 
account holder. The ultimate account holder may be: 
(a)  an investor acting for its own account;  
(b)  a secured party holding the intermediated securities as a 
result of a transaction involving a security interest;  
(c)  the beneficiary of a limited interest, such as an usufruct, 
other than a security interest; or  
(d)  a person holding intermediated securities as a fiduciary, 
such as an agent, a trustee, etc. 
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 Article 9 defines two basic packages of rights resulting from 
a credit of securities to a securities account (hereafter: a credit), one 
for the ultimate account holder, and a less extensive one for account 
holders acting as intermediaries in the chain. Under the Convention, 
the difference between the two packages is the rights attached to 
the securities, which must accrue to the ultimate account holder, but 
not necessarily to the intermediaries in the chain. 
 Depending on how non-Convention law characterises 
intermediated securities, each package of rights may be extended 
by such law. Similarly, those packages may be restricted by such 
law in line with the types of limited interests it allows the parties to 
create. 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits declarations in 
respect of the matters discussed in this section.  
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 The following matters are to be addressed or clarified. First, 
the law should supplement the rights accruing to account holders in 
a manner consistent with its own characterisation of an account 
holder’s legal position. See Article 9(1)(a)(ii) and 9(1)(d). In so 
doing, it may distinguish between the legal position of the ultimate 
account holder and the legal position of account holders acting as 
intermediaries in the chain. Second, the law should clearly define 
which limited interests may be granted in intermediated securities, 
and how these interests limit the rights of account holders. Article 
9(3). Third, the law should also accommodate cross-border 
situations, where a domestic intermediary holds securities through 
a securities account with another intermediary in another 
jurisdiction, and thus likely holds under some foreign law. 
a. Rights accruing to account holders 
 There is a necessary relationship between:  
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(a)  the characterisation of intermediated securities and the 
additional rights conferred by the non-Convention law on all or 
certain account holders; and 
(b)  the types of security interests and other limited interests 
allowed by the non-Convention law and the restriction it 
imposes on the rights of an account holder when the credit 
represents such a limited interest. 
Notably, the ensuing discussion elaborates upon this relationship, 
in particular using diagrams 90-1 and 92-1, which go beyond the 
basic static models set forth in Part I.B and show alternative ways 
rights and interests flow through intermediated securities holding 
chains. 
 For example, most legal systems of the civil law tradition 
consider the ultimate account holder to have a proprietary interest 
over the (certificated or uncertificated) securities held at the very 
top of the holding chain. Ultimate account holders are the “owners” 
or “co-owners” of the securities as well as the creditors (or right 
holders) against the issuer. Such systems see the intermediaries as 
depositories and bookkeepers. Unless an intermediary has obtained 
a security interest, it does not have any proprietary interest over the 
securities themselves. Intermediaries do not receive or exercise the 
rights attached to the securities, except where this is necessary to 
pass such benefits down the chain all the way to the ultimate 
account holder.  
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Diagram 90-1: Flow of specific rights and interests in the 
individual ownership and co-ownership models 
 In such legal systems, the non-Convention law would 
typically use Article 9(1)(d) to confer on the ultimate account 
holder a proprietary interest over the securities. The holder of a 
limited interest would also be recognised as having a (limited) 
proprietary interest over the same securities. In respect of Article 
9(1)(a), intermediaries may be authorised to receive and exercise 
the rights attached to the securities registered in the name of the 
investor. Similarly, for unregistered (bearer) securities, 
intermediaries may receive and exercise the rights attached to the 
securities, subject to an obligation to pass such benefit to their own 
account holder. 
 Other legal systems, typically of the Anglo-American 
tradition, characterise the legal position of each account holder as 
including a proprietary interest in the securities or intermediated 
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securities held by the relevant intermediary. In some systems, this 
is based on a cascade of trusts. The upper-most intermediary holds 
the securities in trust for its account holders. These account holders, 
who are usually second-tier intermediaries, are the beneficiaries of 
this trust. The credit of securities in their securities account 
represents their beneficiary interest under the trust. They in turn 
hold this beneficial interest in trust for their own account holders, 
and so on. In some other systems, the credit of securities to a 
securities account creates a security entitlement. What these 
systems have in common is that each intermediary has a proprietary 
interest in certain assets (e.g. in securities, a beneficiary interest 
under a trust, a security entitlement) and creates a distinct 
proprietary interest when it makes a credit to the securities account 
it maintains for a client. 
 
Diagram 92-1: Flow of specific rights and interests in the trust and 
security entitlement models 
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 In this second group, in accordance with Article 9(1)(a)(ii), 
the non-Convention law would provide for each intermediary to 
receive the rights attached to the securities and pass these benefits 
to its own account holders, so that they finally reach the ultimate 
account holder. It would also define and characterise the rights 
(benefit of a trust, security entitlement, etc.) each account holder 
obtains in addition to the rights conferred by the Convention. 
Article 9(1)(d).  
b. Limited interests 
 As discussed below in paragraphs 131 and 158, the 
Convention provides various methods for the granting of any type 
of security interests and other limited interests in intermediated 
securities, but does not prescribe which types may be so granted. It 
is entirely for the non-Convention law to define the types of 
(consensual and non-consensual) interest that can be granted (e.g. 
pledge, lien, charge, title-transfer security interest, usufruct, etc.).  
 The non-Convention law may refer this matter to its general 
provisions governing other types of assets (e.g. movable assets, 
intangible assets, etc.).  
 Alternately, the non-Convention law may define one or 
more types of limited interests that would apply exclusively to 
intermediated securities.  
 One way or the other, when drafting or reforming the non-
Convention law in this area, lawmakers should be aware that 
limited interests are likely to limit the rights that arise from the 
credit of securities to a securities account. For example, if the 
account holder is the pledgee of the securities credited to its 
securities account, the non-Convention law regulating pledges is 
likely to limit the right to dispose of the intermediated securities to 
certain circumstances. It may also determine whether the pledgee 
can exercise the voting rights attached to the securities.  
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c. Cross-border situations 
 When drafting or revising law governing intermediated 
securities, lawmakers should design the bundle of rights created by 
a credit to a securities account in a manner consistent with that 
jurisdiction’s characterisation of the rights of investors, collateral 
takers and other account holders. Top-down consistency may be 
achieved for holding chains which are purely domestic, from the 
upper-most to the last intermediary in the chain. However, this is 
unlikely to be the case where the holding chain begins or ends in 
another jurisdiction. This is due to the different characterisations 
(and bundles of rights) that this or these other jurisdictions may 
attach to a credit of securities.  
 Lawmakers should be aware of this frequent inconsistency 
in cross-border holding chains, which is inherent in a global 
intermediated securities holding system. Because non-Convention 
law differs from one jurisdiction to another, and because it 
generally provides rights in addition to Convention rights, it is 
likely that the rights resulting from a credit of securities with 
Intermediary 1 in diagram 99-1 below are different from the rights 
resulting from a credit of the same securities with Intermediary 2. 
While the non-Convention law applicable to Intermediary 2 cannot 
unilaterally expand its application to Intermediary 1, it can secure 
the position of account holders by providing that, in cross-border 
situations, an account holder not only has the rights it enjoys under 
the non-Convention law of State B, but enjoys any additional rights 
that the relevant intermediary (here: Intermediary 2) obtains from 
its own intermediary at the upper level (here: Intermediary 1), 
provided that the exercise of such rights by the foreign account 
holder would be recognised by the non-Convention law of State A.  
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Diagram 99-1: Different States laws in a cross-border 
intermediated securities holding chain spanning two States 
B. Measures to enable the exercise of rights of account holders  
 The Convention provides that certain rights of account 
holders may be exercised only against the intermediary. Article 
9(2)(c). However, because the Convention does not make any 
assumption about the legal structure and characterisation of 
proprietary interests in intermediated securities, it does not 
determine whether the rights attached to the securities can or must 
be exercised by the account holder against its own intermediary 
(“through the intermediated chain”) or directly against the issuer. 
See Article 9(2)(b). This is why the law should clearly define the 
persons entitled to exercise the rights attached to the securities vis-
à-vis the issuer and the conditions thereof. See paragraph 246 et 
seq. below. 
 Even when an account holder may or is required to exercise 
the rights attached to the securities against the issuer, it often must 
rely on the assistance of the intermediary chain. In many respects, 
intermediaries must enable account holders to exercise their rights. 
They have corresponding duties and liabilities, which are only 
partially laid down by the Convention. In this area, as in many 
others, the Convention leaves broad space for non-Convention law.  
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Legislative Principle 2: The Convention provides one general and 
four specific obligations of intermediaries to their account 
holders. The law should establish specific contents for these 
duties and, if necessary, expand them in a manner consistent with 
its own characterisation of an account holder’s legal position. 
The law should also specify the manner in which an intermediary 
may comply with its obligations and determine the conditions 
under which an intermediary becomes liable. In transparent 
systems, where intermediary functions are shared between the 
CSD and account operators, the law should clearly allocate the 
respective responsibilities, and the Contracting State must make 
a declaration in this respect. 
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• An intermediary must generally take all appropriate 
measures to enable its account holders to receive and exercise 
their rights. Article 10(1).  
• An intermediary must protect securities credited to a 
securities account. Articles 10(2)(a) and 24. 
• An intermediary must allocate securities or 
intermediated securities to the rights of its account holders so 
that they cannot be reached by the intermediary’s creditors. 
Articles 10(2)(b) and 25. 
• An intermediary must give effect to authorised 
instructions. Articles 10(2)(c) and 23.  
• An intermediary must not dispose of securities credited 
to a securities account without an authorised instruction. 
Articles 10(2)(d) and 15. 
• An intermediary must regularly pass on information 
necessary for the exercise of rights, dividends and other 
distributions. Articles 10(2)(e)-(f). 
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• An intermediary may not exclude liability for its gross 
negligence or wilful misconduct. Article 28(4) and see 
paragraphs 120 et seq. below. 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 For transparent systems, where some functions of the 
relevant intermediary (usually the CSD) are performed by other 
persons often called account operators, Article 7 requires the 
Contracting State to make a declaration. In particular, it requests 
the Contracting State to: 
(a) identify by name or description the CSD (or the relevant 
intermediary) on one hand, and the persons who are 
responsible for the performance of some intermediary 
functions on the other; 
(b) specify the functions for which these persons are 
responsible and the Convention provisions that apply to 
them; and, 
(c) where applicable, specify the categories of securities to 
which this function sharing applies.  
 In such transparent systems, the core principles and rules 
summarised in paragraph 102 do apply to the CSD (or the relevant 
intermediary) and to the other persons in accordance with the 
sharing of functions described in paragraph 103, and lawmakers 
may also wish to clarify in non-Convention law how the 
responsibilities and functions are split. For more information on 
Article 7 and the optional declaration thereunder, see paragraphs 
206-207 below. 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits any other 
declaration in respect of the matters discussed in this section.  
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3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 The following matters are to be addressed or clarified by 
law outside the Convention. First, the law should determine the 
extent of information that an intermediary must regularly pass on 
to account holders relating to intermediated securities and to what 
extent an intermediary must pass on to account holders any 
distribution received in relation to intermediated securities. Articles 
9(1)(a)(ii) and 10(2)(e)-(f). Second, more generally, the law should 
determine how an intermediary must enable account holders to 
exercise the rights (if any) that they are entitled to exercise vis-à-
vis the issuer. Article 9(1)(a). Third, the law should specify when a 
personal representative (such as the guardian of a minor, the 
administrator of an estate or an insolvency, etc.) may give 
instructions in lieu of the account holder. Article 23(2)(d). Fourth, 
the law may impose additional duties on intermediaries as required 
to support the exercise of account holders’ rights and should specify 
the manner in which intermediaries may comply with their legal 
and Convention duties. Article 28(1)-(2). 
 In transparent systems, moreover, law outside the 
Convention should clearly allocate all those duties between the 
CSD and the account operators who are responsible for the 
performance of some intermediary functions.  
 At the outset, it is worth noting that, in the provisions 
discussed in this section, the Convention refers generally to the 
non-Convention law and, to the extent allowed by the non-
Convention law, to the account agreement between the 
intermediary and the account holder or to uniform rules of a SSS. 
See generally Part V.C below. It is impossible for legal provisions 
to cover the entirety of the operational obligations of an 
intermediary. It is thus quite frequent that legal provisions are 
supplemented by contractual provisions in the account agreement, 
and it is always the case that uniform rules of settlement systems 
contain extensive and minute prescriptive provisions regulating the 
respective obligations of the operator and the participants to the 
system.  
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 One should also keep in mind that law outside the 
Convention, including the term “non-Convention law”, not only 
refers to statutory instruments but also to decrees and regulations. 
In most systems, the duties of intermediaries are the subject matter 
of a more or less extensive set of statutory provisions supplemented 
by sometimes extensive regulations of a technical nature issued by 
a ministry, a regulatory agency or the central bank within the 
framework of their respective regulatory powers. 
a. Passing on information and distributions received  
 For unregistered (bearer) securities, and often for registered 
securities (where the shareholder or bondholder is identified in a 
register maintained by or on behalf of the issuer), information and 
payments provided by the issuer to the securities holders will 
actually go down through the chain of intermediaries. Other 
“corporate actions” may require or enable the account holder to 
declare choices (such as providing voting instructions concerning 
resolutions proposed to the general meeting, accepting a tender 
offer, exercising an option, etc.), which must be passed up the 
holding chain. It is generally so that the law affirms a duty on each 
intermediary to pass on such information, distribution or 
declaration, but leaves the particulars to be regulated in the account 
agreement. 
 The duty to pass on distributions needs some qualifications. 
There may be several reasons why a payment received directly or 
indirectly from the issuer by an intermediary should not be 
transferred to the account holder, such as when the intermediary 
itself or a third party has a security interest in the intermediated 
securities.  
b. Enabling the exercise of other rights against the 
issuer 
 Many rights attached to the securities cannot merely be 
passed on to the account holder. To exercise such rights, the 
account holder must make a choice or a declaration such as issuing 
a vote or giving a power to vote to another person. Or the account 
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holder may need to take an action such as filing a claim in the 
issuer’s bankruptcy or filing a derivative suit against the issuer’s 
directors. In most cases, the account holder will need the assistance 
of the relevant intermediary (and possibly other intermediaries in 
the holding chain) to convey its declaration to the issuer or to certify 
its position as a shareholder or bondholder.  
 While it is unlikely that all situations can be anticipated, the 
law should deal with the most common situations and possibly lay 
out a general principle or test to solve other situations as they may 
come. More specific provisions in account agreements or in the 
uniform rules of a SSS could supplement the legal provisions. For 
various reasons, including to reduce risks inherent in holding 
chains, the law might be permit a foreign intermediary to hold in an 
intermediated holding system without the necessity of holding 
through a local intermediary.  
c. Giving effect to authorised instructions 
 First and foremost, an intermediary owes its duties to the 
account holder, who is generally authorised to give instructions for 
the intermediary to take action. Under certain circumstances, 
however, another person may give binding instructions to the 
intermediary. That person’s power to give instructions may be 
additional to the general power of the account holder, or it may limit 
(e.g. when the other person has negative control – see paragraph 
146 below – over intermediated securities as the result of an interest 
granted to it) or exclude (e.g. when the account holder is legally 
incapacitated) the validity of instructions given by the account 
holder. 
 Article 23(2) contemplates situations in which another 
person is authorised to give instructions to the intermediary. The 
list includes persons to whom an interest has been granted in the 
intermediated securities; a person who has power to give an 
instruction under the account agreement or the uniform rules of a 
SSS; and a court or administrative authority empowered by law to 
issue an order in respect of intermediated securities. 
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 Many other situations are not contemplated by the 
Convention but derive from general principles or specific rules of 
the non-Convention law. They may include the power of a guardian 
over the assets of its pupil or a ward of court, an executor over the 
assets of an estate, an insolvency administrator over the assets 
subject to the insolvency; the power of directors or officers of an 
issuer; powers of attorney; etc.  
 The law should therefore clarify generally or by specific 
provisions which and when such powers are effective against an 
intermediary and to what extent such powers displace the account 
holder’s own power to give instructions. 
d. Specifying the manner of complying with Convention 
obligations 
 The general duty of intermediaries to enable the exercise of 
their account holders’ rights and the four specific obligations laid 
down by the Convention are expressed in general terms. This may 
create a degree of uncertainty for intermediaries. To reduce this 
uncertainty, Article 28(1) provides that the non-Convention law 
may specify the content and the manner in which an intermediary 
complies with its Convention obligations. The law may 
alternatively allow such issues to be specified in the account 
agreement or, where applicable, in the uniform rules of a SSS. One 
should keep in mind that any reference to the law is not limited to 
statutory instruments but includes regulations as well. 
 Article 28(2) states that, where an intermediary complies 
with a provision of non-Convention law – or alternatively the 
account agreement or uniform rules of a SSS to the extent permitted 
by such law – that specifies the substance of an obligation under 
the Convention, it satisfies the Convention obligation. However, 
such law cannot make the Convention obligation so minimal that it 
amounts to no obligation in substance. See Official Commentary, 
paragraph 28-14. 
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C. Liability of intermediaries  
Legislative Principle 3:  The Convention does not specify the 
liability of intermediaries. The law should clearly establish the 
conditions and the extent of such liability, and whether it may be 
exempted by way of contractual provisions. 
 The Convention does not set out the conditions under which 
an intermediary becomes liable to its account holders or to other 
persons. Article 28(3). Non-Convention law should therefore 
determine the conditions and the effects of a breach of duty by an 
intermediary and by other persons such as account operators in 
transparent systems, where duties may be split. Non-Convention 
law may do so by providing a set of rules specific to the functioning 
of the intermediated holding system, or by referring to its general 
provisions and, where necessary, supplement or modify them to 
reflect adequately the specificities of the system.  
 Non-Convention law should specify whether that liability 
may be modified or excluded by the account agreement or by the 
uniform rules of a SSS. That law, however, cannot derogate from 
Article 28(4), which states that an intermediary may not exclude 
liability for its gross negligence or wilful misconduct.  
 Of particular concern is the liability of an intermediary for 
a failure by its (own) relevant intermediary or other intermediaries 
(which, as noted in paragraph 29 above, may be referred to as “sub-
custodians”) in a holding chain. Where holding chains involve 
several intermediaries and, in particular, cross national borders, an 
account holder may be exposed to risk and loss due to the actions 
or omissions of intermediaries with which it has no direct 
relationship. The non-Convention law should address these risks by 
setting, at a minimum, a duty upon a relevant intermediary to use 
care in the selection and monitoring of intermediaries that it 
employs. But the non-Convention law might set upon 
intermediaries duties (and corresponding liability) beyond such a 
duty of care. Such law, for example, might require a relevant 
intermediary to ensure that its account agreements with other 
intermediaries impose on those intermediaries duties not less 
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protective than those the relevant intermediary has assumed under 
the non-Convention law and the account agreement with respect to 
its account holders. It might reach even further by requiring this other 
intermediary to impose similar duties on its own upper-tier 
intermediaries. As a practical matter, however, States should proceed 
with caution so as not to restrict unduly, geographically or otherwise, 
the investments that account holders could feasibly acquire.  
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PART IV - TRANSFER OF INTERMEDIATED 
SECURITIES 
 The ability to buy and sell intermediated securities and 
create and grant interests in them is essential to the functioning of 
capital markets. To promote the sound functioning of markets, as 
set out in this Part of the Guide, States should establish or revise 
their laws consistent with the following principles, rules, and 
related guidance on transfer of intermediated securities, in 
particular regarding (a) acquisition and disposition of intermediated 
securities, (b) unauthorised dispositions and reversal, (c) protection 
of an innocent acquirer, and (d) priorities. 
A. Acquisition and disposition of intermediated securities 
Legislative Principle 4: The Convention provides that 
intermediated securities or any limited interests therein may be 
transferred by debits and credits. The law also may adopt any one 
or more of the other methods specified by the Convention.  
 The transfer of intermediated securities and any limited 
interests (e.g. security interests) may occur by various methods. 
Some methods for transfer rely on book-entries in securities 
accounts, such as the debit and credit method and the designating 
entry method. Not all methods for transfer, however, require such 
entries. This section deals with transfer by the debit and credit 
method and by other methods. 
1. Transfer by debit and credit method 
a. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• Intermediated securities are acquired when a credit is 
entered in the securities account of the transferee, and they 
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are disposed of when a debit is made to the securities account 
of the transferor. Article 11(1) and 11(3). 
• Limited interests in intermediated securities, such as 
security interests, may also be transferred by debit and credit 
entries in the securities accounts of the transferor and the 
transferee respectively. Article 11(4). 
• No further steps, such as publicity or registration 
requirements, are necessary to make such acquisition 
effective against third parties. Article 11(2). 
 As intermediated securities exist as book-entries in 
securities accounts, debits to the transferor’s account and credits to 
the transferee’s account play an essential role in intermediated 
holding systems. Such debits and credits, however, do not occur in 
a void as they are based on the transactions agreed between the 
transferors and the transferees and generally result from 
instructions issued by them to their respective intermediaries. 
Based on that transaction and the underlying interests transferred, 
the debits and credits may represent the transfer of a full interest in 
intermediated securities or a limited one. 
 Debits and credits have become the universal method for 
transferring intermediated securities. As a result, the Convention 
requires that this method of transfer be available to all account 
holders. The Convention further requires that, as discussed in Part 
IV.B, a debit be authorised by the account holder and, to ensure 
legal certainty for transferees against third parties, no further step 
may be necessary to render that transfer effective. 
 Apart from these core harmonising rules, because of the 
diversity of legal rules and operational systems in intermediated 
holding worldwide, the Convention leaves to non-Convention law 
various important issues, which are discussed below.  
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b. Choices to be made by declaration 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits declarations in 
respect of the matters discussed in this section.  
c. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 The following matters are to be addressed or clarified. First, 
the law should determine whether a “no credit without debit” rule, 
whereby any credit to a securities account must have a 
corresponding debit to another securities account, is to apply to 
transfers by this method. Second, the law should also determine 
whether to permit net settlement of intermediated securities 
transactions. Article 11(5). Third, consideration should be given to 
whether the law should determine what constitutes a debit and a 
credit.  
 Relatedly, what limited interests may be transferred by a 
credit to a securities account – or by the other methods described in 
paragraph 138 et seq. below – is entirely for the non-Convention 
law to determine, as the Convention is silent in this regard. See 
paragraphs 94-97 above and 158 below. In addition, although no 
further steps may be required for effectiveness against third parties, 
the law should clearly define when a debit or credit is valid and 
when a debit is or can be made conditional. Articles 11(1)-(2) and 
16 and see paragraphs 165-168 below. 
(i) The connection between debits and credits  
 The connection between debits and credits is an area of 
significant divergence between various domestic legal and 
regulatory regimes. Most legal systems of the civil law tradition, 
for example, follow the “no credit without debit” rule and consider 
that the intermediated securities debited from the transferor’s 
account are the very same ones that are credited to the transferee’s 
account. In other words, in a given securities transaction, the 
equivalent property that is relinquished by the transferor is acquired 
by the transferee and the book-entries for that transaction should 
occur at the same time, though this does not always occur in 
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practice. If not simultaneous, the law ensures that there is a single 
conceptual instance for the acquisition and disposition and that any 
mismatch between the relevant securities accounts is resolved as 
soon as possible. It may also provide that the credit to the 
transferee’s account prevails over any remaining credit to the 
transferor’s account.  
 Legal systems of the common law tradition, however, do 
not necessarily make such a connection. In a trust system, for 
example, account holders acquire an equitable interest in the assets 
held by their intermediary as beneficiaries of a trust. When an 
account holder sells securities, that account holder is not legally 
transferring its equitable interest to the transferee. Instead, that 
equitable interest – derived from the intermediary’s holding – is 
extinguished, and a comparable interest is created by the 
transferee’s intermediary for the transferee. In a security 
entitlement system, as another example, a similar analysis applies. 
The transferor’s entitlement with its intermediary is extinguished, 
and another entitlement is created by the transferee’s intermediary 
for the transferee.  
 The Convention fully defers on these issues and, depending 
on how intermediated securities are characterised (see paragraph 85 
et seq.), the non-Convention law should determine whether a “no 
credit without debit” rule is to apply. 
(ii) Debits and credits on a net basis 
 As noted in paragraph 20 above, where multiple 
transactions are made every day, it makes sense not to transfer gross 
quantities per transaction but, where possible, to net transfer 
obligations at predetermined times and to transfer only the resulting 
net amount. In systems in which net settlement of intermediated 
securities transactions is permitted, to the extent that there are 
matching debits and credits to accounts maintained by the 
intermediary for its account holders, there need not be precisely 
matching entries in the intermediary’s accounts maintained with its 
upper-tier intermediary. Such entries, however, should simply 
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reflect the net overall change in the aggregate balance of its account 
holders taken together.  
 The Convention does not mandate recognition of netting 
arrangements. See Article 11(5). Non-Convention law thus may 
allow or disallow debits and credits to be made on a net basis in the 
accounts of an intermediary with an upper-tier intermediary to 
reflect, for securities of the same description, the net result of all 
movements in the accounts maintained by that intermediary for 
account holders and its own holdings. Such law should address and 
determine whether to provide for recognition of netting 
arrangements.  
(iii) Definition of debit or credit 
 It is for the non-Convention law to determine what 
constitutes entries such as debits and credits as the Convention is 
silent in this regard. Such a definition, if necessary, may be found 
in some legal or regulatory provisions of the non-Convention law 
or, possibly, in the uniform rules of an SSS. 
2. Transfer by other methods 
a. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The Convention expressly recognises three optional 
additional methods for an account holder to transfer 
intermediated securities or any interest therein.  
• An account holder may grant an interest by entering 
into a valid agreement with its intermediary (Article 
12(3)(a)), with another person and by having a designating 
entry (earmarking) made in favour of that person in its 
security account (Article 12(3)(b)), or by entering into a valid 
control agreement with the intermediary that permits that 
person to exercise control over the securities (Article 
12(3)(c)). 
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• For these methods, as for the debit and credit method, 
no further steps may be required for effectiveness against 
third parties. Articles 12(1)-(2). The non-Convention law 
should be reviewed to determine whether any further step or 
steps are required and, if any exist, they should be eliminated. 
As to the invalidity or reversal of a designating entry or other 
book-entry, see Article 16 and paragraphs 165-168 below. 
• Other methods for transfer may be maintained in the 
non-Convention law. Article 13. 
 The Convention expressly provides four methods for 
transferring intermediated securities or any limited interests 
therein: the debit and credit method in Article 11 and three 
additional methods in Article 12. The three additional methods, 
although present to varying extents around the world, have not 
reached the same level of universal acceptance as the debit and 
credit method. Accordingly, under the Convention, the debit and 
credit method must be recognised, whereas the three additional 
methods are optional. 
 Apart from the methods expressly provided in the 
Convention, Contracting States are entitled to use additional 
methods under Article 13. Subject to certain limitations described 
below, Article 13 permits States to accommodate alternative 
methods for transfer (e.g. an existing one that a State may wish to 
retain) in that State’s legal framework. 
b. Choices to be made by declaration 
 Article 12 sets out a number of options with respect to the 
three additional methods, and States may wish to consider whether 
to provide for or retain one, two, all or none of these methods in 
their non-Convention law. The additional methods provided by 
Article 12 are the following: 
(a) Designating entry (or earmarking): besides a valid 
agreement between parties, this method requires a book-entry in 
favour of the transferee in the transferor’s securities account, 
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made by the relevant intermediary according to the transferor’s 
instructions; 
(b) Control agreement: a valid agreement between the parties 
is accompanied not by a book-entry in the transferor’s securities 
account, but rather the control agreement directly states those 
conditions or obligations under which the relevant intermediary 
must act to the benefit of the transferee; and 
(c) Agreement with relevant intermediary (or automatic 
perfection): an interest is created when the account holder 
and its relevant intermediary enter into a valid agreement. 
There is no other condition to be met because the agreement 
binds the very same parties that would be needed for a control 
agreement, and the position of the intermediary is secured by 
the control it has over the securities account that it maintains 
for the account holder. 
 All these methods have in common that the intermediated 
securities in which interests are transferred remain credited to the 
transferor’s securities account. Further, two steps are required for 
each: (a) the transferor and the transferee enter into a valid 
agreement regarding the interest to be granted; and (b) the condition 
specific to the relevant method is satisfied.  
(i) Positive and negative control  
 Because designating entries are book-entries like debits and 
credits, they conform in many ways with this universal method for 
transfer and are preferred in many systems. The book-entry also 
serves as a form of publicity, but this is generally of very limited 
value because securities accounts are not public registries to be 
consulted without authorisation. Account statements, moreover, 
may become out of date within minutes of being generated. 
 Other systems prefer control agreements, which do not 
require a book-entry in the transferor’s account and allow for 
contractual provisions regulating the relationship between the 
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transferor, transferee and, in typical instances, the relevant 
intermediary. 
 As the intermediated securities in relation to which an 
interest is granted by designating entry or control agreement remain 
in the transferor’s securities account, it is not enough that a book-
entry be made or an agreement be in place reflecting the existence 
of that interest. That entry or agreement must also have certain 
effects protecting the transferee against possible unauthorised 
actions regarding the relevant securities.  
 For protection in this regard, non-Convention law is to 
determine whether a designating entry or a control agreement 
provides the transferee of the interest with “positive” or “negative” 
control, or both. Positive control requires the intermediary 
maintaining the transferor’s account to comply with any 
instructions given by the transferee in relation to those 
intermediated securities as may be provided by the account 
agreement, control agreement, or the uniform rules of an SSS, 
without further consent of the transferor. Negative control requires 
that the intermediary maintaining the transferor’s account may not 
comply with any instructions given by the transferor in relation to 
the relevant intermediated securities without the transferee’s 
consent. See Articles 1(k) and 1(l).  
(ii) Interests transferable by the three methods 
 In many systems, these three additional methods are 
typically used to transfer limited interests in intermediated 
securities, such as security interests. Like the debit and credit 
method under Article 11, however, the three additional methods 
provided in Article 12 are capable of granting any type of interest 
in intermediated securities under the non-Convention law, 
including a full interest, even though transferees of intermediated 
securities typically prefer to have them credited to their securities 
accounts.  
 Under the Convention, these three methods are not 
restricted to transferring limited interests, despite the fact that they 
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are primarily used for doing so, because such a restriction would 
require defining the content of particular concepts, such as security 
interests. This would undermine the Convention’s functional 
approach and interfere with the property notions of various 
domestic systems. 
 In line with commercial practices in numerous markets, 
Article 12(4) provides that any of these methods may be used to 
grant an interest in respect of: 
(a)  an entire securities account, so that it applies to all 
intermediated securities credited from time to time standing 
to the credit of that account; or 
(b)  a specified category of intermediated securities, or a 
specified quantity or value of intermediated securities, 
standing to the credit of a given securities account.  
(iii) Declarations 
 What methods for transfer are available in which legal 
systems is important information for investors and intermediaries. 
This is why the Convention promotes the three optional methods 
(in addition to the debit and credit method). If a Contracting State 
wishes to adopt one or more of those methods, a declaration is 
required regarding which methods they have chosen and, if 
applicable, to specify the type of control resulting from a 
designating entry or control agreement.  
 A Contracting State may also limit via declaration the 
possibilities provided under Article 12(4). See paragraph 149.  
 The purpose of such declarations is to enhance international 
transparency and legal predictability, and they may be subsequently 
modified. For more information on these optional declarations 
under Article 12(5)-(7), see the Declarations Memorandum, 
Section 4.D and accompanying Forms No. 4A to 4F. 
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 Furthermore, if a State chooses both designating entries and 
control agreements, it should also consider whether both methods 
rank equally or if an interest granted by a designating entry always 
has priority over an interest granted by way of a control agreement, 
in which case this should be the subject matter of a declaration. See 
Article 19(7) and paragraph 189 below. 
c. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
(i) Valid agreement required 
 Each of the three additional methods for transfer requires 
that the account holder enter into an agreement with or in favour of 
the person to whom an interest is granted. Non-Convention law 
determines the nature, scope, and extent of the interest granted, may 
establish formal requirements for such agreement, and may 
distinguish among classes of account holders. It also determines the 
consequences for an agreement that is invalid or ineffective for 
reasons such as lack of formality, lack of capacity, mistake, and 
illegality.  
(ii) Other methods for transfer under non-
Convention law 
 The four methods for transfer expressly identified in the 
Convention are not exclusive. Indeed, additional methods, as 
recognised by Article 13, are not precluded by the Convention. 
There are a number of policy choices to be made with respect to 
such non-Convention methods. States may wish to consider 
whether these aspects of intermediated securities law are to be 
standalone (with creation of special methods) or part of existing 
laws or rules within their domestic system. States may preserve 
existing methods or consider other approaches to ensure effective 
transfers of interests. 
 Transfers according to such other methods are not eligible 
for the protection of an innocent acquirer under Article 18, though 
they may be protected by a similar provision of non-Convention 
law. See paragraphs 180-181 below. Their priorities are determined 
by the non-Convention law, except that they are subordinated to all 
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interests that become effective against third parties under Article 
12. See paragraphs 196-197 below. 
 A Contracting State should consider existing methods for 
transfer falling under Article 13 and whether they should be 
retained. 
(iii) Limited interests that can be granted  
 What limited interests may be granted by a method under 
Article 12 is entirely for the non-Convention law to determine. For 
discussion, see paragraphs 94-97 above. 
(iv) Non-consensual security interests 
 Article 12(8) references non-consensual security interests 
(e.g. statutory liens, purchase-money liens, etc.), which are not 
regulated by the Convention. Such interests arise, become effective 
against third parties and enjoy the priority determined by the 
applicable law. As discussed in paragraphs 192-195 below, States 
may wish to consider how these types of interests are addressed in 
their law. 
B. Unauthorised dispositions and invalidity, reversal and 
conditions   
Legislative Principle 5:  The Convention provides that an 
intermediary may only dispose of intermediated securities with 
the authorisation of the person(s) affected by the disposition. The 
law may provide for other cases of authorised dispositions, and it 
should establish the consequences of unauthorised dispositions. 
The law should also determine whether and in what 
circumstances a book entry is invalid, reversible, or conditional, 
and the consequences thereof. 
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
66 GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES 
 
• Debits of securities to a securities account, designating 
entries or the removal of designating entries or any other 
disposition of intermediated securities may only be made 
with the authorisation of the person(s) negatively affected by 
the disposition. Article 15(1)(a)-(d). 
• Such authorisation may also be contained in the non-
Convention law. Article 15(1)(e).  
• The non-Convention law and, to the extent permitted 
by the non-Convention law, the account agreement or the 
uniform rules of a SSS determine the consequences of 
dispositions lacking the required authorisation. Article 15(2). 
• This corresponds with the Convention’s general rule 
that non-Convention law determines whether and in what 
circumstances a debit, credit, designating entry or removal of 
a designating entry is invalid, is liable to be reversed or may 
be subject to a condition, and the consequences thereof. See 
Articles 15(2) and 16. 
• With respect to unauthorised designating entries, the 
consequences of unauthorised dispositions provided in the 
non-Convention law are subject to the protection of innocent 
acquirers. Article 18(2). 
 The general idea of Article 15 is that dispositions of 
intermediated securities must be authorised by the person(s) 
affected by those dispositions. Article 15(1)(a)-(d) specify such 
dispositions, including dispositions in accordance with Articles 11, 
12 and 13, and the persons by whom the intermediary must be 
authorised. The prerequisites of a valid authorisation are not 
regulated by the Convention. But the authorisation itself may be 
given by any kind of express or implied consent under the 
Convention, including instructions of the affected person. 
Article 10(2)(c). The non-Convention law may additionally 
provide authorisation by operation of law and not by the affected 
person(s).  
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 The consequences of unauthorised dispositions are deferred 
to non-Convention law. Dispositions under Article 15(1) are not 
necessarily associated with book-entries (e.g. Articles 12(3)(a), 
12(3)(c), 13). But insofar as unauthorised dispositions implicate a 
(removal of a) book-entry in a securities account, Article 15(2) 
replicates the general rule that the validity, reversibility and 
conditionality of book-entries in securities accounts are determined 
by the non-Convention law. Article 16. The non-Convention law 
may permit that the account agreement or the uniform rules of a 
SSS also determine the consequences of unauthorised dispositions 
and whether book-entries are defective. Articles 15(2), 16, 17(d).  
 The relevance of the non-Convention law is subject to the 
protection of the innocent acquirer. Articles 15(2), 16, 18. The 
reason why only unauthorised designating entries are mentioned in 
Article 15(2) and expressly made subject to Article 18(2) is that 
only such book-entries may directly result in defective entries. In 
the case of other unauthorised dispositions, later resulting in a 
defective (credit or designating) entry, however, an innocent person 
may, by a subsequent transaction, also acquire an interest in 
intermediated securities free of adverse claims. 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits declarations in 
respect of the matters discussed in this section.  
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
a. Defining authorisation of dispositions and the 
consequences of unauthorised dispositions 
 While the Convention states that an intermediary may only 
dispose of intermediated securities with the authorisation of the 
person affected by the disposition, the authorisation required by 
Article 15 may also be contained in (general provisions of) the non-
Convention law.  
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 The law should clarify the consequences of dispositions that 
are not authorised by the person who is negatively affected by the 
disposition. Article 15(2). The non-Convention law may defer this 
decision to the general provisions of its law, to the account 
agreement or the uniform rules of a SSS. 
 The non-Convention law may also regard such unauthorised 
dispositions neither as void nor as liable to be reversed but, for 
instance, as a mere breach of contract between the intermediary and 
the person affected by the unauthorised disposition.  
 To some extent, the consequences of unauthorised 
dispositions may be dependent on the intermediated securities 
holding model chosen by the respective State. See generally Part 
I.B above. For example, in the co-ownership system of a European 
civil law State, unauthorised debits are void, though the subsequent 
acquisition by an innocent person may be protected, having the 
result that the account holder of the wrongly debited securities 
account would lose its proprietary interest. In the security 
entitlement system of a North American common law State, 
unauthorised debits are also void, and the relevant intermediary is 
obligated to re-credit the securities account which was wrongly 
debited, thereby re-establishing that account holder’s security 
entitlement. 
b. Clarifying validity requirements and conditions of 
book-entries 
 In general, the law should clarify whether and in what 
circumstances book-entries are void, are liable to be reversed or are 
conditional. Article 16.  
 The law should also address the consequences of the 
reversibility of unauthorised or defective (credit or designating) 
book-entries. In particular, the law has to determine whether the 
reversal of book-entries has retroactive effect or ex nunc effect. 
Likewise, decisions have to be made in case of conditional book-
entries when the condition is not fulfilled. The non-Convention law 
may defer this decision to the general provisions of its law or to the 
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account agreement or the uniform rules of a SSS. Articles 15(2), 16 
and see paragraphs 132-134 above (regarding the “no credit without 
debit” rule). 
 The law has to make clear that the consequences of 
unauthorised dispositions and defective (credit or designating) 
book-entries that are determined by the non-Convention law are 
subject to the overriding principle of the protection of an innocent 
acquirer. Article 18 and see also Articles 15(2), 16.  
C. Protection of an innocent acquirer 
Legislative Principle 6: The Convention provides that an innocent 
acquirer who acquires for value is protected against adverse 
claims. This protection covers instances in which (a) another 
person has an interest in intermediated securities which is 
violated by the acquisition, and (b) the acquisition could be 
affected by an earlier defective entry. The law may extend the 
scope of this protection.  
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The innocent acquirer who acquires for value is 
protected against adverse claims. The innocent acquirer is 
protected if another person has an interest in intermediated 
securities which is violated by the acquisition. Article 18(1). 
The innocent acquirer is also protected against the invalidity 
or reversibility of an earlier defective entry. Article 18(2). 
• With regard to earlier defective entries, the acquisition 
by an innocent person is, to the extent permitted by the non-
Convention law, subject to the uniform rules of a SSS or the 
account agreement. Article 18(5). 
• The Convention also protects against other claims (e.g. 
damages or unjust enrichment) that may be asserted against 
the innocent acquirer by the person who holds the right or 
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interest or would otherwise benefit from the invalidity or 
reversal of the defective entry. Article 18(1)(c) and 18(2)(b). 
• The protection of the innocent acquirer is limited to 
instances in which the acquirer has given (any kind of) value, 
which has to be understood in a broad sense. See 
Article 18(3) and Official Commentary, paragraphs 18-15 to 
18-16. 
• The priority of interests in the same intermediated 
securities is, however, not regulated by Article 18, but by 
Articles 19 and 20(2). See Articles 18(6) and 19 and 
paragraphs 182-188 below. 
 The general idea of Article 18 is not only to protect the 
innocent acquirer, but also to immunise onward transfers against 
the consequential risk of being removed or reversed based on 
another person’s interest in the intermediated securities or on an 
earlier defective entry. Article 17, for its part, provides definitions 
which are relevant for the operation of Article 18, including the 
following: 
(a)  The term “acquirer” is defined in a broad sense, including 
the acquisition of a security interest or another limited interest. 
Article 17(a). 
(b)  The acquirer is innocent, unless the acquirer actually knows 
or ought to know, at the relevant time, of another person’s 
interest or of an earlier defective entry. Considering the short 
time frame of transactions in intermediated securities that are 
effectuated through impersonal markets, an acquirer has no 
general duty of inquiry or investigation in order to meet the 
standard of innocence. See Article 17(b) and, as to the standard 
of “ought to know”, Official Commentary, paragraphs 17-8 to 
17-14. 
(c)  The question whether organisations actually know or ought 
to know of an interest or fact has to be determined by reference 
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to the individual responsible for the matter to which the interest 
or fact is relevant. Article 17(c).  
(d)  A defective entry is a credit of securities or designating 
entry that is invalid or liable to be reversed. Article 17(d). 
(e)  The relevant time at which the acquirer must be innocent is 
usually the time that the credit is made. Article 17(e). Since 
interests in intermediated securities may become effective 
without a credit entry in the securities account, the relevant time 
is, in this case, determined by the time when those interests have 
been made effective against third parties. Article 19(3). 
 The protection of the innocent acquirer thus covers 
situations in which the other person’s interest in the intermediated 
securities is violated by the acquisition. Article 18(1). Article 18(2) 
extends this protection to situations in which the earlier defective 
entry does not constitute an interest in the intermediated securities 
at the relevant time of acquisition, but bears the risk of resulting in 
the innocent acquisition being reversed. The scope of application 
of Article 18(1) and Article 18(2) may overlap. 
 As the results under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 18 are 
identical, the distinction between these paragraphs is usually not 
relevant. The protection under Article 18(1) is not subject to law 
outside the Convention. The protection under Article 18(2), 
however, may be subject to any provision of the uniform rules of a 
SSS or the account agreement. See Article 18(5).  
 The function and meaning of Articles 18(1) and (2) depend 
on the (general) provisions of the law of the respective State for two 
reasons. First, Article 18(1) protects an innocent acquirer of 
intermediated securities against any competing claim from another 
person and ensures that he or she may acquire the securities even if 
a corresponding debit has not been made. This is relevant even in a 
so-called matching system (i.e. a system in which credit entries 
have to correspond with an equivalent number or amount of debits). 
In a system which allows for the acquisition of intermediated 
securities without corresponding debits, however, the innocent 
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acquisition principle has more the character of a limitation of the 
acquisition, which is generally possible by the person to whose 
securities account the credit was made. In such a system, the 
protection of an innocent acquirer may create a shortfall or 
imbalance in securities that States might decide to resolve by 
requiring regular or periodic reconciliation by issuers or 
intermediaries (including CSDs) or by using the intermediary’s 
securities, if any, to correct the shortfall. See paragraph 217 below.  
 Second, in a Contracting State that regards the transfer (of 
rights) as a contract that is separate and abstract from the underlying 
contract, the transfer of intermediated securities is not directly 
affected by the invalidity (rescission) of the underlying contract 
(principle of abstraction). Hence, the transfer is, in principle, valid, 
even though the acquired right or interest has to be returned on the 
ground of unjust enrichment. The situation is, of course, different 
if the transfer itself is void. But in this case the acquirer will already 
be protected under Article 18(1). Consequently, resort to Article 
18(2) may not be necessary in such a State.  
 Lawmakers should be aware that the rights and liabilities of 
acquirers in case they are not protected by Article 18(1) or 
Article 18(2) are determined by the applicable law. Article 18(4) 
replicates the general principle that, if the Convention does not 
provide any special rules, the applicable law will determine the 
rights and liabilities of the respective persons. 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits declarations in 
respect of the matters discussed in this section. 
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 The law should clarify whether and to what extent the rules 
of a SSS or an account agreement may limit the innocent 
acquisition principle of Article 18(2). If so, the consequence is the 
reversal of (a series of) book-entries. The innocent acquisition 
principle under Article 18(1), however, is applicable at any rate. 
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Because the Convention harmonises the “credit side” but not the 
“debit side” of transactions, the non-Convention law may require 
that, in the case of acquisition by an innocent person, a 
corresponding debit must occur in order to avoid an “inflation” of 
securities. See paragraph 176.  
 Lawmakers may also consider whether to extend the scope 
of the protection offered to innocent acquirers under Article 18 and 
determine other circumstances in which an innocent acquisition of 
intermediated securities will be protected. Indeed, law outside the 
Convention may provide more generous protection than that 
provided by Articles 18(1) and 18(2).  
D. Priorities  
Legislative Principle 7: The Convention provides clear priority 
rules that apply among competing claimants to the same 
intermediated securities. The law may supplement and adjust 
these priority rules. The law should address priority contests that 
are not resolved by the Convention.  
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The Convention sets out basic priority rules for 
interests made effective under Articles 12 and 13 with respect 
to the same intermediated securities (i.e. securities credited to 
the same securities account). Article 19. 
• The Convention partially determines the priority 
among an intermediary’s collateral taker and its account 
holder. Article 20. 
• The Convention contains a general transition rule, 
which preserves the priority of interests created under the 
non-Convention law of a Contracting State before the 
Convention has entered into effect in relation to the 
Contracting State. Article 39. 
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 Subject to exceptions mentioned below, interests made 
effective under Article 12 have priority over interests otherwise 
effective under the non-Convention law (i.e. Article 13 interests). 
Article 19(2). 
 Exceptions to the Article 19(2) priority rule are made for 
non-consensual security interests, as to which the Convention 
defers to priority rules under the non-Convention law under Article 
19(5), and for the priority of interests created by an intermediary as 
against the rights and interests of the intermediary’s account 
holders governed by Article 20. 
 Article 19(3) provides the baseline temporal priority rule. 
Interests made effective under Article 12 rank according to the time 
(a) of an intermediary’s acquisition of an interest under Article 
12(3)(a); (b) of the making of a designating entry; and (c) that a 
control agreement is entered into or, if applicable, that the relevant 
intermediary receives notice that a control agreement has been 
entered into. 
 Article 19(4) provides a special non-temporal priority rule. 
If an intermediary holds an effective Article 12 interest and 
subsequently makes a designating entry or enters into a control 
agreement in favour of another person, the other person’s interest 
has priority unless the parties expressly agree otherwise. 
 Article 19(6) permits parties to vary the otherwise 
applicable priorities by agreement, except that applicable law 
governs whether parties may vary the priority of a non-consensual 
security interest. See paragraphs 192-195 below. 
 Under Article 20, an interest granted by an intermediary 
under Article 12 has priority over the rights of the intermediary’s 
account holders unless the intermediary’s grantee knew or ought to 
have known that the interest violated the rights of one or more 
account holders. Article 20(2). This is essentially the same test of 
innocence provided in Article 18(1). The Convention leaves to non-
Convention law the relative priorities in the case of the grant of an 
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interest by the intermediary under Article 13. See paragraphs 196-
197 below. 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
a. Declaration regarding priority of interests granted 
by designating entry 
 A Contracting State may declare that an interest made 
effective by a designating entry has priority over interests granted 
by other methods, subject to the priority rule in Article 19(4). See 
paragraph 186 above. For more information on the optional 
declaration under Article 19(7), see the Declarations 
Memorandum, Section 4.E and accompanying Form No. 5. 
b. Declaration regarding transitional provision 
 Under the transition rule variation in Article 39(2), a 
Contracting State may declare that a pre-existing interest will retain 
its priority under Article 39(1) only if it is made effective under 
Article 12 before the relevant date.  
 Pre-existing interests are defined in Article 39(3)(a) to mean 
consensual interests granted under the non-Convention law other 
than by a credit to a securities account. The relevant date is defined 
in Article 39(3)(b) to mean the date stated by the Contracting State 
in its declaration, but not later than two years after the declaration’s 
effective date. For more information on the optional declaration 
under Article 39(2), see the Declarations Memorandum, Section 4.J 
and accompanying Form No. 10. 
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
a. Non-consensual security interests 
 Because Article 19(5) leaves the priority of non-consensual 
security interests to the applicable law, a Contracting State should 
reconsider any such applicable priority rules for consistency with 
and conformity to the policies embodied in the Convention. 
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 In particular, a Contracting State should consider whether 
the priority of any or all applicable non-consensual security 
interests may be varied by agreement. See Article 19(5)-(6). 
 If the non-Convention law of a Contracting State provides, 
or if a Contracting State is giving consideration to the enactment of 
a law which provides, that an intermediary acting as an agent or 
broker obtains a non-consensual security interest in securities to 
secure an account holder’s obligation to pay for the securities, then 
the Contracting State should consider the priority given (or to be 
given) to that security interest. The Contracting State should 
consider giving first priority to such a non-consensual security 
interest, subject to the operation of Article 19(4). 
 A Contracting State should consider whether a right of 
retention or similar right or interest provided under the State’s civil 
code, commercial code, or both applies to intermediated securities 
for the benefit of the relevant intermediary. The State should 
consider clarifying such provisions with respect to the applicability 
or non-applicability to intermediated securities and, if applicable, 
the priority of such a right or interest. 
b. Priorities regarding interests granted by non-
Convention methods 
 If and to the extent that the priority rules applicable to 
interests created under the non-Convention law of a Contracting 
State differ from those applicable under the Convention, the 
Contracting State should consider conforming those rules to the 
Convention’s rules. 
 In particular, a Contracting State should consider 
conforming the priority rule for an interest granted by an 
intermediary under the non-Convention law (i.e. an Article 13 
interest) to be consistent with Article 20(2). 
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c. Priorities of interests granted by an intermediary 
 Except for the protection of an innocent acquirer contained 
in Article 20(2), the Convention does not determine the result of a 
priority contest between the interests of account holders and an 
effective interest granted by the intermediary under Articles 12 or 
13. Such a priority contest may occur, for example, in the case of 
an insolvent intermediary and the occurrence of a shortfall in 
securities. As such a contest is to be determined by the applicable 
law, a Contracting State may wish to consider its law in this regard 
and, in particular, how that contest should be resolved. See Article 
20(1) and Official Commentary, paragraphs 20-7 to 20-10. 
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PART V - INTEGRITY OF THE 
INTERMEDIATED HOLDING SYSTEM 
A. Prohibition of upper-tier attachment  
Legislative Principle 8:  The Convention, with limited exceptions, 
prohibits any attachment of intermediated securities of an account 
holder against, or so as to affect (a) a securities account of any 
person other than that account holder, (b) the issuer of any 
securities credited to a securities account of that account holder, or 
(c) a person other than the account holder and the relevant 
intermediary. 
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The Convention generally prohibits upper-tier 
attachment, subject to an exception specified under Article 
22(3). See Article 22(1). 
• The phrase “upper-tier attachment” is commonly used 
where a creditor of an account holder attempts to attach 
securities credited to a securities account maintained by an 
intermediary which is not the account holder’s/debtor’s 
relevant intermediary.  
• In other words, upper-tier attachment indicates that the 
creditor tries to attach at an inappropriate tier of the holding 
chain. 
 The prohibition of upper-tier attachment is based on an 
important policy consideration. Permitting such attachment would 
undermine the ability of an intermediary to perform its functions 
and disrupt the integrity of the intermediated securities holding 
system. What should be avoided is that such an attachment order 
blocks securities accounts of other account holders who have 
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nothing to do with the subject matter of the attachment. If upper-
tier attachment is permitted, such blockage could happen because 
upper-tier intermediaries usually do not know and are unable to 
specify what part of the securities or intermediated securities are 
the relevant securities that should be subject to the attachment. 
Even if upper-tier intermediaries can identify the relevant securities 
or intermediated securities, permitting upper-tier attachment could 
produce enormous costs for the relevant upper-tier intermediary in 
identifying the relevant securities or intermediated securities and 
could prevent efficient operations of the intermediated securities 
holding system. Upper-tier intermediaries will, in general, be 
unable to determine if the relevant securities or intermediated 
securities may be subject to a security interest or attachment order 
at the level of the relevant intermediary. The prohibition of upper-
tier attachment thus ensures that the rights of the holders of such a 
security interest or attachment will not be adversely affected, and 
the provided exception to that prohibition is meant for transparent 
systems and to be used with caution. See paragraph 203. 
 This policy is particularly important in the cross-border 
context, inasmuch as if some systems permit upper-tier attachment 
and others do not, it would seriously harm compatibility and thus 
efficiency of cross-border holding of intermediated securities. 
 The definition of attachment is broad. Article 22(2) defines 
“attachment of intermediated securities of an account holder” as 
“any judicial, administrative or other act or process to freeze, 
restrict or impound intermediated securities of that account holder 
in order to enforce or satisfy a judgment, award or other judicial, 
arbitral, administrative or other decision or in order to ensure the 
availability of such intermediated securities to enforce or satisfy 
any future judgment, award or decision.” 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 As an exception to the general prohibition of upper-tier 
attachment, Article 22(3) allows a situation in which an attachment 
is permitted to be made against a person other than the relevant 
intermediary. This is often the case in the context of holding 
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patterns (the so-called “transparent systems”) where the relevant 
intermediary shares its functions with a third person. See Article 7 
and paragraphs 51 and 103 et seq. above. However, the exception 
of Article 22(3) can also apply where there is no holding pattern 
built on such shared functions in the sense of Article 7.  
 In particular, a Contracting State would have to declare that, 
under its non-Convention law, an attachment of intermediated 
securities of an account holder made against or so as to affect a 
person other than the relevant intermediary has effect also against 
the relevant intermediary. Any such declaration would also have to 
identify that other person by name or description and shall specify 
the time at which such an attachment becomes effective against the 
relevant intermediary. 
 The rationale for this exception lies in the general purpose 
of the prohibition of upper-tier attachment (i.e. upper-tier 
attachment risks disrupting the holding chain). However, this 
detrimental effect can be avoided where the applicable law provides 
for special safeguards avoiding such disruption, in particular 
reconciliation mechanisms which allow the relevant intermediary 
and the other person to communicate with each other and have 
procedures in place which guarantee that an attachment made at the 
level of one entity is correctly reflected in the accounts maintained 
by the other entity. 
 In many (probably most) cases, a Contracting State making 
a declaration under Article 22(3) will also have made a declaration 
under Article 7(1) with respect to the sharing of intermediary 
functions. However, Article 22(3) does not limit its applicability to 
such Contracting States as it is based on the assumption that a 
Contracting State that elects to make a declaration under Article 
22(3) will do so rationally and only if a system is in place (through 
the use of information technology or otherwise) which ensures that 
the problems and risks that Article 22(1) is intended to prevent are 
adequately addressed.  
 Where a declaration under Article 22(3) is made, it must 
identify the other person by name or description. Furthermore, it 
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must specify the time at which such an attachment becomes 
effective against the relevant intermediary. The latter requirement 
shows that the decisive account at which to look remains under all 
circumstances the one held for the debtor by the relevant 
intermediary. Only if and when the attachment of intermediated 
securities standing to the credit of that account takes legal effect, 
the intermediated securities are validly frozen, restricted or 
impounded. Until that point, the intermediated securities can be 
disposed of. For more information on the optional declarations 
under Articles 7 and 22(3), see the Declarations Memorandum, 
Section 4.C and accompanying Forms 3.A and 3.B (regarding 
Article 7) and Section 4.F and accompanying Form No. 6 
(regarding Article 22(3)). 
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 To make a declaration under Article 22(3), a Contracting 
state should make sure that, under its non-Convention law, an 
attachment of intermediated securities of an account holder made 
against or so as to affect a person other than the relevant 
intermediary has effect also against the relevant intermediary. If the 
relevant intermediary is a foreign entity, however, attachment made 
against or affecting a person other than the relevant intermediary 
should be permitted only if it has effect against the relevant 
intermediary under the applicable law or as a result of consent or 
contract.  
B. Prevention of shortfalls and allocation of securities 
Legislative Principle 9:  The Convention requires intermediaries 
to prevent shortfalls, notably by holding or having available 
sufficient securities to cover credits to securities accounts that 
these intermediaries maintain. The law should regulate the 
method, manner, and time frame for compliance.  
The Convention also requires intermediaries to allocate securities 
to account holders’ rights. The law may establish a specific form 
of segregation as a method of allocation. 
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1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• An intermediary should hold or have available 
sufficient securities to cover credits made to securities 
accounts it maintains. Article 24. 
• An intermediary should allocate securities to account 
holders’ rights. A common way to do this is segregation. 
Article 25. 
 It is crucial for the integrity of an intermediated securities 
holding system to prevent shortfalls as much as possible, to provide 
for correction mechanisms when they occur, and to have rules in 
place for the distribution of losses due to shortfalls in insolvency. 
The Convention addresses these issues in Articles 24-26. 
Lawmakers should ensure that intermediaries hold or have 
available sufficient securities (Article 24) and that securities are 
allocated to account holders, notably by way of segregation (Article 
25). The Convention rule regarding the distribution of losses in 
insolvency (Article 26) and alternative solutions are dealt with in 
paragraphs 264-265 and 268 below. 
a. Sufficient securities 
 Lawmakers should ensure that an intermediary holds or has 
available sufficient securities to cover credits to securities accounts 
it maintains or, in technical and more precise terms, “hold[s] or 
[has] available securities and intermediated securities of an 
aggregate number or amount equal to the aggregate number or 
amount of securities of that description credited to: (a) securities 
accounts that it maintains for its account holders other than itself; 
and (b) if applicable, securities accounts that it maintains for itself”. 
Article 24(1). 
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b. Allocation 
 In addition to ensuring that intermediaries hold or have 
available sufficient securities and intermediated securities (Article 
24), lawmakers should also make sure that these securities are 
allocated to the rights of the account holders of the intermediary 
concerned (Article 25). This allocation is an important tool in 
determining which assets belong to whom. The allocation should 
take place to account holders other than the intermediary itself. The 
default policy set out in the Convention is that securities are deemed 
to be allocated to such account holders up to the aggregate number 
or amount of their credits, and that these securities are not available 
to the intermediary’s other creditors in case of its insolvency. States 
may, however, deviate from this policy by making a declaration. 
 The Convention does not determine exactly how allocation 
takes place, which is thus left to domestic lawmakers. Article 25(3). 
However, the Convention does mention the commonly applied 
method of segregation. Article 25(4). Two different types of 
segregation can be distinguished in the context of holding through 
upper-tier securities accounts. In the first case of pooled “omnibus 
accounts”, the securities of a certain description that an 
intermediary holds for itself are distinguished from those of all its 
account holders, whose securities of that description are pooled in 
an omnibus account. In the second case of so-called “individual 
segregation”, a distinction is made between an intermediary’s own 
securities and those of particular account holders or groups of 
account holders individually. It should be noted that these different 
methods of segregation can also be combined: an intermediary may 
hold securities of a certain description for (a) itself, (b) one or more 
account holders individually, and (c) remaining account holders in 
an omnibus account. 
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Diagram 213-1: Omnibus account 
In diagram 213-1, Intermediary 4 holds 10000 securities X in two 
accounts with Intermediary 3. An omnibus account contains 5000 
securities X held for Account Holders 1, 2, and 3; another account 
contains 5000 securities X that Intermediary 4 intends to hold for 
itself. Intermediary 3 only knows Intermediary 4, not the identity 
of Account Holders 1, 2, and 3. 
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Diagram 213-2: Individual segregation 
In diagram 213-2, Intermediary 4 holds accounts with 
Intermediary 3 for each of its account holders individually, as well 
as for securities it holds for itself. Intermediary 3 knows the identity 
of Intermediary 4 and of its account holders. In order for the 
individual segregation to be effective throughout the chain, it must 
also be ensured at upper-tiers (Intermediary 2, etc.). 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
a. Sufficient securities 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits declarations in 
respect of the requirement to hold or have available sufficient 
securities. 
b. Allocation 
 The default rule of the Convention is that securities that are 
available under Article 24 are ex Conventione allocated to account 
holders and are not available to the intermediary’s other creditors 
in its insolvency. However, a State may decide to protect the 
intermediary’s other creditors instead of the intermediary’s account 
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holders by giving “proprietary effect” to the segregation by an 
intermediary of securities that it holds for its own account. If the 
non-Convention law of a State so provides and if a declaration is 
made to this end, only the securities allocated to the intermediary’s 
account holders will be available to these account holders, whereas 
all other “own account” securities are available to the 
intermediary’s other creditors. For more information on the 
optional declaration under Article 25(5), see the Declarations 
Memorandum, Section 4.G and accompanying Form No. 7 and 
Official Commentary, paragraph 25-20 and ex. 25-6. 
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
a. Sufficient securities: Available methods, time frame 
for action, and allocation of costs and other 
consequences 
 Lawmakers should decide on the different methods that are 
made available for complying with the requirement to hold or have 
available sufficient securities. Different methods are listed in 
Article 24(2) and include registration in the issuer’s register (either 
in the name or for the account of account holders or in the 
intermediary’s own name), possession of certificates or other 
documents of title, holding intermediated securities with another 
intermediary, or any other appropriate method. The suitability of 
these methods depends on the set-up of a given intermediated 
system.  
 Lawmakers should also consider the time frame within 
which corrective action should be undertaken in case the 
requirement to hold or have available sufficient securities is not 
complied with at any given moment. Article 24(3). Such corrective 
action – to make up the difference – could include an intermediary 
purchasing securities or intermediated securities from the market or 
from one or more of its account holders, or using a securities 
lending arrangement to borrow securities or intermediated 
securities from the market or from its account holders. Again, the 
policy decision on the time frame to be provided depends on the 
set-up of a given system. Some systems envisage an inseparable 
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link between credits and debits (the so-called “no credit without 
debit” rule) and any mismatch within the system is therefore 
conceptually impossible. Other systems envisage some leeway as 
long as there is a form of financial backup to protect account 
holders.  
 Another matter that is left to domestic lawmakers is the 
allocation of cost and any other consequences of non-compliance 
with the requirement to hold or have available sufficient securities. 
Article 24(4). 
b. Allocation and segregation 
 Lawmakers should decide on the available methods of 
allocation, including by way of segregation. See paragraphs 212-
213 above. 
C. Securities clearing and settlement systems 
Legislative Principle 10: The Convention recognises the systemic 
importance of securities clearing or settlement systems, and in 
some instances allows derogations to the rules of the Convention 
to the extent permitted by the law applicable to the system. The 
law should only allow for derogations to the Convention rules 
where such derogations are necessary to ensure the integrity of 
the local securities clearing or settlement systems.  
The law should clearly determine when an instruction or a 
transaction within a securities clearing or settlement system 
becomes irrevocable and final, notwithstanding the insolvency of 
the operator of the system or one of its participants. 
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The Convention contains definitions of an SCS and an 
SSS. See Articles 1(n) and 1(o) and, for discussion, see 
paragraph 70 above and the Glossary. 
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• Only SCSs or SSSs that (a) are central to the reduction 
of risk to the stability of the financial system (i.e. systemically 
important institutions) and (b) have been identified as an SCS 
or SSS in a declaration of the Contracting State qualify as 
such under the Convention. 
 The effective and safe operation of systemically important 
systems requires their internal rules and procedures to be 
enforceable with a high degree of certainty and tailored to their 
particular legal context. This is why Articles 9(1)(c), 10(2)(c), (e), 
(f), 15(1), 16, 18(5), 23(2)(e), 24(4), 26(3), 27(a)-(b), 28(1)-28(2) 
and 28(3) of the Convention provide that the uniform rules of an 
SSS may contain rules which either derogate from the Convention 
or the ordinary laws of the Contracting State. Lawmakers should 
thus give serious consideration to the establishment of SCSs and 
SSSs as an integral part of the infrastructure for the operation of an 
intermediated securities holding system.  
 SSSs which meet the above criteria can benefit from the 
Convention’s exemptions. Although the SSS in its dealings with 
the issuer is in some systems identified as a CSD, the reality is that 
the SSS is a completely different financial market infrastructure 
with a different function from the CSD. Except in systems where 
the SSS is also a CSD, both financial market infrastructures work 
closely to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the intermediated 
securities holding system. To the extent that those dealings include 
the creation, recording and reconciliation of securities vis-à-vis the 
issuer, pursuant to Article 6, they are excluded from the scope of 
the Convention. 
 Article 27, in addition, recognises the effects of law 
applying to SCSs or SSSs which provide for the irrevocability of 
instructions and the finality of recordings in an insolvency scenario 
of a participant to any such system or of the system itself. Such 
irrevocability and finality is important because settlement of 
securities within an SSS or SCS are particularly vulnerable to being 
unwound in an insolvency scenario. There is often a delay between 
entering instructions and the finalisation of the clearing and 
settlement process, and the revocation of instructions once they 
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have been entered could create very significant practical problems 
by causing the unwinding of already netted obligations or 
settlement positions, with potential systemic consequences. In 
order to avoid such consequences, it needs to be ensured that 
transfer orders entered into a system can be settled and that book-
entries would remain effective regardless of whether a participant 
or the system operator becomes insolvent. See Official 
Commentary, paragraph 27-20 et seq. 
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 To ensure predictability for intermediaries, it is important 
that they can easily identify whether an entity or system can 
derogate, either pursuant to the law applicable to it or by virtue of 
its uniform rules, from the rules of the Convention. To that effect, 
the Convention permits each Contracting State to identify in a 
declaration the SCSs or SSSs which are to be subject to it, because 
the effect is to extend the recognition afforded by the Convention 
to uniform rules of a SCS or SSS to those systems specifically 
identified. 
 Only the Contracting State, whose laws govern a system, 
may make a declaration, not the Contracting State whose laws 
govern the agreement between the SCS or SSS and their 
participants (if different). 
 Only SCSs and SSSs that are central to the reduction of risk 
to the stability of the financial system may be identified. This 
means that only systemically important institutions may be listed in 
a declaration. For more information on the optional declarations 
under Articles 1(n)(iii) and 1(o)(iii), see the Declarations 
Memorandum, Section 4.A and accompanying Form No. 1 and 
Official Commentary, paragraph 1-106. 
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 Lawmakers should, with respect to each instance mentioned 
in paragraph 221, carefully consider which derogations to the 
Convention or to their domestic law they shall allow for the 
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operation of SCSs and SSSs. Bearing in mind the complexities 
associated with SCSs and SSSs, lawmakers are referred to the 
references to the Official Commentary contained in Annex 4 on the 
uniform rules of SCSs and SSSs and to the specialised guidance 
provided by, among others, BIS and IOSCO, including the 
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures. 
 In considering such guidance, Contracting States should 
only allow derogations to the Convention rules if such derogations 
are essential to ensure the integrity of the SCS or SSS in light of 
their systemic importance. 
 Further to paragraph 223 above, Contracting States are 
encouraged to introduce rules on irrevocability of instructions and 
finality of recordings with respect to transactions settled through an 
SCS or SSS, and in particular in the case of an insolvency 
proceeding of a participant of the SCS or SSS, or of the SCS or SSS 
itself, in order to ensure the integrity of both the national and 
international financial systems. 
D. Issuers 
Legislative Principle 11: The Convention generally does not deal 
with the relationships between account holders and issuers. The 
law should clearly define the persons entitled to exercise the 
rights attached to the securities vis-à-vis the issuer and the 
conditions for such exercise. The law should facilitate the 
exercise of those rights by the ultimate account holder, in 
particular, by allowing intermediaries who act on behalf of 
account holders to exercise voting rights or other rights in 
different ways, and should recognise holding through 
representatives other than intermediaries (i.e. nominees).  
In the insolvency proceeding of an issuer, the Convention 
provides that an account holder is not precluded from exercising 
a right of set-off merely because it holds securities through 
intermediaries.  
1. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
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• The Convention generally does not deal with the 
relationships between account holders and issuers. Article 8. 
• However, the Convention contains a few exceptions to 
that principle that are considered necessary to achieve 
compatibility of intermediated securities holding systems 
around the world. Articles 29 and 30. 
• Contracting States should permit the holding of publicly 
traded securities through one or more intermediaries, and the 
effective exercise of the rights attached to such securities that 
are so held; in particular, they shall recognise the holding of 
such securities by a person acting in its own name but on 
behalf of another person or other persons and shall permit 
such a person to exercise voting or other rights in different 
ways. Article 29. 
• Contracting States should not discriminate between non-
intermediated and intermediated securities with regard to set-
off rights in relation to the insolvency of the issuer. 
Article  30. 
 As discussed in paragraph 24 above, securities give 
investors certain rights that the Convention refers to as “the rights 
attached to the securities”. See, e.g., Articles 8(2), 9(1)(a)). 
 Investors must be in a position to exercise the rights 
attached to the securities. In intermediated holding systems, 
however, investors may be unable to exercise directly those rights 
against the issuer, because the person who appears in the issuer’s 
register or in the CSD (when this institution replaces that register) 
may not be the ultimate account holder. Issuers may not know who 
the investors are and, accordingly, investors may not be entitled to 
exercise the rights attached to the securities directly against the 
issuers.  
 In this context, the Convention takes as a starting point the 
difference between the exercise of the rights attached to the 
securities (a) vis-à-vis the relevant intermediary and (b) vis-à-vis 
the issuer. The Convention focuses on the relationship between the 
account holder and its intermediary and establishes that the rights 
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attached to the securities belong to the account holder and that the 
intermediary must ensure the exercise of those rights. See Articles 
9-10 and Part III.A-B above.  
 However, the Convention, in principle, does not deal with 
the relationship between account holders and issuers. Article 8 
enshrines this principle. On the one hand, from the account holder’s 
standpoint, the Convention does not affect any right of the account 
holder against the issuer of the securities. Article 8(1). On the other 
hand, from the issuer’s standpoint, the Convention does not 
determine whom the issuer is required to recognise as the 
shareholder, bondholder or other person entitled to receive and 
exercise the rights attached to the securities. Article 8(2). 
 The Convention is therefore neutral as to whether the rights 
attached to the securities are to be exercised by the ultimate account 
holder, its intermediary or any other upper-tier intermediary. This 
is a matter governed by the law applicable to the securities. This 
law also governs the conditions to exercise those rights. For 
example, the law governing the issuer may establish that, when the 
shareholders exercise their voting rights by proxy, a valid proxy 
card must be prepared, signed and submitted to the issuer within a 
certain number of days before the shareholders meeting. These 
rules are not affected by the Convention. 
 This law will usually be the law of the issuer with regard to 
shareholders and the law governing the bonds with regard to 
bondholders (together, sometimes referred to here as the law 
governing the securities). This law can be the law of a Contracting 
or non-Contracting state. That is why on this point Article 9(1)(c) 
refers, among others, to the applicable law and the terms of the 
securities.  
 The shareholder or bondholder must be in a position to 
exercise rights attached to the securities. The exercise of those 
rights can, under applicable law, be done directly through 
intermediaries or through representatives other than intermediaries 
(i.e. nominees). 
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 As shown in diagram 238-1 below, for example, an account 
holder has a securities account with an intermediary. The account 
is located in State B, but the securities credited to that account are 
issued under the law of State A. The Convention does not say 
anything about whether the ultimate account holder, his 
Intermediary (3) or any other intermediary at an upper-tier 
(Intermediary 2 or the CSD (Intermediary 1)) is entitled vis-à-vis 
the issuer to exercise the rights attached to those securities. The law 
of State A may, for example, only recognise as shareholder the 
persons whose names appear in the issuer’s register at a certain 
date. Unless and until the name of the account holder appears on 
such register, the issuer is not obliged to treat that ultimate account 
holder as shareholder. This means the account holder’s right over 
the securities are effective against the intermediary and third parties 
(see Article 9), but the account holder will not be entitled to 
exercise those rights against the issuer. 
 
Diagram 238-1: Application of State A’s law to relationships 
between the Issuer and CSD (Intermediary 1) and the CSD and 
Intermediary 2 
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 Even if under the law governing the securities, however, the 
account holder is not entitled to exercise the rights attached to such 
securities against the issuer, Article 10 establishes that 
intermediaries must take appropriate measures to enable their 
account holders to receive and exercise those rights. As an example 
of such measures, intermediaries should exercise voting rights 
following their instructions or should appoint them as proxy holders 
to attend and vote at the general meeting.  
 Articles 29 and 30 include exceptions to the principle laid 
down by Article 8. Though the Convention does not generally apply 
to the relationships between issuers and account holders, Articles 
29 and 30 contain certain exceptions to this principle that were 
considered necessary to achieve compatibility of intermediated 
securities holding systems around the world.  
 Article 29(1) establishes an element that is crucial for the 
well-functioning of exchanges or regulated markets, in particular to 
ensure cross-border compatibility of the various models of holding 
systems: the recognition of intermediated holding systems. 
Contracting States shall permit publicly traded securities (i.e. the 
securities traded on exchanges or regulated markets of the 
corresponding Contracting State) to be held through one or more 
intermediaries and recognise the effective exercise of the rights 
attached to those securities, and such recognition works with all the 
models, as well as mixed and transparent systems, described in Part 
I.B above. Contracting States, however, are not obliged to require 
that all securities are issued on terms that allow them to be held 
through intermediaries. See Article 29(1) in fine.  
 Furthermore, Article 29(2) adds that Contracting States 
shall recognise the holding of securities by a person acting in its 
own name but on behalf of another, and to permit that person to 
exercise voting rights or other rights in different ways. In particular 
in cross-border scenarios, it is common that intermediaries act in 
their own name (as nominees) but also on behalf of third parties 
(beneficiaries). The purpose of this provision is to ensure 
recognition of this nominee holding fact-pattern to ensure the 
interoperability of different systems.  
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 The Convention, however, does not prevent the non-
Convention law from establishing certain conditions for a person 
(the nominee) to be able to exercise those rights. For instance, the 
law governing the issue (that of State A in diagram 238-1) may 
require the nominee to disclose the name of its clients in order to 
vote in different ways.  
 Article 30 provides an equal footing rule between 
intermediated and non-intermediated securities with regard to set-
off but only in relation to the insolvency of the issuer. If a set-off 
right would have existed and would have been exercisable in a non-
intermediated context (e.g. when the investors hold a certificate of 
bonds), such rights must also exist and be recognised where the 
securities are held through one or more intermediaries. The reach 
of this provision is very limited, as it only prevents Contracting 
States from discriminating on the mere fact of the intermediation. 
Whether set-off rights exist and are enforceable in the insolvency 
of the issuer is outside the scope of the Convention.  
2. Choices to be made by declaration 
 The Convention neither requires nor permits declarations in 
respect of the matters discussed in this section.  
3. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
 The non-Convention law must define the persons entitled to 
exercise the rights attached to the securities vis-à-vis the issuer and 
the conditions thereto when the securities are held through one or 
more intermediaries. From a conflict of laws perspective, the 
Contracting State should make it clear that these provisions only 
apply to the securities governed by its own law. See generally Part 
VIII below. 
 The conditions for the exercise of those rights vis-à-vis the 
issuer should be clearly stated so that they provide legal certainty 
and predictability to: (a) the issuer, in particular regarding whom it 
is required to recognise as entitled to exercise those rights; (b) and 
the intermediaries and account holders, in particular regarding who 
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is entitled to exercise them against the issuer. This includes the 
determination of the date relevant for the identification of the 
person entitled to a specific corporate action. 
 Furthermore, the non-Convention law should facilitate the 
exercise of the rights attached to the securities by the ultimate 
account holders, in particular establishing a transparent, smooth 
and effective process of proxy voting. Thus, if the person entitled 
to exercise the corporate rights vis-à-vis the issuer is acting as a 
nominee, the law should clearly establish under what conditions 
such person may exercise the rights stemming from the securities 
on behalf of clients.  
 The law should also clearly establish that nominees will not 
be prevented from granting a proxy to each of their clients or to any 
third party designated by a client.  
 As a corollary of the recognition of intermediated securities 
holding systems, the non-Convention law should ensure a general 
principle of non-discrimination with regard to the exercise of the 
rights attached to the securities wider than the simple exercise of 
voting rights. The law governing the securities should not 
discriminate against the exercise of the rights attached to the 
securities on the sole grounds that the securities are held through a 
chain of intermediaries. And this principle should apply not only to 
nominee systems but also to alternative systems of holding 
securities indirectly (e.g. by means of omnibus accounts). 
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PART VI - INSOLVENCY PROTECTION 
Legislative Principle 12: The Convention establishes important 
insolvency proceeding-related rules on the interests made 
effective against third-parties and provides loss-sharing rules in 
case of a shortfall of account holder securities. However, the law 
should address many other important and relevant features of 
insolvency and regulatory law that the Convention leaves to it. 
A. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The Convention deals generally with the effectiveness 
of interests made effective under Articles 11, 12, or 13 as 
against an insolvency administrator and creditors in an 
insolvency proceeding. Article 14. 
• The Convention partially determines the priority 
among an intermediary’s collateral taker and its account 
holders. Article 20 and see paragraph 188 above.  
• The Convention deals generally with the effectiveness 
of interests made effective under Articles 11, 12, or 13 as 
against an insolvency administrator and creditors in an 
insolvency proceeding of the relevant intermediary. 
Article 21. 
• The Convention provides a loss-sharing mechanism in 
case of a shortfall of securities credited to account holders’ 
securities accounts in an insolvency proceeding of an 
intermediary. Article 26. 
• The Convention shields the legal effects of certain 
provisions in the uniform rules applied in respect of the 
operation of SCSs and SSSs from adverse consequences 
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flowing from the insolvency of the system operator or a 
system participant. Article 27. 
1. Effectiveness in insolvency in general 
 Article 14(1) provides affirmatively that interests made 
effective under Articles 11 and 12 are effective in an insolvency 
proceeding. 
 Article 14(2) provides that Article 14(1) does not affect 
substantive or procedural rules applicable by virtue of an 
insolvency proceeding such as ranking of categories of claims, 
avoidance powers for preferences and fraudulent transfers, and the 
enforcement of rights to property under the control or supervision 
of an insolvency administrator. 
 Article 14(3) provides that Article 14(1) does not apply to 
the situation of an intermediary insolvency proceeding addressed 
by Article 21. 
 Under Article 14(4), the Convention does not impair the 
effectiveness in an insolvency proceeding of an interest that is 
effective under Article 13. 
2. Effectiveness in the insolvency of the relevant 
intermediary 
 Article 21(1) provides affirmatively that interests made 
effective under Articles 11 and 12 are effective in an insolvency 
proceeding of the relevant intermediary. 
 Article 21(2) provides that Article 21(1) does not affect 
rules applicable in an insolvency proceeding of the relevant 
intermediary relating to avoidance powers for preferences and 
fraudulent transfers and procedural rules relating to the 
enforcement of rights to property under the control or supervision 
of the insolvency administrator. The exceptions in Article 21(2) are 
narrower than those provided by Article 14(2). 
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 Article 21(3) provides that nothing in Article 21 impairs the 
effectiveness in an insolvency proceeding of an interest that is 
effective under Article 13. 
3. Loss sharing in case of insolvency of the intermediary 
 Article 26 applies regarding loss sharing unless there is a 
conflicting rule applicable in the insolvency proceeding of the 
intermediary. Article 26(1). 
 If the securities of a description (i.e. a particular issue) 
allocated under Article 25 are insufficient to cover the securities of 
that description credited to securities accounts, the shortfall is to be 
borne (a) if the securities are allocated to a single account holder, 
by that account holder, and (b) otherwise by the account holders to 
whom the securities have been allocated in proportion to the 
number or amount of securities credited to securities accounts. 
Article 26(2). This is a pro rata allocation on an issue-by-issue 
basis. 
 If the intermediary is the operator of a SSS, the uniform 
rules of the SSS determine who bears the shortfall if the rules so 
provide. 
B. Choices to be made by declaration 
 The Articles primarily addressed here do not involve 
choices to be made by declaration. However, the optional 
declaration under Article 25(5) regarding segregation is relevant in 
the context of an intermediary’s insolvency proceeding. See 
paragraphs 212 and 215 above and 270 below. 
C. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
1. General observations 
 Many of the matters that must be addressed by the non-
Convention law may fall within the realm of securities regulation—
the regulation of securities markets and market participants such as 
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intermediaries, exchanges and other trading systems, SCSs, and 
SSSs. Other matters are squarely in the field of insolvency law, but 
involve many complex and highly technical issues in the context of 
the insolvency of an intermediary. In this connection, many lessons 
have been learned through the recent financial crisis and in 
particular from the insolvency proceedings of various Lehman 
Brothers entities. There is a wealth of recent literature that should 
be consulted as well. The most important available resources are 
listed on UNIDROIT’s webpage for the Guide. A State wishing to 
reform its legal and regulatory infrastructure should consult these 
resources. While this section of the Guide endeavours to identify 
the most important areas of inquiry for such a reform process, it 
cannot provide detailed, specific recommendations. 
2. Loss sharing 
 As Article 26 defers to a conflicting loss-sharing rule 
applicable in an intermediary insolvency proceeding, a Contracting 
State should consider whether it should retain or adopt any such 
different rule. 
 By way of example, assume that the intermediary has two 
Account Holders, 1 and 2. The intermediary has credited 100 units 
of A securities valued at 100 to Account Holder 1. It has credited 
100 units of B securities valued at 100 to Account Holder 2. 
However, the intermediary only has 90 units available of A 
securities. Under the loss-sharing rule of Article 26(2), Account 
Holder 1 would bear the loss of the shortfall. Diagram 265-1 
illustrates this result. 
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Diagram 265-1: Loss sharing under Article 26(2) 
 Under the loss-sharing rule in the security entitlement 
system of a North American common law State, all account holders 
share in the entire pool of securities to the extent of their net equity, 
which is the value of the securities credited to their accounts. This 
is so even if there is a shortfall. Diagram 266-1 illustrates this result. 
It reflects the fact that it normally would be purely fortuitous that 
there would be a shortfall in one issue of securities as opposed to 
another and would treat similarly situated account holders in the 
same manner. 
 
Diagram 266-1: Loss sharing in the insolvency law for broker-
dealers acting as intermediaries of a North American common law 
State 
102 GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES  
 
3. Priority of interests granted by intermediary  
 The priority of intermediary-granted interests as against the 
rights of the intermediary’s account holders is relevant primarily in 
the case of an intermediary insolvency proceeding. See generally 
paragraph 198 above. 
4. Account holder protection fund or insurance 
 A Contracting State should consider adopting a scheme that 
provides a fund or insurance for the protection of “retail” account 
holders up to a specified value of securities carried in a securities 
account. If a Contracting State already has such a system, it should 
consider and assess its adequacy. 
5. Transfer of account holder securities accounts to 
solvent intermediary 
 An important technique for the protection of account 
holders in the insolvency proceeding of an intermediary is the 
transfer of securities accounts (and the underlying securities) to a 
solvent intermediary that assumes the insolvent intermediary’s 
duties and obligations to the account holders. An account holder 
protection fund or insurance typically would provide assurances 
against losses to the transferee intermediary. A Contracting State 
should ensure that the relevant insolvency law facilitates this 
approach. 
6. Rights of an intermediary’s creditors and segregation 
 A Contracting State’s decision on whether or not to make a 
declaration under Article 25(5) regarding segregation and the 
corresponding impact on an intermediary’s account holders and 
unsecured creditors primarily is relevant in an intermediary’s 
insolvency proceeding. See generally paragraphs 212 and 215 
above. 
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7. Limitations on ranking of categories of claims and 
avoidance powers 
 A Contracting State should consider whether to adjust 
ranking of claims and whether to adopt or retain protection from 
avoidance as a preference or fraudulent transfer of certain transfers 
as a mechanism to ensure that securities settlements are not 
invalidated merely because, for example, they take place 
mechanically during a relevant suspect period. Payments made to 
or within a SSS for the settlement of securities transactions, for 
instance, might be protected. In evaluating any such adjustments, 
Contracting States should take into account, in particular, the 
potential impact on systemic risk in financial markets. 
8. Stay of enforcement and close-out netting  
 Related to the discussion in the preceding paragraph and the 
limitations discussed in Part VII below, and as a means of reducing 
systemic risk, in some States, enforcement against securities 
collateral and in connection with repo transactions and the 
operation of close-out netting is exempt from any stay or other 
injunction in an insolvency proceeding. See UNIDROIT Principles 
on the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions. A Contracting 
State should consider whether to adopt, retain, or adjust any such 
exemptions. See FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes for Financial Institutions, paragraphs 4.1 et seq. and I-
Annex 5 (October 2014, “FSB Key Attributes”) and, regarding a 
regulatory stay, paragraph 281 below. 
9. Special provisions in relation to collateral transactions 
 If a Contracting State declares under Article 38 that Chapter 
V does not apply, it may nonetheless consider whether it should 
enact as a part of the non-Convention law the protection of 
collateral takers in connection with insolvency proceedings as 
under Articles 33, 36, and 37. See generally paragraph 278 et seq. 
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10. Return of account holder assets and funds  
 As to securities accounts that are not transferred to a solvent 
intermediary, a Contracting State should ensure that insolvency law 
provides means of promptly returning to account holders securities 
credited to their securities accounts and credit cash balances in such 
accounts. The law should provide for flexible solutions such as 
partial returns pending resolution of complex relationships and the 
potential for an insolvency administrator to claw back securities 
and funds to the extent returns were not justified or were made in 
error. Such solutions are necessary for ensuring that an account 
holder’s rights are respected in an intermediary’s insolvency 
proceeding, as under Articles 14(1) and 21(1), but are not alone 
sufficient for protecting the rights of account holders. 
11. Intermediary access to SCSs and SSSs and assets held 
in such systems or otherwise as collateral 
 In order to provide proper protection and treatment of 
account holders and creditors generally, insolvency law should 
ensure that an insolvency administrator of an intermediary has 
access to information and records and access to assets held in such 
systems or otherwise held as collateral, such as by a clearing lender 
or derivatives counterparty. Of course, the interests of the operators 
of and participants in such systems and of those holding collateral 
must be protected as well. But it is important to ensure the 
transparency of all of these relationships. As to the insolvency of 
SCSs and SSSs, see Article 27 and paragraphs 227-229 above.  
12. Intermediary access to information, records, and 
information technology systems  
 An intermediary’s insolvency administrator must have 
access to all relevant information, records, and information 
technology systems to the extent available to the intermediary prior 
to an insolvency proceeding. A lack of access could be especially 
problematic in the case of a multinational financial corporate group 
in which an affiliate other than the intermediary manages 
information centrally and may be subject to a separate insolvency 
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proceeding. Such access and other appropriate contingency plans 
for an intermediary’s insolvency proceeding could be imposed or 
encouraged by the rules of an SSS. A Contracting State’s 
supervisory or regulatory authority also should consider whether to 
impose or encourage relevant reporting or disclosure requirements. 
13. Enhanced regulation and supervision of 
intermediaries, exchanges and alternative trading 
systems, SCSs, and SSSs  
 The optimal approach to the problem of intermediary 
financial distress would be to ensure that an intermediary does not 
suffer from financial distress in the first place. Ex ante regulation 
and supervision of intermediaries and the market structures and 
participants with which they interact may play an important role in 
this respect. 
 
106 
PART VII - SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN 
RELATION TO COLLATERAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
Legislative Principle 13: The law should establish clear and 
sound rules in relation to collateral transactions involving 
intermediated securities. The Convention provides optional rules 
in relation to such transactions, whether by way of security 
collateral agreement or title transfer collateral agreement. Other 
international instruments and documents, reflecting lessons of 
the financial crisis, provide further guidance on regulatory, 
private and insolvency law issues involved. 
A. Core Convention principles and rules 
 The core principles and rules are the following:  
• The Convention covers collateral consisting of 
intermediated securities provided by way of a title transfer or 
a security collateral agreement. See Article 31. 
• A title transfer collateral agreement should be able to 
take effect in accordance with its terms. Article 32. 
• Enforcement of collateral may be effected by way of 
sale or, if agreed, appropriation or close-out netting. Article 
33(1)-(2). 
• It should be possible to enforce collateral relatively 
easily and quickly (i.e. without prior notice, approval by a 
court or other person, or a public auction), also in the case of 
insolvency. Articles 33(3) and 35.  
• The collateral taker may be given the right to “use” or 
“re-hypothecate” the collateral (i.e. to dispose thereof as if it 
were the owner). Article 34.  
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• Collateral agreements and the provision of collateral 
thereunder are protected against timing claw back rules in 
insolvency (such as “zero hour rules”). Articles 36 and 37. 
 Chapter V of the Geneva Securities Convention contains 
optional, private and insolvency law oriented rules on transactions 
with collateral consisting of intermediated securities, including 
repurchase (or “repo”), securities lending, and collateralised 
derivatives transactions. See, e.g., paragraph 19 above and diagram 
279-1 below. The choice to incorporate the rules of Chapter V in a 
given jurisdiction can be made independent of the choice to adopt 
the other rules of the Convention concerning basic features of the 
intermediated system. If opted into, the detailed character of the 
rules set out in Chapter V means that there are only a few instances 
for States to make declarations or determine the content of non-
Convention law. 
Diagram 279-1: Repurchase transaction 
In a repo, a seller in need of cash transfers securities to a buyer 
outright in exchange for cash at the purchase date, while the seller 
returns the cash together with an interest component at the 
repurchase date in exchange for equivalent securities. 
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 The global financial crisis of 2007 and onwards has 
triggered a range of regulatory standards in relation to securities 
financing transactions and other transactions involving financial 
collateral (in the regulatory-inspired debate on shadow banking the 
term “securities financing transactions” is common, which overlaps 
largely, but not entirely, with the transactions covered by Chapter 
V of the Geneva Securities Convention). Key documents with 
international regulatory guidance include: (a) the FSB’s 
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: 
Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in 
Securities Lending and Repos (August 2013, “FSB Shadow 
Banking Framework”); (b) the FSB Key Attributes, to which 
reference is also made in paragraph 272 above; and (c) BCBS-
IOSCO’s Margin Requirements for Non-Centrally Cleared 
Derivatives   (March 2015).  As  indicated  above  in  paragraph 
263, as a result of the financial crisis, there has been debate which 
in some jurisdictions could lead to limitations as to the enforcement 
and exercise of certain rights.  
 The FSB Shadow Banking Framework (including also some 
follow-up FSB guidance documents) envisages enhanced 
transparency obligations regarding securities financing 
transactions, providing regulators with data to detect and address 
systemic risk; limits on cash collateral reinvestment; limits on the 
right of use or re-hypothecation; guidelines regarding collateral 
valuation and management; minimum regulatory haircuts for non-
centrally cleared securities financing transactions; and standards 
for indemnification-related risks in the context of securities 
lending. The FSB Shadow Banking Framework also contemplates 
the possibility of a revision of insolvency law rules. In addition, the 
FSB Key Attributes envisage, among other things, a temporary 
regulatory stay, so as to provide resolution authorities with a 
window for decision-making regarding financial institutions in 
distress. The guidance contained in the UNIDROIT Principles on the 
Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions, for example, refers to 
the FSB Key Attributes and takes the regulatory stay into account. 
See UNIDROIT Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting 
Provisions, paragraph 117.  
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 The international regulatory standards are developed at the 
international level by the FSB and other bodies, such as the BCBS, 
and have been taken into account by regional and domestic 
legislation and guidelines. Regional and domestic lawmakers may, 
and in practice do, provide rules and guidelines that specify and go 
beyond the standards proposed by the international bodies. 
B. Choices to be made by declaration 
 Various choices may be made by declaration. First, the 
personal scope of Chapter V may be limited. Second, intermediated 
securities that are not permitted to be traded on an exchange or a 
regulated market may be excluded. Third, categories of relevant 
obligations (i.e. the obligations of a collateral provider or another 
person for whom collateral is provided) may be excluded. Fourth, 
top-up or substitution arrangements may not receive protection if 
they are triggered by criteria relating to creditworthiness, financial 
performance, or the financial condition of the collateral provider.  
 Article 38 addresses the first three choices and provides 
lawmakers with possibilities to limit the scope of Chapter V. The 
first option is to limit the personal scope in order to protect natural 
persons or other categories of entities, notably entities that are not 
financial market participants, which are deemed to need protection. 
Article 38(2)(a). The second option is to apply the regime of 
Chapter V only to intermediated securities that are traded on an 
exchange or a regulated market (i.e. to securities that potentially 
have a significant impact on the liquidity of financial markets). 
Article 38(2)(b). The third issue that lawmakers should decide is 
whether there are relevant obligations that should not fall within the 
regime of Chapter V of the Convention. Article 38(2)(c). For more 
information on the optional declarations under Article 38, see the 
Declarations Memorandum, Section 4.I and accompanying Form 
No. 9 and Official Commentary, paragraphs 38-1 to 38-11. 
 Article 36 addresses the fourth choice and protects the 
provision of collateral in the course of a transaction under “top-up” 
and substitution arrangements against timing claw back rules. The 
declaration envisaged in Article 36(2) addresses the specific 
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situation where top-up collateral should be provided as a 
consequence of changes to the creditworthiness, financial 
performance, or the financial condition of the collateral provider or 
another person owing the relevant obligations concerned. Such 
changes may be a prelude to the insolvency of the collateral 
provider. Lawmakers should decide on the policy question of 
whether in such a case the collateral taker receives the top-up 
collateral, or whether it is left to the collateral provider’s general 
creditors. See paragraph 274 above and, for more information on 
the optional declaration under Article 36(2), see the Declarations 
Memorandum, Section 4.H and accompanying Form No. 8 and 
Official Commentary, paragraphs 36-17, 36-20, and 36-26. 
C. Matters to be addressed or clarified 
1. Extra rights for collateral takers 
 The basic approach underlying Chapter V is that the 
liquidity of financial markets should be enhanced by eliminating 
traditional rules of private and insolvency law that strike a balance 
between collateral provider and collateral taker, and by extending 
extra rights to the collateral taker. Chapter V contains a minimum 
regime. Article 31(2) provides for the possibility that non-
Convention law envisages additional rights and powers of collateral 
takers and additional obligations of collateral providers. However, 
in their decision to go beyond the minimum regime envisaged in 
Chapter V, lawmakers should take into account the lessons learned 
during the global financial crisis. 
2. Commercial reasonableness 
 The concept of commercial reasonableness is key where 
securities need to be valued, notably in the context of enforcement. 
Article 35 determines that non-Convention rules regarding 
commercial reasonableness are not affected by the Convention 
rules on enforcement and the right of use. The content of the 
concept of commercial reasonableness is not specified in the 
Convention, and it is thus up to the domestic lawmaker to determine 
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whether a specification of this content is necessary in the context 
of securities markets. 
3. New regulatory framework 
 As mentioned in paragraphs 280-282, lawmakers should 
take into account new regulatory standards regarding securities 
financing transactions and other transactions involving financial 
collateral as developed by bodies such as the FSB and the BCBS 
on issues such as transparency, cash collateral reinvestment, the 
right of use or re-hypothecation, collateral valuation and 
management, minimum haircuts, indemnification-related risk, ipso 
facto clauses, the regulatory stay and insolvency safe harbours.  
4. Close-out netting 
 Lawmakers can find specific guidance on close-out netting 
in the UNIDROIT Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting 
Provisions.  
5. Secured transactions law 
 In case lawmakers decide not to adopt Chapter V as a whole, 
but only to draw inspiration from its provisions in structuring their 
legal framework, they could also look at the guidelines regarding 
general secured transactions law in the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Secured Transactions and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Secured Transactions. It should, however, be noted that the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide does not cover securities at all, 
whereas the UNCITRAL Model Law contains rules for non-
intermediated securities only. Policy considerations relating to 
intermediated securities markets, such as those enshrined in the 
Geneva Securities Convention, therefore merit special attention. 
For example, besides the provisions of the UNCITRAL instruments 
on the creation of interests and their third party effectiveness, the 
considerations underlying Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Geneva 
Securities Convention remain relevant. Where priority contests are 
concerned, Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention should be 
considered and, in the case of enforcement, Articles 33 and 35 of 
the Convention should be taken into account.
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PART VIII - CONFLICT OF LAWS ASPECTS 
Legislative Principle 14: As the Convention does not contain 
conflict of laws rules, the law should establish clear and sound 
conflict of laws rules in relation to intermediated securities.  
 Many intermediated securities transactions take place in an 
international context and therefore entail the presence of foreign 
elements. For example, the issuer may be incorporated in another 
State, the securities may be governed by a foreign law or the 
holding chain may begin, pass through or end in another State. 
These situations could raise problems of conflict of laws.  
 Such problems are resolved by what are known as conflict 
of laws rules. These rules determine which State’s law applies to a 
transaction or to one particular aspect of it. Conflict of laws rules 
usually employ one or more elements of the transaction, the so-
called “connecting factor”, to link the transaction or the legal issue 
to a particular State law. 
 The Convention establishes uniform rules on intermediated 
securities but does not completely eliminate problems of conflict of 
laws. Indeed, the Convention does not contain conflict of laws 
rules. Thus, its sphere of application is not determined by itself but 
by the conflict of laws rules applicable in each State (i.e. the conflict 
of laws rules of the forum).  
 As a result, adoption of the Convention or its incorporation 
into domestic law should therefore be accompanied by a set of clear 
and sound conflict of laws rules that reflect the reality of how 
securities are held and transferred. This is particularly important 
because – as the Convention is based on a core and functional 
harmonisation approach – it leaves various matters to be governed 
by State laws, and these laws may still vary to a large extent. With 
respect to these non-harmonised aspects, identification of the 
applicable law becomes critical.  
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 This Part deals with conflict of laws, specifically (a) the 
Convention’s sphere of application; (b) traditional conflict of laws 
rules and their modernisation; (c) the Convention’s “tier-by-tier” 
approach and its interaction with conflict of laws rules; and (d) 
other conflict of laws rules. 
A. The Convention’s sphere of application 
 The Convention does not lay down conflict of laws rules. 
Its application is determined instead by the conflict of laws rules of 
the forum. This idea is stated in Article 2(a) of the Convention. The 
Convention applies whenever the conflict of laws rules of the forum 
designate the law in force in a Contracting State as the applicable 
law.  
 The reason for this approach is clear. In some systems, once 
the Convention has been ratified by a State or incorporated into its 
domestic law, it becomes part of the substantive domestic law of 
that State. Therefore, the Convention’s rules will apply insofar as 
the substantive law of that State is the applicable law under the 
conflict of laws rules of the forum.  
 As a result, even if the forum is a Contracting State to the 
Convention, the Convention does not apply when its conflict of 
laws rules point to the law of a non-Contracting State as the law 
applicable on an issue. And vice versa, even if the forum is a non-
Contracting State, the Convention will apply if the conflict of laws 
rules of the forum point to the law of a Contracting State as the 
applicable law. As an example, let us assume that State A is the 
forum state and its conflict of laws rules point to State B’s law as 
applicable: if State B has ratified the Convention, the Convention 
will apply, regardless of whether State A has ratified the 
Convention.  
 Together with Article 2, Article 3 clarifies the effect of 
conflict of laws rules on declarations. Because the declarations 
established by the Convention are related to its substantive rules – 
mainly allowing Contracting States to opt into or out of the 
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harmonising rules – the application of such declarations is also 
determined by the conflict of laws rules of the forum.  
B. Traditional conflict of laws rules and their modernisation 
 The application of traditional conflict of laws rules to 
intermediated securities can give rise to difficulties. The law should 
therefore establish modernised conflict of laws rules to address the 
particularities raised when securities are not held directly but with 
an intermediary.  
 Traditional conflict of laws rules – mainly based on the lex 
rei (cartae) sitae principle – have not proved to be very useful for 
intermediated securities, because those rules entail the attribution 
of an artificial location to an asset which by its nature may have no 
physical manifestation. Furthermore, it has also resulted in legal 
uncertainty and serious practical difficulties, because a prima facie 
application of that principle may lead to the law of the State where 
the issuer of the securities is incorporated or where the original 
securities are physically held by a CSD or registered (“look-through 
approach”), even though the ultimate account holder is not 
registered there.  
 Therefore, some States have modernised their conflict of 
laws rules to go beyond that principle and offer a more appropriate 
solution taking into account the way intermediated securities are 
held and transferred. In the EU, for example, the Directives on 
Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral provide conflict of 
laws rules based on the Place of the Relevant Intermediary 
Approach (PRIMA), that is, the law of the place where the account 
holder’s relevant intermediary maintains the securities account for 
the account holder. 
 At the international level, the Hague Securities Convention, 
which was concluded on 5 July 2006 and entered into force on 1 
April 2017, is the only instrument. The Hague Securities 
Convention represents an evolution beyond the initial formulation 
of PRIMA in that it too is based upon the notion of the relevant 
intermediary. However, it avoids any attempt to locate where the 
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relevant intermediary maintains the securities account and instead 
gives effect to an agreement on governing law between an account 
holder and its intermediary as long as a qualifying office 
requirement is met (the “Hague approach”). Thus, the State law 
chosen by the parties is to apply only if the relevant intermediary 
has an office – involved in the maintenance of securities accounts 
– in that State. See Hague Securities Convention, Article 4.  
C. The Convention’s “tier-by-tier” approach and its interaction 
with conflict of laws rules 
 The Convention relies on a “tier-by-tier” approach for 
intermediated securities holdings systems. Though the Convention 
does not, as discussed in Part III.A above, characterise the legal 
nature of the rights and interests arising from a credit of securities 
to a securities account and at which level such rights and interests 
arise, the Convention does view intermediated holding chains as 
made up of distinct relationships. In particular, it divides the 
holding chain into tiers and looks at each link in that chain: for each 
account holder there is one, but only one, relevant intermediary. 
The building blocks of the Convention are each relationship 
between an account holder and its relevant intermediary.  
 This substantive approach works well with a conflict of 
laws approach whereby the applicable law is determined separately 
for each tier of the chain of intermediaries (i.e. for each relationship 
between an account holder and its relevant intermediary), as is 
generally the case for approaches based on the notion of the 
relevant intermediary. There may only be one applicable law for 
each tier and, therefore, in a multi-tier structure there may be two 
or more layers of laws. And this perfectly suits a substantive law 
regime that focuses on establishing the rules governing each 
relationship. 
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Diagram 305-1: Application of law in an intermediated securities 
holding chain spanning three States 
Let us imagine that Intermediary 1 is in State A, Intermediary 2 is 
in State B and Intermediary 3 is in State C. According to either the 
initial formulation of PRIMA or the Hague approach: (a) the law 
governing the rights of the ultimate account holder vis-à-vis the 
securities account maintained by Intermediary 3 is State C’s law, 
(b) the law governing the rights of Intermediary 3 vis-à-vis the 
securities account maintained by Intermediary 2 is State B’s law; 
(c) and the law governing the rights of Intermediary 2 vis-à-vis the 
securities account maintained by Intermediary 1 is State A’s law. 
There are, therefore, three layers of rights, each set of which is 
governed by a different law. It can be said that the ultimate account 
holder has a set of rights governed by State C’s law over a set of 
rights acquired by Intermediary 3 with Intermediary 2 under State 
B’s law, and over a set of rights acquired by Intermediary 2 with 
Intermediary 1 under State A’s law.  
 Lawmakers should modernise the conflict of laws rules to 
avoid the ambiguities raised by traditional solutions (i.e. the lex rei 
(carta) sitae principle), and introduce a solution based on the 
relevant intermediary as the main connecting factor. Additionally a 
specification of that solution may be recommendable. Article 4(1) 
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of the Hague Securities Convention, for example, calls for the “law 
in force in the State expressly agreed in the account agreement as 
the State whose law governs the account agreement or, if the 
account agreement expressly provides that another law is 
applicable to all such issues, that other law” provided that the 
relevant intermediary has an office in that State. In the EU, as 
another example, the Directives on Settlement Finality and 
Financial Collateral establish that the applicable law is that of the 
place where the relevant intermediary maintains the securities 
account for the account holder. In transparent systems, in particular, 
lawmakers should be aware that additional clarifications may be 
required. In principle, in these systems, the “relevant intermediary” 
for the purpose of determining the applicable law may be the CSD, 
where the accounts are maintained in the name of the ultimate 
investors.   
D. Other conflict of laws rules 
 Both the initial formulation of PRIMA and the Hague 
approach determine the law applicable to intermediated securities, 
but only for certain issues; for example, in the Hague Securities 
Convention, only for the issues enumerated in its Article 2(1)(a)-
(g). If according to the Hague Securities Convention, the law 
applicable is that of a Contracting State to the Geneva Securities 
Convention, the Geneva Securities Convention would govern all 
substantive issues included in Article 2(1)(a)-(g) of the former.  
 However, the substantive scope of application of the Hague 
Securities Convention is not exactly the same as the substantive 
scope of the Geneva Securities Convention. Article 2(1)(a)-(g) of 
the Hague Securities Convention contains an exhaustive list of all 
the issues falling within the scope of the Hague Securities 
Convention, which is narrower than the scope of the Geneva 
Securities Convention. Although the concept is avoided, the Hague 
Securities Convention applies mainly to “proprietary” issues. 
However, purely contractual or personal rights which arise solely 
from the contractual relationship between the account holder and 
its intermediary or the parties to a disposition inter se are not 
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included within the scope of the Hague Securities Convention. See 
Hague Securities Convention, Article 2(3)(a)). 
 The law applicable to other issues that are outside the 
substantive scope of the Hague Securities Convention but which 
may fall within the scope of the Geneva Securities Convention is 
determined by the corresponding conflict of laws rules of the 
forum. For example, the law applicable to the contractual 
obligations of the intermediary vis-à-vis its account holder is 
determined by the conflict of laws rules on contractual obligations. 
In the EU, this is the Rome I Regulation, which is based on the 
principle of party autonomy (“A contract shall be governed by the 
law chosen by the parties”). The same principle inspires the Hague 
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts. In application of this principle, if the law chosen by the 
parties is that of a Contracting State to the Geneva Securities 
Convention, the provisions of that instrument on contractual 
obligations (e.g. Article 10) would apply.  
 Finally, the determination of the law applicable in 
insolvency proceedings (i.e. “insolvency conflict of laws rules”) 
should be designed to ensure the effectiveness of the rights over 
intermediated securities in such proceedings as established, in 
particular, by Articles 14 and 21 of the Convention. See, e.g., 
Hague Securities Convention, Article 8.  
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PART IX - OTHER INSTRUMENTS AND 
REGULATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Legislative Principle 15: Lawmakers should consider the various 
instruments and guidance that is available in order to develop and 
implement an intermediated securities holding system which is 
tailored to their legal and economic context and consistent with 
the principles and rules contained in the Guide. 
 It is important for lawmakers to consider the links between 
the Geneva Securities Convention and other international 
instruments and how best to implement changes made in order to 
create or improve an intermediated securities holding system. Other 
instruments and guidance documents are available for 
consideration in establishing or evaluating an intermediated 
securities holding system, which is just one important part of a 
State’s broader and interconnected financial system. States should 
consider the various instruments and documents available – which 
may address particular aspects in greater detail – in order to tailor 
and implement legal reforms which correspond best to their system 
and are consistent with the principles and rules set forth in the 
Guide. 
A. Links to other international instruments or regulations  
 The modernisation of domestic legislation on financial 
markets is essential to a State’s economic development. At the 
international level, many standard-setting bodies have adopted 
standards to ensure financial stability and mitigate risk, to improve 
efficiency and to favour cross-border transactions. The FSB, for 
instance, keeps a regularly-updated compendium of standards 
relating to financial markets. In particular, the FSB selected a 
number of “Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems” (“FSB 
Key Standards”), concerning three macro-areas: (a) 
macroeconomic policy and data transparency, (b) financial 
regulation and supervision, and (c) institutional and market 
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infrastructure. These are elaborated by different international 
standard-setting bodies, according to relevant competences, but are 
jointly used as a basis for evaluation of the soundness of a State 
(e.g. FSAP by the IMF and the World Bank are based on those 
standards).   
 On the one hand, these exercises are done to reduce 
systemic risk and to prevent financial distress from spreading from 
one State to another, but also to support investment and reinforce 
the infrastructure of domestic markets. On the other hand, emerging 
markets offer extremely interesting opportunities for foreign 
investments, which in turn may favour the development of 
domestic sectors of the economy. In order to strengthen their 
internal markets, as well as incentivise foreign investments by 
accruing trust, States endeavour to sustain their own economies 
with adequate infrastructures according to such standards. 
 International standards consider as a first requirement to 
attaining the above objectives of development and stability that a 
sound legal system be in place. For instance, Principle One of the 
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, which are included 
in the FSB Key Standards, establishes that any FMI needs to have 
a sound legal basis. This requirement, however, should not be 
simply interpreted as meaning that legal obstacles to the working 
of specific systems or business schemes be eliminated. This is of 
course one of the priorities to reduce risk and its diffusion to foreign 
markets, but it cannot stand alone. A State needs to have modern 
legislation that offers a legally sound environment, conducive to 
modernisation, and in which operators can act on a level playing 
field while relevant interests are duly protected and stability is 
adequately taken care of. International standards not only require 
elimination of legal barriers, but also the building of a sound legal 
environment conducive to development and stability. 
 Many States use international standards, and in particular 
those concerning or affecting their internal legal order, as an 
effective benchmark for reform. On the other hand, it is generally 
understood that a State that respects international standards and 
possesses a sound legal environment receives positive rankings in 
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the various international comparative exercises that are performed 
by international bodies (such as the World Bank’s Doing Business 
reports), which can make a difference regarding foreign 
investments actually received in a State because respect of such 
standards has proven to favour concretely market development and 
ensure stability. The World Bank’s Doing Business reports, for 
example, include evaluation of the legal environment of a State in 
many contexts, and uses international Conventions and other 
international instruments for harmonisation as benchmarks.     
 Indeed, the exercises done at the international level by 
international organisations and bodies to harmonise domestic 
legislation in specific fields has the objective, among others, to 
provide guidance in this direction, and offer models that are the 
result of international harmonisation. It is not a specific State’s 
model that is diffused by these bodies, but the synthesis of various 
legal experiences and traditions. Because of this, they usually 
reflect balanced solutions, to be taken into serious consideration in 
any domestic reform efforts. 
 The adoption of international instruments such as the 
Geneva Securities Convention is thus a fundamental step within a 
wider scenario of domestic legal reforms for modernisation and 
openness of a State’s economy using international standards as 
benchmarks, and international instruments for harmonisation of 
law as the most balanced and unbiased models to be used to that 
end.  
B. Overview of implementation in a domestic legal framework 
 Each State has its own tradition and is situated within a 
specific regional context. As a result, each needs to implement a 
tailor-made legal reform. However, there are high-level principles 
that are usually recognised as commonly shared, and thus included 
in international instruments. When principles are generally shared 
and can be sufficiently detailed, a Convention is adopted. In other 
cases, a Model Law or a Legislative Guide is issued because these 
instruments, although not offering hard law solutions, permit 
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convergence by leaving more flexibility in the means to be used to 
reach such convergence. 
 Ways to adopt a Convention, a Model Law or a Legislative 
Guide into a domestic legal order are different, but in all cases the 
international instrument has to be understood within the more 
general context of both other fields of legislation that are not 
covered by the specific international instrument, and the 
institutional and legal order of the State, with its own existing legal 
tradition and institutions. 
 As mentioned, in the case of financial markets, various 
international standards and measures of a regulatory nature exist. 
The Convention recognises this variety and excludes such matters 
from its own scope, as it does for other matters of a purely legal 
nature (such as corporate law). 
 However, these regulations and standards need to be 
considered by the domestic lawmaker not only to avoid the risk of 
leaving essential aspects unregulated, but also because each piece 
of reform needs to be drafted in a consistent manner and policy 
choices taken as much as possible under an holistic approach. When 
other international instruments exist in these fields, these need to 
be adequately implemented. When international standards do not 
exist, there is still a need for modernisation, and the State should 
rely on its own general principles of law and institutional 
framework. This may involve cooperation by many public bodies 
in the State according to their individual functions and scope of 
responsibility.  
 While corporate law generally does not fall within the 
Convention’s scope, that law affects the working of book-entry 
systems for securities and some rights and duties of account holders 
found in such body of law might unpredictably affect the 
application of the Convention. In the same vein, rules on money 
laundering or market abuse, which are excluded by the scope of the 
Convention, need to be put in place if concrete modernisation is to 
be achieved. 
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 Finally, legal reform coming from international instruments 
may require the adoption of articulated implementing measures. 
Indeed, international rules may be better reflected in a legal system 
by way of a statutory act, a secondary measure, contractual 
agreements by the market, or finally a combination of these options. 
Adoption of a reform not only implies evaluation of rules to be 
adopted into a legal system, amendment of existing specific 
provisions or adaptation of legal institutions, but also determination 
of the most appropriate legal mechanisms to be adopted. For 
example, for legal reforms by statutory act, there are two main 
approaches. First, a statutory act could address the core aspects of 
an intermediated securities holding system and then cross-reference 
to the relevant statutes or authority on related aspects, such as 
innocent purchasers or insolvency. Secord, a standalone statutory 
act on intermediated securities could be developed, which 
addresses comprehensively all the necessary aspects in an 
intermediated securities holding system. For newer or lesser 
developed securities markets, the latter approach could enhance the 
attractiveness of a particular market by clearly laying out the 
applicable legal framework and thereby reducing the perceived 
legal risk.   
 With respect to undertaking reforms consistent with the 
Convention and the Guide, there are two aspects that need to be 
kept in mind. First, in creating or evaluating an intermediated 
securities holding system, a State could use the Guide, for example, 
to prepare for signing and adopting the Convention or to select and 
implement all or certain principles and rules set forth in the Guide. 
Signature and adoption of the Convention, however, may be a 
State’s preferred option, as the Convention offers the advantage of 
a streamlined, functional, core package of principles and rules 
governing intermediated securities. As discussed throughout the 
Guide, if the Convention is signed and is to be adopted, a 
Contracting State may need to make certain declarations under the 
Convention and address or clarify certain aspects of law outside the 
Convention. Regarding declarations specifically, they include not 
only those discussed above in the relevant subsections entitled 
“Choices to be made by declaration”, but also those concerning 
technical treaty matters, in particular competence of Regional 
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Economic Integration Organisations under Article 41(2) and 
territorial units under Article 43. For more information on these 
latter declarations, see the Declarations Memorandum, Sections 
4.K and 4.L and accompanying Forms No. 11 and No. 12 
respectively. Whether a State opts to sign and adopt the Convention 
or to select and implement the Convention’s principles and rules, 
legal certainty and economic efficiency would be enhanced. 
 Second, for the specific matters governed by the 
Convention, some provisions might need to be included in a 
statutory act, because they would establish rights and obligations 
against third parties. Other provisions can be addressed by 
regulations or other secondary measures by relevant authorities. 
This is surely the case for regulatory matters outside the scope of 
the Convention but still to be covered by a wider legal reform of 
the sector. In this case, as briefly mentioned, the issue gives rise to 
the question of which relevant authorities would be competent for 
such exercise. Standard contractual rules by the market are often 
the best normative tool, as the Convention recognises in the case of 
internal rules of securities systems or other bodies, usually 
authorised to operate following satisfaction of various conditions 
verified by the regulator. All these choices need to be made not only 
according to principles of efficiency but also in light of the existing 
institutional framework of the State. 
 Whereas technical assistance can substantially help the 
State to consider all of these elements and address them 
consistently and in light of international best practice, the reform 
belongs to the individual State and is its own product, as a result of 
efforts usually involving many domestic stakeholders.     
*     *     * 
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ANNEX 1 
REFERENCES TO “NON-CONVENTION LAW” 
References in the Convention For discussion 
Preamble, recital 7: 
HAVING due regard for non-Convention law in matters 
not determined by this Convention, 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para P-8 
Article 1(k):  
“control agreement” means an agreement in relation to 
intermediated securities between an account holder, the 
relevant intermediary and another person or, if so 
provided by the non-Convention law, between an account 
holder and the relevant intermediary or between an 
account holder and another person of which the relevant 
intermediary receives notice, which includes either or 
both of the following provisions: […] 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-52, 1-54 
Legislative 
Guide: 
Paras 141 to 146 
Article 1(l): 
“designating entry” means an entry in a securities 
account made in favour of a person (including the relevant 
intermediary) other than the account holder in relation to 
intermediated securities, which, under the account 
agreement, a control agreement, the uniform rules of a 
securities settlement system or the non-Convention law, 
has either or both of the following effects: […] 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-53 to 1-54 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 141 to 146  
Article 1(m): 
“non-Convention law” means the law in force in the 
Contracting State referred to in Article 2, other than the 
provisions of this Convention; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-55 to 1-60 
Legislative 
Guide: 
Para 75  
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Article 1(p): 
“uniform rules” means, in relation to a securities 
settlement system or securities clearing system, rules of 
that system (including system rules constituted by the non-
Convention law) which are common to the participants or 
to a class of participants and are publicly accessible. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-100 to 
101 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 75  
Article 7(1): 
A Contracting State may declare that under its non-
Convention law a person other than the relevant 
intermediary is responsible for the performance of a 
function or functions (but not all functions) of the relevant 
intermediary under this Convention, either generally or in 
in relation to intermediated securities, or securities 
accounts, of any category or description. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 7-19 
Legislative 
Guide: 
Paras 103, 203 to 
207 
Declarations 
Memorandum: 
Section 4.C and 
accompanying 
Forms 3.A and 
3.B  
Article 9(1)(a)(ii): 
The credit of securities to a securities account confers on 
the account holder: 
(a) the right to receive and exercise any rights attached to 
the securities, including in particular dividends, other 
distributions and voting rights: (i) if the account holder is 
not an intermediary or is an intermediary acting for its 
own account; and (ii) in any other case, if so provided by 
the non-Convention law; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 9-16 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 82, 88 to 93 
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Article 9(1)(c): 
The credit of securities to a securities account confers on 
the account holder: […] (c) the right, by instructions to 
the relevant intermediary, to cause the securities to be 
held otherwise than through a securities account, to the 
extent permitted by the applicable law, the terms of the 
securities and, to the extent permitted by the non-
Convention law, the account agreement or the uniform 
rules of a securities settlement system; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 9-21 to 9-26 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 82 et seq., 
236 
Article 9(1)(d): 
The credit of securities to a securities account confers on 
the account holder: […] (d) unless otherwise provided in 
this Convention, such other rights, including rights and 
interests in securities, as may be conferred by the non-
Convention law. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 9-27 to 9-30 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 82, 88 et 
seq.  
Article 9(3): 
If an account holder has acquired a security interest, or a 
limited interest other than a security interest, by credit of 
securities to its securities account under Article 11(4), the 
non-Convention law determines any limits on the rights 
described in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 9-31 to 9-33 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 82, 88, 94 
to 97  
Article 10(2)(c), (e), and (f): 
An intermediary must, at least: […] (c) give effect to any 
instructions given by the account holder or other 
authorised person, as provided by the non-Convention 
law, the account agreement or the uniform rules of a 
securities settlement system; […] (e) regularly pass on to 
account holders information relating to intermediated 
securities, including information necessary for account 
holders to exercise rights, if provided by the non-
Convention law, the account agreement or the uniform 
rules of a securities settlement system; and (f) regularly 
pass on to account holders dividends and other 
distributions received in relation to intermediated 
securities, if provided by the non-Convention law, the 
account agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system.  
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 10-10, 10-
13, 10-15 to 10-
17 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 101 to 119, 
221  
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Article 11(2): 
No further step is necessary, or may be required by the 
non-Convention law or any other rule of law applicable 
in an insolvency proceeding, to render the acquisition of 
intermediated securities effective against third parties. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 11-17 to 11-
19 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 125, 131  
Article 12(2): 
No further step is necessary, or may be required by the 
non-Convention law or any other rule of law applicable 
in an insolvency proceeding, to render the acquisition of 
intermediated securities effective against third parties. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 12-31, which 
also refers to 
paras 11-17 to 11-
19 
Legislative 
Guide: 
Para 138  
Article 13: 
This Convention does not preclude any method provided 
by the non-Convention law for: (a) the acquisition or 
disposition of intermediated securities or of an interest in 
intermediated securities; or (b) the creation of an interest 
in intermediated securities and for making such an 
interest effective against third parties, other than the 
methods provided by Articles 11 and 12. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 13-5 to 13-6 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 138 to 140, 
155 to 157, 183, 
188, 197, 255 
Article 15(1)(e): 
An intermediary may make a debit of securities to a 
securities account, make or remove a designating entry or 
otherwise dispose of intermediated securities only if it is 
authorised to do so: […] (e) by the non-Convention law. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 15-17 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 160 et seq.  
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Article 15(2): 
The non-Convention law and, to the extent permitted by 
the non-Convention law, the account agreement or the 
uniform rules of a securities settlement system determine 
the consequences of: an unauthorised debit; an 
unauthorised removal of a designating entry; subject to 
Article 18(2), an unauthorised designating entry; or any 
other unauthorised disposition. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 15-18 to 15-
21 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 160 to 171  
Article 16: 
Subject to Article 18, the non-Convention law and, to the 
extent permitted by the non-Convention law, the account 
agreement or the uniform rules of a securities settlement 
system determine whether and in what circumstances a 
debit, credit, designating entry or removal of a 
designating entry is invalid, is liable to be reversed or may 
be subject to a condition, and the consequences thereof. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 16-9 to 16-
23 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 160 to 171, 
221 
Article 18(5): 
To the extent permitted by the non-Convention law, 
paragraph 2 is subject to any provision of the uniform 
rules of a securities settlement system or of the account 
agreement. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 18-11 to 18-
14 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 172, 221  
Article 19(2): 
Subject to paragraph 5 and Article 20, interests that 
become effective against third parties under Article 12 
have priority over any interest that becomes effective 
against third parties by any other method provided by the 
non-Convention law. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 19-13 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 183 to 184  
 
 
 
 
130 GUIDE ON INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES  
 
Article 19(7): 
A Contracting State may declare that under its non-
Convention law, subject to paragraph 4, an interest 
granted by a designating entry has priority over any 
interest granted by any other method provided by Article 
12. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 19-17 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 153, 189 
Declarations 
Memorandum: 
Section 4.E and 
accompanying 
Form No. 5 
Article 22(3): 
A Contracting State may declare that under its non-
Convention law an attachment of intermediated securities 
of an account holder made against or so as to affect a 
person other than the relevant intermediary has effect also 
against the relevant intermediary. Any such declaration 
shall identify that other person by name or description and 
shall specify the time at which such an attachment 
becomes effective against the relevant intermediary. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 22-19 to 22-
22 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 203 to 208 
Declarations 
Memorandum: 
Section 4.F and 
accompanying 
Form No. 6 
Article 23(2)(d): 
Paragraph 1 [which states that “[a]n intermediary is 
neither bound nor entitled to give effect to any instructions 
in relation to intermediated securities of an account 
holder given by any person other than that account 
holder”] is subject to: […] (d) any applicable provision 
of the non-Convention law; and  
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 23-26 to 23-
27 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 106, 114-
117 
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Article 24(3): 
If at any time the requirements of paragraph 1 are not 
complied with, the intermediary must within the time 
permitted by the non-Convention law take such action as 
is necessary to ensure compliance with those 
requirements. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 24-20 to 24-
21 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 217  
Article 24(4): 
This Article does not affect any provision of the non-
Convention law, or, to the extent permitted by the non-
Convention law, any provision of the uniform rules of a 
securities settlement system or of the account agreement, 
relating to the method of complying with the requirements 
of this Article or the allocation of the cost of ensuring 
compliance with those requirements or otherwise relating 
to the consequences of failure to comply with those 
requirements. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 24-22 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 218  
Article 25(3): 
The allocation required by paragraph 1 shall be effected 
by the non-Convention law and, to the extent required or 
permitted by the non-Convention law, by arrangements 
made by the relevant intermediary. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 25-15 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 213 
Article 25(5):  
A Contracting State may declare that, if all securities and 
intermediated securities held by an intermediary for its 
account holders, other than itself, are in segregated form 
under arrangements such as are referred to in paragraph 
4, under its non-Convention law the allocation required 
by paragraph 1 applies only to those securities and 
intermediated securities and does not apply to securities 
and intermediated securities held by an intermediary for 
its own account. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 25-19 to 25-
20 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 212, 215, 
262, 270  
Declarations 
Memorandum: 
Section 4.G and 
accompanying 
Form No. 7 
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Article 26(3): 
To the extent permitted by the non-Convention law, if the 
intermediary is the operator of a securities settlement 
system and the uniform rules of the system make provision 
in case of a shortfall, the shortfall shall be borne in the 
manner so provided. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 26-12 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 221  
Article 28(1) and (2): 
(1) The obligations of an intermediary under this 
Convention, including the manner in which an 
intermediary complies with its obligations, may be 
specified by the non-Convention law and, to the extent 
permitted by the non-Convention law, the account 
agreement or the uniform rules of a securities settlement 
system.  
(2) If the substance of any such obligation is specified by 
the non-Convention law or, to the extent permitted by the 
non-Convention law, the account agreement or the 
uniform rules of a securities settlement system, 
compliance with it satisfies that obligation. 
 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 28-10 to 28-
13 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 106, 118 to 
119, 221  
 
Article 28(3): 
The liability of an intermediary in relation to its 
obligations is governed by the non-Convention law and, 
to the extent permitted by the non-Convention law, the 
account agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 28-15 to 28-
17 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Paras 106, 120 to 
122, 221  
Article 31(2): 
Nothing in this Chapter impairs any provision of the non-
Convention law which provides for additional rights or 
powers of a collateral taker or additional obligations of a 
collateral provider. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 31-17 to 31-
18 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 286  
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Article 34(4): 
The exercise of a right of use shall not render invalid or 
unenforceable any right of the collateral taker under the 
relevant security collateral agreement or the non-
Convention law. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 34-17 
Legislative 
Guide: 
Para 278 
 
Article 35: 
Articles 33 and 34 do not affect any requirement of the 
non-Convention law to the effect that the realisation or 
valuation of collateral securities or the calculation of any 
obligations must be conducted in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 35-8 to 35-
11 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 287  
Article 36(1)(a)(iii): 
If a collateral agreement includes: (a) an obligation to 
deliver additional collateral securities: […] (iii) to the 
extent permitted by the non-Convention law, in any other 
circumstances specified in the collateral agreement; or 
 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 36-21 
Legislative 
Guide:  
Para 285  
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ANNEX 2 
REFERENCES TO “APPLICABLE LAW” 
References in the Convention For discussion 
Article 2(a):  
This Convention applies whenever: (a) the applicable 
conflict of laws rules designate the law in force in a 
Contracting State as the applicable law; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 2-6 to 2-9 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 296 
Article 3: 
If the law of the forum State is not the applicable law, 
the forum State shall apply the Convention and the 
declarations, if any, made by the Contracting State the 
law of which applies, and without regard to the 
declarations, if any, made by the forum State. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 3-5 to 3-7 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 299 
Article 9(1)(c):  
The credit of securities to a securities account confers 
on the account holder: […] (c) the right, by instructions 
to the relevant intermediary, to cause the securities to 
be held otherwise than through a securities account, to 
the extent permitted by the applicable law, the terms of 
the securities and, to the extent permitted by the non-
Convention law, the account agreement or the uniform 
rules of a securities settlement system; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 9-8, 9-21 to 
9-26 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 82, 236  
Article 9(2)(b): 
Unless otherwise provided in this Convention: […] (b) 
the rights referred to in paragraph 1(a) may be 
exercised against the relevant intermediary or the issuer 
of the securities, or both, in accordance with this 
Convention, the terms of the securities and the 
applicable law; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 9-17 
Legislative Guide: 
Paras 100 to 101  
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Article 12(8): 
The applicable law determines in what circumstances a 
non-consensual security interest in intermediated 
securities may arise and become effective against third 
parties. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 12-20 
Legislative Guide: 
Para 159  
Article 18(4): 
If an acquirer is not protected by paragraph 1 or 
paragraph 2, the applicable law determines the rights 
and liabilities, if any, of the acquirer. 
 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 18-17 to 18-
18 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 178  
Article 19(5): 
A non-consensual security interest in intermediated 
securities arising under the applicable law has such 
priority as is afforded to it by that law. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 19-15 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 192 to 195  
Article 19(6): 
As between persons entitled to any interests referred to 
in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 and, to the extent permitted by 
the applicable law, paragraph 5, the priorities provided 
by this Article may be varied by agreement between 
those persons, but any such agreement does not affect 
third parties. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 19-16 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 187  
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ANNEX 3 
REFERENCES TO RULES RELATING TO INSOLVENCY 
 
References in the Convention For discussion 
Preamble, recital 9: 
Emphasising that this Convention is not intended to 
harmonise or otherwise affect insolvency law except to 
the extent necessary to provide for the effectiveness of 
rights and interests governed by this Convention, 
Official 
CommentarY:  
Para P-10 
Article 1(h): 
“insolvency proceeding” means a collective judicial or 
administrative proceeding, including an interim 
proceeding, in which the assets and affairs of the debtor 
are subject to control or supervision by a court or other 
competent authority for the purpose of reorganisation 
or liquidation; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 1-46 
Article 1(i): 
“insolvency administrator” means a person (including 
a debtor in possession if applicable) authorised to 
administer an insolvency proceeding, including one 
authorised on an interim basis; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 1-47 
Article 11(2): 
No further step is necessary, or may be required by the 
non-Convention law or any other rule of law applicable 
in an insolvency proceeding, to render the acquisition of 
intermediated securities effective against third parties. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 11-17 to 11-
19 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 125, 131 
Article 12(2): 
No further step is necessary, or may be required by the 
non-Convention law or any other rule of law applicable 
in an insolvency proceeding, to render the interest 
effective against third parties. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 12-12 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 138 et seq.  
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Article 14(2): 
Paragraph 1 [which states that “[r]ights and interests 
that have become effective against third parties under 
Article 11 or Article 12 are effective against the 
insolvency administrator and creditors in any 
insolvency proceeding] does not affect the application 
of any substantive or procedural rule of law applicable 
by virtue of an insolvency proceeding, such as any rule 
relating to: (a) the ranking of categories of claims; (b) 
the avoidance of a transaction as a preference or a 
transfer in fraud of creditors; or (c) the enforcement of 
rights to property that is under the control or 
supervision of the insolvency administrator. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 14-6 to 14-11 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 253  
Article 21: 
(1) Rights and interests of account holders of a relevant 
intermediary that have become effective against third 
parties under Article 11 and interests granted by such 
account holders that have become effective under 
Article 12 are effective against the insolvency 
administrator and creditors in any insolvency 
proceeding in relation to the relevant intermediary or in 
relation to any other person responsible for the 
performance of a function of the relevant intermediary 
under Article 7.  
(2) Paragraph 1 does not affect: (a) any rule of law 
applicable in the insolvency proceeding relating to the 
avoidance of a transaction as a preference or a transfer 
in fraud of creditors; or (b) any rule of procedure 
relating to the enforcement of rights to property that is 
under the control or supervision of the insolvency 
administrator. 
(3) Nothing in this Article impairs the effectiveness of an 
interest in intermediated securities against the 
insolvency administrator and creditors in any 
insolvency proceeding referred to in paragraph 1, if that 
interest has become effective by any method referred to 
in Article 13.  
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 21-10 to 21-
14 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 256 to 258  
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Article 26(1): 
This Article applies in any insolvency proceeding in 
relation to an intermediary unless otherwise provided 
by any conflicting rule applicable in that proceeding.  
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 26-1, 26-9 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 259  
Article 27: 
To the extent permitted by the law governing a system, 
the following provisions shall have effect 
notwithstanding the commencement of an insolvency 
proceeding in relation to the operator of that system or 
any participant in that system and notwithstanding any 
invalidation, reversal or revocation that would 
otherwise occur under any rule applicable in an 
insolvency proceeding: (a) any provision of the uniform 
rules of a securities settlement system or of a securities 
clearing system in so far as that provision precludes the 
revocation of any instruction given by a participant in 
the system for making a disposition of intermediated 
securities, or for making a payment relating to an 
acquisition or disposition of intermediated securities, 
after the time at which that instruction is treated under 
the rules of the system as having been entered 
irrevocably into the system; (b) any provision of the 
uniform rules of a securities settlement system in so far 
as that provision precludes the invalidation or reversal 
of a debit or credit of securities to, or a designating 
entry or removal of a designating entry in, a securities 
account that forms part of the system after the time at 
which that debit, credit, designating entry or removal of 
a designating entry is treated under the rules of the 
system as not liable to be reversed. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 27-1 to 27-3, 
27-19 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 223  
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ANNEX 4 
REFERENCES TO UNIFORM RULES OF SCSs AND SSSs 
References in the Convention For discussion 
Article 1(l): 
“designating entry” means an entry in a securities 
account made in favour of a person (including the 
relevant intermediary) other than the account holder 
in relation to intermediated securities, which, under 
the account agreement, a control agreement, the 
uniform rules of a securities settlement system or the 
non-Convention law, has either or both of the 
following effects: 
[…] 
(ii) that the relevant intermediary is obliged to comply 
with any instructions given by that person in relation 
to the intermediated securities as to which the entry is 
made in such circumstances and as to such matters as 
may be provided by the account agreement, a control 
agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system, without any further consent of the 
account holder; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-50 to 1-54 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 141 to 146  
Article 1(n): 
”securities settlement system” means a system that: (i) 
settles, or clears and settles, securities transactions; 
(ii) is operated by a central bank or central banks or 
is subject to regulation, supervision or oversight by a 
governmental or public authority in relation to its 
rules; and (iii) has been identified as a securities 
settlement system in a declaration made by the 
Contracting State the law of which governs the system 
on the ground of the reduction of risk to the stability 
of the financial system; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-61 to 1-88 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 70, 220 et 
seq.  
Declarations 
Memorandum: 
Section 4.A and 
accompanying 
Form No. 1 
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Article 1(o): 
”securities clearing system” means a system that: (i) 
clears, but does not settle, securities transactions 
through a central counterparty or otherwise; (ii) is 
operated by a central bank or central banks or is 
subject to regulation, supervision or oversight by a 
governmental or public authority in relation to its 
rules; and (iii) has been identified as a securities 
clearing system in a declaration made by the 
Contracting State the law of which governs the system 
on the ground of the reduction of risk to the stability 
of the financial system; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-89 to 1-99 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 70, 220 et 
seq.  
Declarations 
Memorandum: 
Section 4.A and 
accompanying 
Form No. 1 
Article 1(p): 
”uniform rules” means, in relation to a securities 
settlement system or securities clearing system, rules 
of that system (including system rules constituted by 
the non-Convention law) which are common to the 
participants or to a class of participants and are 
publicly accessible.  
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 1-100 to 1-
107 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 75  
Article 9(1)(c): 
The credit of securities to a securities account confers 
on the account holder: […] (c) the right, by 
instructions to the relevant intermediary, to cause the 
securities to be held otherwise than through a 
securities account, to the extent permitted by the 
applicable law, the terms of the securities and, to the 
extent permitted by the non-Convention law, the 
account agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system; 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 9-24 to 9-26 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 82, 236  
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Article 10(2)(c), (e) and (f): 
An intermediary must, at least: […] (c) give effect to 
any instructions given by the account holder or other 
authorised person, as provided by the non-Convention 
law, the account agreement or the uniform rules of a 
securities settlement system; […] (e) regularly pass on 
to account holders information relating to 
intermediated securities, including information 
necessary for account holders to exercise rights, if 
provided by the non-Convention law, the account 
agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system; and (f) regularly pass on to account 
holders dividends and other distributions received in 
relation to intermediated securities, if provided by the 
non-Convention law, the account agreement or the 
uniform rules of a securities settlement system. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 10-13, 10-15 
to 10-17 
Legislative Guide: 
Paras 100 to 119, 
221  
Article 15(2): 
The non-Convention law and, to the extent permitted 
by the non-Convention law, the account agreement or 
the uniform rules of a securities settlement system 
determine the consequences of: an unauthorised debit; 
an unauthorised removal of a designating entry; 
subject to Article 18(2), an unauthorised designating 
entry; or any other unauthorised disposition. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 15-18 to 15-
19 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 165 to 171  
Article 16: 
Subject to Article 18, the non-Convention law and, to 
the extent permitted by the non-Convention law, the 
account agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system determine whether and in what 
circumstances a debit, credit, designating entry or 
removal of a designating entry is invalid, is liable to 
be reversed or may be subject to a condition, and the 
consequences thereof. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 16-1 and 16-
22 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 165 to 171  
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Article 18(5): 
To the extent permitted by the non-Convention law, 
paragraph 2 (which states that “[u]nless an acquirer 
actually knows or ought to know, at the relevant time, 
of an earlier defective entry: (a) the credit or interest 
is not rendered invalid, ineffective against third 
parties or liable to be reversed as a result of that 
defective entry; and (b) the acquirer is not liable to 
anyone who would benefit from the invalidity or 
reversal of that defective entry”) is subject to any 
provision of the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system or of the account agreement. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 18-11 and 18-
12 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 172, 221  
Article 23(2)(e): 
Paragraph 1 [which states that “[a]n intermediary is 
neither bound nor entitled to give effect to any 
instructions in relation to intermediated securities of 
an account holder given by any person other than that 
account holder”] is subject to […] (e) if the 
intermediary is the operator of a securities settlement 
system, the uniform rules of that system. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 23-28 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 221  
Article 24(4): 
This Article does not affect any provision of the non-
Convention law, or, to the extent permitted by the non-
Convention law, any provision of the uniform rules of 
a securities settlement system or of the account 
agreement, relating to the method of complying with 
the requirements of this Article or the allocation of the 
cost of ensuring compliance with those requirements 
or otherwise relating to the consequences of failure to 
comply with those requirements. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 24-22 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 218  
Article 26(3): 
To the extent permitted by the non-Convention law, if 
the intermediary is the operator of a securities 
settlement system and the uniform rules of the system 
make provision in case of a shortfall, the shortfall 
shall be borne in the manner so provided. 
Official 
Commentary:  
Para 26-12 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 221  
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Article 27: 
To the extent permitted by the law governing a system, 
the following provisions shall have effect 
notwithstanding the commencement of an insolvency 
proceeding in relation to the operator of that system 
or any participant in that system and notwithstanding 
any invalidation, reversal or revocation that would 
otherwise occur under any rule applicable in an 
insolvency proceeding: 
(a) any provision of the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system or of a securities clearing system in 
so far as that provision precludes the revocation of any 
instruction given by a participant in the system for 
making a disposition of intermediated securities, or 
for making a payment relating to an acquisition or 
disposition of intermediated securities, after the time 
at which that instruction is treated under the rules of 
the system as having been entered irrevocably into the 
system; 
(b) any provision of the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system in so far as that provision precludes 
the invalidation or reversal of a debit or credit of 
securities to, or a designating entry or removal of a 
designating entry in, a securities account that forms 
part of the system after the time at which that debit, 
credit, designating entry or removal of a designating 
entry is treated under the rules of the system as not 
liable to be reversed. 
 
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 27-1 to 27-8 
Legislative Guide:  
Para 223  
Article 28(1), (2) and (3): 
(1) The obligations of an intermediary under this 
Convention, including the manner in which an 
intermediary complies with its obligations, may be 
specified by the non-Convention law and, to the extent 
permitted by the non-Convention law, the account 
agreement or the uniform rules of a securities 
settlement system.  
Official 
Commentary:  
Paras 28-1 to 28-3 
Legislative Guide:  
Paras 106 to 122, 
221  
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(2) If the substance of any such obligation is specified 
by the non-Convention law or, to the extent permitted 
by the non-Convention law, the account agreement or 
the uniform rules of a securities settlement system, 
compliance with it satisfies that obligation. 
(3) The liability of an intermediary in relation to its 
obligations is governed by the non-Convention law 
and, to the extent permitted by the non-Convention 
law, the account agreement or the uniform rules of a 
securities settlement system. 
 
 
